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THE MISSISSIPPI

CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.-- VIII.

THE MISSISSIPPI

BY

FRANCIS VINTON GREENE,

LIBirt. OF KNOIMEEB8, U. S. ABUT ; LATE MILITABT ATTACH^ TO THE

U. B. LEGATION AT BT. PETEBSBUBG ; AUTHOR OV " THE BU88IAN

ABMT AND ITS OAMFAIGMB IN TUBKKT IN 1877-78," AND

or "ABMY LITE IN BU8SIA"

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1882

/ ^16 fy^

/

< A

^^'-r.^p,0^

{^nh^^

GOPTBIORT BY

CHARLES SORIBNEB'B B0N8
1888

Trow's

Printing and Bookbinding Company

301-913 East xaM Street

NEW YORK

PREFACE.

The following pages are founded upon a careful study of
the Becords of the War of the Bebellion, now in course of
publication by the War Department, and not upon the recol-
lection of personal experience, as it was not my fortune to
belong to the generation which fought the Great War. I
have earnestly endeavored to make them accurate, and be-
lieve that they contain no statement of fact which cannot be
substantiated by the Becords. Such interpretation as has
been put upon these facts is, with all deference, submitted
to the judgment of the candid reader.

I desire to express my sense of obligation to Colonel B.
N. Scott, U. S. Army, in charge of the publication of the
Becords, for his kindness, not only in affording me unre-
stricted access to the Archives, but also in giving me infor-
mation, which his thorough knowledge of the subject alone
could give, to assist my search through them.

Washington. AnguBt 31, 1883.

CONTENTS.

PAOB

List of Maps, zi

INTRODUCTOBY, 1

CHAPTER L
Thb Fibbt Yeab's Operations, . . ... 4

CHAPTER n.

lUKA AND COBINTH, 29

CHAPTER III.
Thb Fibst Moyb against Yicksbubg, .... 55

CHAPTER IV.
Bayou Expeditions, 01

CHAPTER V.
Thb Campaigit m Bbab of Vicksbubg, . . ..185

viii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VI.

PlOB

ThB SIBOB AMD SURBBNDER OF VlCKSBUBG, . . .174

CHAPTER VIL
Port Hudson, 209

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCLUDIMO OPBBATIONSy 234

APPENDIX A.

SUMMABT OF PBINCIFAL EvBKTS, 239

APPENDIX B.

Rbtubks of Hallbck^s Abmt at Cobikth, Mat 31,
1863, 243

APPENDIX C.

Retubns of Confbdbbatb Armt at Corimth, Mat 28,
1862, 244

APPENDIX D.

COBBESPONDBKCB WITH REFERENCE TO THE DISPERSION
OF HALLBCK'S AbMT AFTEB THB CAPTURE OF COR-
INTH, 245

APPENDIX. B.

Organization of thb Armt of thb Tennessee, April
' 30, 18C3, . 248

CONTENTS. ix

APPENDIX P.

PIGS

Oboanization of Troops mr the Dbpartmbnt of the
MissiSBiFPi AND East Louisiana, April 30, 1863, • 255

APPENDIX G.

CORRBSPOKDENCB BETWEEN GENERAL GRANT AND GBN-

bbal Banks Relative to the Go-opbbation of
THEIB Abmies, • . 258

APPENDIX H.
Union Losses in the Yicesbubg Campaign, . . . 268

Index, 265

LIST OF MAPS.

PAOS

The Theatre op War is the West, 1863-68, Frmtispiece.

Memphis to Iuka, 1862, 85

luKA, September 19, 1862, 40

Corinth, October 3-4, 1862, 46

Memphis to Vickbburg, 1862-1863, 57

Chickasaw Bluffs, December 29, 1862, ... 76
Arkansas Post, January 11, 1863, . . . ... 85

Campaign against Vicksburg, 1863, . . to face 135

Champion's Hill, May 16, 1863, 153

Siege of Vicksburg, 1863, .... to face 174
Operations in Louisiana, February to July, 1863, . 212

Port Hudson, 1863, 226

Helena, July 4, 1863, 285

THE MISSISSIPPI.

INTRODUCTORY.

The military operations of the Civil War were practically
limited on the west by the irregular line nmning near the
95th meridian, which forms the western boundary of the
States between Louisiana and Minnesota. The territory of
the United States east of that line contains about l,130,00i0
square miles ; and it would be divided into two parts, almost
exactly equal in size, by an irregular line from west to east
following the course of portions of the Missouri, Mississippi,
Ohio, and Potomac Rivers. This was the very line which
upon tbe outbreak of war became the frontier between the
two hostile sections.

Singularly enough, in a territory of such vast proportions,
the capital cities of both sections were situated on the same
slope of a range of mountains not far from the coast, and
both were very dose to the common frontier, being, in fact,
only 115 miles distant from one another. The possession of
these capitals was, next to the destruction of armies, the ob-
ject constantly sought for in the East ; for four long years,
therefore, excepting the expeditions which gained certain
points along the sea-coast, but made no impression on the
interior of the Confederacy, the tide of war in the East
VIII —1

THE MISSISSIPPI.

INTRODUCTORY.

The military operations of the Civil War were practically
limited on the west by the irregular line running near the
95th meridian, which forms the western boundary of the
States between Louisiana and Minnesota. The territory of
the United States east of that line contains about lyl30,00<0
square miles ; and it would be divided into two parts, almost
exactly equal in size, by an irregular line from west to east
following the course of portions of the Missouri, Mississippi,
Ohio, and Potomac Rivers. This was the very line which
upon the outbreak of war became the frontier between the
two hostile sections.

Singularly enough, in « territory of such vast proportions,
the capital cities of both sections were situated on the same
slope of a range of mountains not far from the coast, and
both were very close to the common frontier, being, in fact,
only 115 miles distant from one another. The possession of
these capitals was, next to the destruction of armies, the ob-
ject constantly sought for in the East ; for four long years,
therefore, excepting the expeditions which gained certain
points along the sea-coast, but made no impression on the
interior of the Confederacy, the tide of war in the East
VIII— 1

2 THE MISSISSIPPL

surged back and forth across a small portion of Virginia,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania, tmtil the end finally came at
Appomattox. The site - of Lee's surrender was bnt little
more than one hundred miles distant from the first battle-

m

field of Bull Run.

In the West the course of the war was entirely diSerent ;
beyond the Alle^anies there was no one point whieh called
for such extraordinary defensive efforts as those which were
expended on Richmond, nor was there any Confederate gen-
eral who possessed the vigorous defensive skill and resource
of Lee. There the great territorial object was the posses-
jsion of the Mississippi Biver ; by gaining and holding which
the Union armies would possess a great natural highway
and line of communications for future operations, and would
cut off the Confederacy from the fertile resources of Arkan-
sas, Louisiana, and Texas. For two years and three months
after the fall of Fort Sumter both sides strove incessantly—
the one to gain, the other to hold, the control of the great
river. The contest was finally decided at Yicksburg and
"Port Hudson in July, 1863, and then "the Father of Waters
again went unvexed to the sea."

Once faiiiy possessed of the river, the Western armies
were free to concentrate and move to the interior without
fear of exposing their flank and rear, and they moved on by
Chattanooga, Atlanta, Savannah, and Goldsboro, defeating
hostile armies and eating out the vitals of the country, until
the end saw them almost join hands with their comrades in
Virginia. In these Western operations, which began at St.
Louis in 1861, and ended near Baleigh in 1865, the tide of
conquest was twice met by a counter-current of invasion
under Bragg and Hood, but in neither case was more than
a portion of the Northern armies swept back. The main
force kept steadily onward, and it was the unparalleled

INTRODUCTORY. 3

good fortune of the Aimy of the Tennessee to be constantly
advancing, now faster, now slower, against retreating armies
dnring fonr years of nearly incessant combat, and to accom-
plish a forward conquering march of well-nigh three thou-
sand miles, the like of which has not been seen in civilized
lands during the Chrigtian era.

Of the great chain of events here roughly indicated, those
links which eorer tbe movemeiitfi on the MJimissippi are to
be described in the following pages.

ft

CHAPTER I

THB FIRST TEAR'S OPERATIONS.

The straggle for the control of the Mississippi began at
St. Louis, in those exciting events of May, 1861, which have
been so well described in the first volume of this series.
By the energy and courage of Nathaniel Lyon and Frank P.
Blair, Jr., this city was saved to the Union cause, and the
secessionists were driven to the western and southwestern
portions of Missouri, where the first military operations of
the West were initiated by Jackson, Price, and McCullough.
At the same time M. JefEl Thompson, one of the secession
leaders of Missouri, was preparing to dispute the posses-
sion of the southeastern part of the State along the Mis-
sissippi. He first appears in the records at the village of
Pocahontas, in Arkansas, a few miles south of the Missouri
line, whence, on July 2d, he addressed a letter to Jefferson
Davis, offering his services to the Confederacy, and stating
that << Missouri has no great leader in whom the people have
confidence,*' and "the only way the fifty to one hundred
thousand gallant young soldiers can be made available, and
the rich prize of this great State secured, is by a powerful
demonstration from this portion of the country.*' He had
previously been commissioned a brigadier-general in the
Missouri State Guard, and had raised and brought with
him a small force of militia ; but the Confederacy does not
appear to have highly appreciated his fitness for a great

THE FIRST YBAB'S OPERATIONa $

'jLeaderi for on July 22d, W. J. Hardee, Brigadier-General^ (X
-S. A., assumed command of the District of Upper Arkansas^
and five days later fixed his headquarters at Pocahontas.
Thompson, however, was subject only to the orders of Gov*
emor Jackson, of MissoorL At the same time Maj.-Gen. L.
Polk was in command of " Department No. 2,'* which em*
braced West Tennessee and the State of Mississippi,^ with
headquarters at Memphis. On July 27th, he ordered Brig.-
Gen. Gideon J. Pillow to proceed from Memphis to New
Madrid, with a force of six thousand men, denominated
'^The Army of Liberation.*' The total strength of th^
forces of Pillow, Hardee, and Thompson was from twelve
thousand to fifteen thousand men, and it was their inten-
.tion, so soon as they should be reinforced to a sufficient
strength, to advance and take CSape Girardeau, a command-
ing bluff on the west side of the river, about one hundi'ed
miles below St. Louis; thence, in connection with other
droops of Polk on the east bank, they hoped to gain posr
session of Oairo, at the mouth of the Ohio ; and thus solidly
established on the Mississippi they designed to move north*
ward and westward to the Lron Mountain Bailroad and liber-
Ate the State.

These expectations were, however, not realized. On Au*
fpotst 28th, Brig. -Gen. U. S. Grant, then serving at Jefferson
City, Mo., was ordered by Fremont to proceed forthwith
to CSape Girardeau and assume command of all troops in the
vicinity of the mouth of the Ohio. He was specially di-
rected to^ fortify Cairo, Bird's Point, and Cape Girardeau,
to destroy all fortifications erecting by the Confederates^
and to drive their forces away from the river. Grant
reached Cape Girardeau on August 30th, and proceeded to

> Extended on September Sd to Include Arkansas **and all militaiy operations
inlUasMnrL'*

6 THE MI8SIS3IPPL

Cairo on September 2d. He ftrriTed none too toon. For
ft few days before his arrival, Pillow had abandoned his pro-
ject of liberating Missouri, and had suggested to Polk that
ihe high blnff on the Kentucky bank at Columbns, abont
fifteen miles below Cairo, should be seized and fortified for
defence ; and Polk, having made up his mind that the neu-
trality of Kentucky could not longer be allowed to interfere
with miUtary operations, had left Memphis and moved up
ihe river. At New Madrid he took Pillow's troops with
him, increasing his strength to about 15,000 men; with
these he took possession of Columbus on September 4th,
and immediately began fortifying it, while, at the same
time, he sent a detachment toward Paducah, at the month
of the Tennessee Biver. Grant heard of this on the next
day, September '5th, and that night started from Cairo, with
two regiments on transports, for Paducah, where he arrived
the next morning, just in time to forestall the action of the
Confederates. On returning to Cairo, on the 6th, be re^
ceived an order from Fremont, dated the previous day, to
seize and fortify the Kentucky shore opposite Cairo. Gnuit
immediately executed this order.

These early events are related somewhat in detail, beoaina
they resulted in giving the Federal foroes posseeidon of two
points — ^the junctions of the T^messee and Ohio^ and of the
Ohio and Mississippi Bivers^which controlled the water
highway from Cincinnati to St. Xionis, and were therefore of
vital importance to the Union cause.

During the autunm and winter months of 1861, both sides
were gathering strength, but their relative positiosis re-
mained unchanged. On December 81st, Grant's return of
" present for duty " aggregated 14,374 men, and they were
stationed at Cape Girardeau and Cairo, and on the Missouri
and Kentucky shores, opposite the latter point. On the

THB FIRST YBAB'S OPBRATIONa 7

same date, Polk's reinm of " present for duty " was (after
deducting the 1,372 at Fort Henrj) 19,661 ; the greater part
of them were stationed at Oolumbus, and the rest at New
Madrid, Fort Pillow, and Memphis. His first point of de-
fence was on the bluff at Columbus, which had been so
extensively fortified that it was the habit to speak of it in
reports — ^as later of Vicksburg and other points — as 'Hhe
Gibraltar of the West." The next was at New Madrid and
Island No. 10, opposite the line between Kentucky and
Tennessee, where fortifications were begun during the last
day of August. Eighty miles farther down the river, and
about the same distance above Memphis, was situated Fort
Pillow, on a lofty bluff between the Hatchie Biver and
the Mississippi. The fortifications at this point were very
extensive, consisting of a water battery at the base of the
bluffy and of several small detached works, and a continu-
ous line of strong intrenchments, four to five miles in length,
on the ridge. The total length of intrenchments was esti*
mated at ten miles, and their armament was thirty-two guns*
Twelve miles below Fort Pillow was a smaller work, called
Fort Bandolph. In the immediate vicinity of Memphis there
were no ^gible sites for fortification which would not ex-
pose the city to bombardment and destruction, and it was
not fortified. Between Memphis and New Orleans there
were no fortifications in 1861.

It was not, however, with land defences and armies alone
that either side purposed to contest the mastery of the great
river. On both sides, and especially on the Union side,
the navy was destined to take part in the contest, by means of
novel and peculiarly constructed boats, which, carrying large
guns for that period, and acting as siege artillery of great
power and extraordinary molnlity, were to accompany the
iKtmies in sM their movements, and render invaluable service.

8 THE MISSISSIPPI.

' On the Union side, the plans for these vessels were ma-
tared early in 1861. After much consultation, in which
General Totten, Gteneral Meigs, Captain Eads, Naval-Gon-
stmctor Lenthall, and others presented their views, plans
and specifications wiere drawn np, and the Quartermaster-
General was authorized to advertise for proposals^ Captain
Eads was the lowest bidder, and a contract was made with
him on August 5, 1861, for the construction of seven gun-
boats, to be completed in sixty-five days. These boats were
named aft^ river cities, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, St. Louis,
liouisville, Cairo, Carondelet, and Mound City, though,
from their peculiar appearance, they were commonly known
as the " turtles.*' They were in every way formidable ves-
sels; each was 175 feet in length, 50 feet in breadth, 6 feet
in depth of hold, and 512 tons in burthen. The hull was
fiat-bottomed, with sides inclined at an angle of forty-five
degrees, and projecting but one foot above the water. On
the hull was constructed a casemate, or box, 150 by 50 feet,
with inclined sides 8 feet high, inside of which were the guns
and machinery. This casemate was constructed of wood,
and plated with 2i inches of iron on the forward end, and
on each side opposite the engine. Each was propelled by a
single wheel near the stem, had a speed of nine miles per
hour, and carried an armament of 13 guns, principally 6-inch
rifies. They were all delivered to the Government at St.
Louis, on December 5, 1861. In addition to these, there
were two other iron-clads, the Essex and Benton, of 1,000
tons burthen, which were originally snag-boats, and had
been purchased by Fremont and rebuilt at St. Louis. They
also were ready on December 5, 1861.

Prior to the construction of these boats, Commander John
Bodgers, of the Navy, had been sent to the West, and had
purchased on the Ohio Biver three ordinary passenger

THE FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS. 9

boats, the Tyler (afterward called Taylor), Lexington, and-
Conestoga, of 400 to 600 tons each, and of great speed ; and
had rebuilt them for naval purposes, by tearing off all the
ordinary top-work, and building a wooden rampart to protect
the gnns, wheels, and machinery. They were not armored,
but carried a battery of 9 guns each.

In the spring of 1862, Mr. Charles Ellet, a distinguished
engineer, impressed upon the War Department the impor-
tance of having a class of vessels which should carry only a
few light howitzers for defence, and should rely for offensive
strength upon their power as rams. He was appointed a
colonel in the army and authorized by Secretary Stanton
to proceed to the West, and purchase and reconstruct on
the Ohio Biver such vessels as were suitable for his purpose.
The crews of his vessels were supplemented by a force of -
volunteers serving in the army, under command of his
brother, Lieut.-Gol. Alfred W. EUet. Colonel EUet bought
and rebuilt four side-wheel and four stem-wheel vessels,
of sizes varying from 200 to 400 tons, and appeared in. the
Mississippi with his fleet in May, 1862.

Still another type of vessel was found in the mortar-boats,
which were scows of sufficient size to carry one 13-inch mor-
tar. They were towed from point to x)oint by tugboats.

A considerable number of vessels of various classes were
also captured from the enemy, so that in the summer of
1862 the fleet in the upper Mississippi contained 45 vessels,
with an aggregate tonnage of 19,464 tons and an armament
of 143 guns, in addition to 38 mortar boats.

On the Confederate side the preparations for naval strength
were hardly less complete. Several boats were bought or
seized on the Mississippi, between Memphis and New Or-
leans, and converted to military use ; generally by taking off
ererpMng above the hall, and constructing on it a woodeQ

10 THE MISStSSIPFl

rampart, plated with railroad iron. Though the plating on
these vessels was heavier than on the Northern ships, jet
their oonstmction was not as strong, their armament was in-
ferior, and their machinery was constantly breaking down.
The Ck>nf ederates also had several iron-clad rams of a
cigar shape.

The beginning of the year 18d2 f oond both sides fairly well
prepared for active operations. Grant commanded at the
month of the Ohio, and had possession of the shores of both
rivers at that point, and of the months of the Tennessee and
Cumberland Bivers higher np. Opposed to him was a force
nnder Polk, a few miles down the Mississippi at Golnmbns,
and another at Forts Henry and Donelson, a short distance
np the T^uiessee and Cumberland rivers. The right of the
Confederate line of defence was at Bowling Green, where
the railroads from Lonisville to Kashville and to Memphis di-
verge. On January 30th, Halleck ordered Grant to attack this
line at its centre, i.e., at Forts Henry and Donelson, and im-
mediately upon receipt of the order Grant started np the Ten-,
nessee Biver with a force of 17,000 men, embarked on trans-
ports and escorted by a squadron of four armored and three
unarmored gunboats nnder Commodore A. H. Foote. Fort
Henry was captured on February 6th, and Fort Donelson on
the 16th. The Confederate line was completely broken, and
the establishment of Grant's force on the railroads in rear of
Columbus rendered the speedy evacuation of that place a
necessity. As soon as authentic information of the fall of
Fort Donelson was 'received on the 18th, General G. T.
Beauregard, who was then at Jackson, Tennessee, on his way
from Virginia to assume command at Columbas, telegraphed
to the Adjutant General at Bichmond that Columbas was
untenable and advised its abandonment. The Seoveftsiy of

THE FIRST TiBAB*S OPERATIONS. H

War replied on the following day that its evacuation was de-
cided Ujion, and on Febmaiy 20th he sent orders to that
effect to Polk.

The destruction of this first line of Confederate defence
in the West carried consternation throughout the South ; it
was seen at once that the future safety of the Confederacy
depended upon holding the Memphis and Charleston Bail>
road ; it was therefore determined to form a second line of
defence with the left on the Mississippi River at Port Pillow
or Memphis, the centre at Corinth or near the bend of the
Tennessee Biver, and the right at Chattanooga ; the position
at Island No. 10 and New Madrid, which had already been
partially fortified, was to be retained as an outpost in ad-
vance of the left, but, as the despatches show, with no great
reliance upon its capacity for defence. Polk was ordered to
send thither from Columbus all his. heavy guns, but only a
portion of his troops ; the rest being kept at Humboldt, a
central point on the Mobile and OhioBailroad. Beauregard
appears for a moment to have had a visionary idea of assum-
ing the offensive, for on February 21st he addressed a cir-
cular letter to the €k>vemors of Tennessee, Louisiana, and
Mississippi, calling upon each of them for 5,000 troops ; and
on the same day he also wrote to Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dom,
who commanded in Arkansas, asking for his co-operation.
To the latter he said : ** I have just called on the Governors of
Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi for 5,000 men from
each State. I have 15,000 disposable for the field. If you
could certainly join me, tna New Madrid or Columbus, with
10,000 more, we could take the field with 40,000 men ; take
Cairo, Paducah, the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumber-
land Bivers, and most probably be able to take also St.
Louis by the river. What say you to this brilliant pro-
gnunme^ which I know is fully practicable if we can get th^

12 THE MISSISSIPPI

forces ? At all events we must do something or die in the
attempt ; otherwise all will shortly be lost." The Gk)yer-
nors of the States promptly responded with promises of
troops, but General A. S. Johnston, who was in chief com-
mand in the West, does not appear to have attached much
importance to the ''brilliant programme." His practical
mind was engaged in the problem of collecting as strong a
force as possible on the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad,
for the purpose of there fighting a decisive battle, on the
issne of which all plans for the future must depend.

Polk meanwhile was removing his stores and guns, 140 in
number, from Columbus to Island No. 10; on March 2d,
eveiything having been removed except two guns in a re-
mote outwork, he set fire to all his buildings and took his
departure, one portion of his command going by transports
to New Madrid, and the other by land along the Mobile
Bailroad. Foote's squadron, accompanied by two regiments
imder Brig.-Gbn. W. T. Sherman, took possession early on
the morning of the 4th.

Polk's movements were probably hastened at the last by
the advance of Brig. -Gen. John Pope, who had organized a
force of about 20,000 men on the west bank of the Mississippi,
just above Cairo, and had beg^n to move south toward New
Madrid on February 28tR, on which day he had a skirmish
with Thompson's Missouri militia. Pope reached New
Madrid on March dd, and after a siege of a month, with the
assistance of Foote's squadron, he finally captured the whole
of the donfederate forces in that vicinity — ^about 7,000 men
— on April 7th. On the 12th, Pope embarked his aimy on
transports, and, escorted by Footers squadron, proceeded
down the river, arriving near Fort Pillow on the 14th. Plans
were siade for a combined attack on the 17th, but on that
day Pox>e received orders from Halleck to take his force

THE FIRST TEAR*S OPERATIONa 13

to Pittsburg Landing without delay, and he started up the
river that afternoon. The withdrawal of the army made the
attack imi>o8sible«

Meanwhile, daring the month of March, Grant's army had
advanced up the Tennessee Biver, and Buell's had marched
across from Nashville to join it. A. S. Johnston had re-
treated from Bowling Green, through Nashville and Mor-
freesborongh to the Memphis and Charleston Baikoad, and
thence to Corinth, bringing with him the troops afterward
Imown as Hardee's Corps; Bragg had come to the same
•point from Mobile and Pensacola, and Folk from Columbus,
with that portion of his troojiBy which had not gone to New
Madrid. Beauregard had collected what few troops there
were along the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad. Van
Dom had come in person from Arkansas to Corinth, and his
troops had received orders to follow him, but had not yet
arrived. Both sides being thus concentrated, the first great
battle in the West, and the most sanguinary, was fought at
Shiloh on April 6th and 7th. Immediately after that battle
Halleck assumed command in person at Shiloh, and ordered
Pope to join him with his force. Van Dom's troops also
joined Beauregard, who had succeeded Johnston in com-
mand on the death of the latter. Beauregard fell back
slowly, and Halleck advanced with great caution to Corinth,
which was evacuated by the Confederates on May 30th,
Beauregard retreating southward on the Mobile and Ohio
Bailroad. The Union troops being thus in possession of the
Memphis and Charleston Bailroad at Corinth, the Confed-
erate position at and above Memphis was turned and ren-
dered untenable, in the same manner that Columbus had
been turned by the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson.
Fort Pillow was therefore abandoned by its garrison on the
irigbt of the 4th of June, and Fort Bandolph on the follow*

14 THE MlfifiOSSIPPL

ing day, the gpreater part of their garrisong being taken down
the river in transports to Vicksburg.

The results of the campaign np the Ten^easee Biver had
been not only the capture of the hostile army at Fort Donel-
son, and the defeat and loss inflicted upon that at Shiloh,
but also the outflanking of all the Confederate iK>6itions on
ihe Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis and their consequent
abandonm^it. The Confederates had, however, a strong
fleet at Memphis, under Commodore Montgomery, and be-
fore giving up that city they determined to try conclusions
with Foote*s fleet, not with any intention to save Memphis,
for there was nothing to prevent Halleok's army from march-
ing into it, but with the hope of destroying or oippling the
fleet.

Foote had remained in the vicinity of Fort Pillow after
the departure of Pope's army on April 17th, but no active
operations had been undertaken further than to bombard
the fort with the mortar boats. On the 9th of May, he
was Anally obliged to relinquish the command of his squad-
ron, on account of the wound he had received at Fort Don-
elson, from which he had been suffering constantly for three
months. He was succeeded by Commodore C. H. Davis.
On the following day, May 10th, about 7 a.m., the Confed-.
erate flotilla of eight vessels came out from under the guns
of Fort Pillow, and attacked the Union flotilla, which con-
sisted of seven armored gunboats. A severe battle took
place, in which the Confederates used thdr vessels as rams
with great effect, completely disabling the Cincinnati and
Mound City, which were both sunk in shoal water, though
they were soon afterward raised and repaired. The Union
ordnance was, however, far superior to that of the Confed-
erates, and its projectiles penetrated four of the latter's
vessels, disabling their maohineiy, and rendering them help-.

THE FIRST YBAR*S OPBRATION&

15

leas. At the end of an hour, the Confederates withdrew to
the forty towing their disabled vessels, which were subse-
quently repaired at Menq>his.

Upon the abandonment of Fort Pillow, on June 4th, Davis
proceeded down the river, arriving at dark on the 5th with-
in two miles of Memphis, where he anchored for the night
At daylight the next morning, June 6th, the Confederate
flotilla was discovered lying at the letee at Memphis. It
consisted of the same vessels which had taken part in the
action off Port Pillow a month previous.

The two flotillas were composed of the following vessels :

UNION.

Guns.

Benton 16

lioniBville 18

Caronddet 13

Cairo 13

8t Louis 13

Qneen of the West ram

Switserboid ''

Honarch **

•liUioaflter ........ • **

€8

CONFEDERATK

GUKS.

Little Rebel 2

Bragg 8

Beauregard 4

Price 4

Sumpter 8

Loyell 4

Thompaon 4

Van Dom. 4

28

At 4.20 AM.f the Union flotilla got under way and began
to drop down the river; the Confederates immediately
opened flre, and advanced slowly to meet them, though
maintaining such a position in front of the city that it was
difficult for the Union boats to return the flre without dan*
ger of firing into the city. The fire was nevertheless re-
turned, and after it had continued for about twenty minutes,
Colonel EUet, in the ram Queen of the West, followed by
the Monarch, dashed out from under the Arkansas shore,
passed in front of Davis's flotilla, and steamed at full speed
against the enemy's vessels. EUet designed to strike the
Beauregard, which was in advimoe, but he missed tlus ves^

16 THE msSISdIPPI.

sel, and crashed into the Lorell, catting her almost in two,
and sinking her in deep water, with the greater part of her
crew. While the Queen was still entangled with the Lovell,
the Beauregard tnme4 and rammed her, and, in turn, re-
ceived a blow from the Monarch. The Price, by this time,
had joined in the fight, and the Monarch made a pass at her,
but missed her, and the Beauregard, endeavoring to strike the
Monarch, missed her, and cut away the port-wheel of her own
consort, the Price. The Benton, which was in advance of
the gunboat fleet, now arrived, and sent a well-directed shot
through the boiler of the Beauregard, completing her dis-
ablement. The result of this general mSUe was as follows :
on the Confederate side, the Lovell had been sunk, and the
Beauregard and Price were completely disabled. On the
Union side, the ram Queen had been disabled, and had run
to the Arkansas shore, and the Monarch had followed her»
taking the Beauregard in tow, which stmk as soon as she
reached shoal water. As the rams Lancaster and Switzer-
land had turned up the river through some misunderstand-
ing of orders, the rams took no further part in the action.

By this time, however, the gunboats had all closed with
the Confederate flotilla, and a running fight ensued, which
lasted for about an hour, in the presence of thousands of
spectators on the Tennessee shore, and which ended ten
miles below the city. In this fight, the Little Bebel re-
ceived a shot through the steam-chest, and was immediately
run on the ArkftTimm shore ; the Thompson was set on fire,
and grotmded some distance below Memphis, where the fire
reached the magazine and blew her up; the Sumpter and
Bragg were disabled by shells, and one was captured while
the other was run ashore and deserted by her crew. The
Van Dom alone escaped, the Monarch and Switzerland being
sent in pursuit, but failing to overtake her.

THE PmST YEAR'S OPERATIONS. 17

The result of thia engagement was most decisive ; thiee of
the Confederate vessels — ^Lovell, Beauregard, and Thomp*
son — ^were wholly destroyed, four of them — ^Little Rebel,
Price, Snmpter, and Bragg — ^were captured, and saved in
such condition that with extensive repairs they were subse-
quently incorporated with the Union flotilla. In addition
to this annihilation of the Confederate flotilla, Ave large
transports and a considerable amount of cotton were cap-
tured, and a large ram and two tugs on the stocks were de-
stroyed. The Confederate loss in men was not accurately:
known, but was estimated at one hundred killed and wound-
ed, and one htmdred and flfty captured. On the Union side,.'
Colonel Ellet received a wotmd in the leg, from which he
subsequently died, and three men on the Carondelet were
slightly injured. No other gunboat but the Carondelet was
struck. The city of Memphis was surrendered to Commo-
dore Davis by the mayor immediataty after the flght, and
the two regiments which accompanied the flotilla marched
in and took possession at 11 a.m.

- For the next three weeks Davis remained at Memphis
with the greater -paai of his flotilla ; but on June 12th he
organized an exi>edition consisting of the Motmd City, St.
Louis, Lexington, and Conestoga, accompanied by three of
the captured transports, carrying the Forty-sixth Indiana,
xmder Colonel Fitch. This force proceeded down the Mis-
sissippi to the mouth of White River, and thence up that
stream to the village of St. Charles, where the Confeder-
ates had erected some batteries at the crossing of the main
road from Memphis to Little Rock. The object of this expe-
dition was to destroy these batteries, clear the river of hostile
boats, and open commtmication with Maj.-Gen. S. R. Curtis,
who, after the battle of Pea Ridge, had begun a march east-
ward to. opea communications on the MississippL The ex-

la THB MIBSI88IPP1

pedition leaiolied St. Charles on June 16th> and attacked
and captured the batteries on the siune day. The loss wonld
have been trifUng bnt for one well-aimed shot^ which pene-
trated the casemate of the Monnd Oity, and exploded the
steam-dram. Many of the crew were killed ontright, others
were frightfoll j scalded, and some jumped overboard, and
were drowned. Out of 176 ]ieople on board, only 35 escaped
uninjured. Having destroyed the batteries, the expedition
returned to Memphis. Curtis did not arrive in time to com-
municate with the gunboats, but, continuing his march, he
reached the MisslBsippi at Helena, about eighty miles below
Memphis, on July 13th.

On June 2dth, Davis left Memphis, and piDoeeded down
the Mississippi, with the Benton, Curondelet, Louisville,
and St. Louis, and six mortar boats in tow of transports.
On July 1st he arrived at Young's Point, a few miles above
Yicksburg, and there joined hands with Admiral D. G. Far-
xagut's fleet from New Orieans. The entire river from Cairo
to the Gulf had now been navigated by Union vessels, but
another long year and many woaiy ^orts were required be-
fore it was free from Confederate controL

It is now necessary to refer briefly to the early movements
up the Mississippi from its mouth. The ever-memorable
passage of the forts below New Orleans by Farxagut's fleet
took place on April 24th, and on the 2&th Farragut arrived
off New Orleans. General Lov^ who commanded the Con-
federate troops in the dty, immediately evacuated the place,
retreating up the line of the Jackson Bsilroad, and on May
Ifit, Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler arrived with his troops and took
possessiim of the city, relieving a few marines who had been
Ifuided.

A portion of Farragut's fleet immediateily proceeded up
the river, meeting no resistance more serious than the wozdyr

THE FnUM? TBAira O^BSIATIONS. 19-

protests of mayors of tmdefended cities. Baton Bongo was
taken on May 8th, and Natehes on the 12th. No fortifica-
tions were encoontered south of Yicksbnrg, at which phice
the advanced division, under OoniBiander S. P. Lee, of
the Oneida, arrived on May 18th. He immediately sum-
moned the Mayor, as well as the oiRcer commanding the de-
fences, to surrender, but the demand was defiantly refused.
A day or two later Farragut himself arrived with additional
vessels^ and with him came two transports, carrying two
regiments and a battery — about fifteen hundred men in all
— ^under command of Brig.-Qen. Thomas Williams, who had
been detached by Butler for this service. A reoonnoissance
of tibe place was made, and then a council of war was held
by Farragut and his commanders, at which Williams was
piesent. Williams was of opinion that his force was alto-
gether too small to accomplish anything against such de-
fences, and a large maJOTity of the naval commanders ad-
vised against Furragut'e propoeition to run by the batteries.
Nothing, Uierefore, was done, mmI Farragut returned to New
Orle»is with part of his fleet, and Williams took his troops
back to Baton Bouge. These events took plaee in the lat-
ter part of May, 1862.

it appears, from the records, that, && December 18, 1861,
Colonel Edward Fontaine, Chief of Ordnance of the Mis-
sissippi Army, wrote to Qovemor Moore, of Louisiana,
proposing to go to Yicksburg, make surveys, and begin the
erection of fortifications. Moore forwarded the letter to
Lovell, who relied that he had no objection to the journey,
but he was unable to assist in constructing the fortifica-
tions, because he had "no competent officer, no guns, no
powder."

Almost immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, in
February, 1862, Bragg, who was then in comnumd at Pensa-^

2a THE MISSISSIFPL

cola, directed Gol. J. L. Auttj to piKoceed to Yicksbtirg witb-
lus regiment,, the 27th MississippL In the month of March
guns and ammunition were sent from Pensacola to Yicks-
borg; and, after the battle of Shiloh and the capture of
Island No. 10> in April, 1962, Beauregard drew up a project
of fortification for batteries, containing about forty guns and
a garrison of three thousand men,' and sent it to Capt. D. B..
Harris, of the Confederate I^ngineers, then serving at Fort.
Pillow, with a letter of instructions, dated at Corinth, Apnl
21st, directing him to proceed to Yicksburg, collect a force:
of 1,000 negroes, and begin the construction of the works at-
once« Special directions were given in this letter to locate
batteries so as to prevent the coqistruction of a canal across
the peninsula opposite the city.

. The fortifications of Yicksburg were therefore begun in
the latter part of April, 1862. At this time, it will be re*
membered, Halleck, with all' the available Union troojiB in
the West, was about to begin his advance from Shiloh,
Beauregard, reinforced by Yan Dom, was preparing to de-;
fend Corinth, and Earragut was passing the forts below
New Orleans.

When Ijovell retreated northward from New Orleans at
the time of its capture, he fally appreciated the importance
of defending Yicksburg, and, therefore, while retaining the
bulk of his force on the Jackson Bailroad, he at once des-
patched Brig. -Gen. Martin L. Smith, who had been an officer
of Topographical Engineers before the war, with five regi-
ments to Yicksburg, with orders to assume command and
complete the fortifications with the utmost despatch. Smith
arrived at Yicksburg on May 12th, and served there tmtil
its surrender more than a year afterward. He found three
batteries completed, and a fourth in progress. Continu-
ing work night and day on the others, he had six bat-

THE FIRST YEAB*S OPERATIONS. 21

teries finished and armed when the advance diTision of Far-
ragat's fleet arrived on May 18th. For the next ten days he
was in extreme anxiety, fearing that he would be nnable to
meet a vigorous attack, but his anxiety was Anally reHeved
by Farragnfs departure. In spite of a desultory bombard-
ment by that portion of the fleet which remained, the ten
batteries originally projected were completed and armed by
the middle of June. Beinforcements then began to arrive.
:Breckenridge's corps of Bragg's army, and Buggles's com-
-mand from Grenada — in all about 16,000 men — were ordered
to Yicksburg on June 22d ; and Van Dom, who had super-
«eded Lovell, arrived in person and took command on June
^th.

' On reaching New Orleans about June Ist, on his return
from his first trip to Yicksburg, Farragut found most urgent
Jetters from the Navy Department, impressing upon him the
importance of clearing the Mississippi, only one point of
-which, Yicksburg, then remained in Confederate control.
-Although Farragut was anxious to attack Mobile, and had
no faith in his ability to take Yicksburg without the aid of
^ large land force, yet he prepared as quickly as possible tp
make the attempt, in compliance with the wishes of the De-
XMfftment. The mortar-flotilla, consisting of sixteen vessels
under Commander D. D. Porter, was sent up in advance of
•him and reached Yicksburg on June 20tlu On the same day
Farragut left Baton Bouge with the large vessels of his fleet,
accompanied by transports carrying Williams and his bri-
gade of four regiments and two batteries, numbering about
three thousand men. They reached Yicksburg on June 25th,
liaving stopped on the way near Natchez and Grand Gulf
^o attack batteries which had been erected since their first
expedition, but which were now abandoned on their approach.
Upon arriving at Yicksburg Williams landed his troops on

^ THB MIBSIBSIPPI.

ihe LonifOBna shore, and oolleeting a force of about 1,200
negroes from the neighboring plantations he began digging
the canal across the peninsula. The line adopted for this
was the same as had been laid oat several years before^ at
a time when the States of Louisiana and Mississippi were
in dispute as to their boundaries, and the former State had
determined to dig a canal which should cut off Yicksburg
from the rirer.

Meanwhile Farragut's fleet was all assembled at Yicksburg
hf June 25th. It consisted of three ships and seven gun-
^boats, carrying in all 106 guns, and of sixteen mortar-boats
carrying each one 13-inch mortar. Williams also placed his
ten field guns on the Louisiana shore to assist the fleet.
The armament of the Confiedsrate batteries cannot be accu*
-rately stated ; it probably did not exceed 40 guns* but th^
had the advantage of being on a bluff about 200 feet high»
from which they obtained a plunging Are on the Tessels,

The mortar-boats having been an^iored in position, £to-
lagut's fleet passed the baitories eariy on the morning of
June 28th. It was simply an artillery duel, lasting about
two hours, at the end of which Ume Parmgut came to an-
•chor above the peninsula with two ships sjsd Ave gunboats ;
one ship and two gunboats, as well as the mortar-fleet^ had
remained below the town. His total losses wen 15 killed
and 42 wounded, and the damage to his fleet, m spite of the
heavy fliing, was not very serious. Earragut states in his
report that " the rebels were soon silenced by the combined
efforts of ihe fleet and flotilla, and at times did not Mply at
all for several minutes,** and the same statement is made by
his commaind«» ; Smith, however, states that **not a sin^
gun was silenced, none disabled, and the serious bombard-
ment of the preceding seven days had thrown nothing out
ci fluting trim." It is probable that some of the guns

THE FIBST TEAR'S OPBRATIONS. 23

.c^As^ firing for a time but that none of them were perma-
nently silenced or disabled. In any event, it was perfectly
evident that the navy could do no seriona damage to the
batteries. Earragat dearly stated ihe^caae in his report by
saying, *' The forts can be passed, and we have done it and
can do it again as otten as may be required of ns ; " bat ** I
am satisfied that it is not possible to take Yicksbarg with-
out an army of 12,000 to 15,000 men.*'

The ccMnbined fleets of Farragut and Davis therefore re-
mained in the vicinity of Yicksburg, part of them above and
.part below the town ; Williams with his little force con-*
tinned digging the canal, and the Confederates worked away
st their batteries, not only increasii^ the number of those
at Yicksburg but erecting new ones at Grand Gulf, about
fifteen miles down the river.

The line for the canal was not well located, for it was per*
pendiculsr to the direction of the current, and at each end
the cunent impinged uxx>n the shoze opposite to that on
.which they were digging. It would have been of no serriee
•if completed, but before its ccnnpletion the river suddenly
rose one night and innndated and destroyed all that had
))een accomplidied. Williams's troops were much prostrated
with sickness, and as he could accomplish nothing where he
was he prepared to return to Baton Bouge.

iWragut was also expeotang an order to return down the
river, when, on July 15tfa, an event ocouxred which caused
him de^ mortification. Early on the morning of that
day some of the light- draft gunboats of Davis's flotilla
had been sent up ihe Yazoo Biver on a leconnomsance to ob-
tain information conoeming the large iron-plated ram,
Arkansas, whidi was known to be building up that stream,
and of whose strength extraordinary veportR had been circu-
lated. The vessels had not been long gone before firing was

24 THE MISSISSIPPI.

heai'd, and soon after they appeared at the month of thd
Yazoo, coming down with all speed and closely followed by
ihe Arkansas. It so happened that not one of Farragnt's
vessels had steam np, and in broad daylight in the morning
the ram passed directly through his fleet, receiving its broad-
sides almost without injury, and proceeded to the shelter of
the batteries at Yicksburg. Farragut was much chagrined,
and determined at once to run past the batteries again
that night and endeavor to destroy the ram in the pas-
sage. He succeeded in passing the batteries with a loss of
6 killed and 16 wounded, but in the darkness and confu-
sion no damage was done to the Arkansas. The river was
now rapidly falling and Farragut became anxious lest his
large vessels should be unable to return to deep water.
It was, therefore, with great relief that he received, on
July 20th, the expected order from the Navy Department
to return. He waited a few days for Williams to embark
his men, and then on the 27th started down the river.
On the same day Davis's flotilla started up the river, and
Yicksburg was left entirely free. Williams's troops re»
turned to Baton Bouge, where two g^nnboats remained with
him, the rest of Farragut's fleet going on to New Orleans,
where it arrived July 29th.

All immediate danger at Yicksbui^ was therefore over,
and in the various artillery engagements which had taken
place during the two months since the fleet first arrived, the
Confederates had lost only 22 men in killed and wounded.
They were very properly jubilant at their successful de-
fence, yet with commendable promptitude they det^mined
to renew the offensive. For this purpose Yan Dom issued
orders on the same day, July 27th, that the fleets moved
off, directing Breckenridge to select 5,000 men from his
corps and proceed by rail, via Jackson, to Oamp Moore, on

THE FIRST TEAR'S OPERATIONa 25

tlie New Orleans Railroad, jnst sonth of the Lotdsiana line ;
here he was to be reinforced by the command of Bnggles
and then proceed to attack Baton Rouge. The object of
this movement was to regain possession of a point on the
Mississippi sonth of the month of Red Biver, and thns re-
tain control of the navigation of that river, by which sup-
plies could be brought from Western Louisiana and Texas.
Breckenridge reached Camp Moore on July 28th, and organ-
vang his force into two divisions began his march against
Baton Bouge on the dOth. His force consisted of eighteen
regiments and four batteries and he states that its strength
was 6,000 when he began his march, but owing to sickness
it was so reduced that the morning report of August 4th
showed only 3,000 effectives, and he ''did not cany into the
action more than 2,600 men." This would give only about
130 men per regiment, and it is doubtless an under-estimate.
Williams's force consisted of six regiments and three bat-
teries ; it is said that one-half of the men were on the sick
list, suffering from fevers contracted at Vicksburg, and the
estimate of 2,500 ''present for duty," which was made at
the time, is probably quite accurate. He was anticipating
an attack, and had placed his men in readiness for battle
on the north and east of the town. The Confederates
opened the battle at daylight, and it lasted with consid-
erable energy for the space of six hours. A portion of the
Union line was at first forced back, and their camps, which
were in advance of the line, were .occupied and plundered
by the Confederates. About 10 a.m., however, their ad-
vance was completely checked ; one division and three bri-
gade commanders had been killed or wounded, the men
had lost very heavily, and were suffering for water, and the
ram Arkansas, which had descended the river with the pur-
pose of driving off the Union gunboats and assisting in the
VIII. —2

26 THB MISSISSIPPI.

battle, had not made its appearance. Breokenridge^ there-
fore, gave np the contest, and retired to a creek about two
miles in rear, where he remained during the afternoon, in-
tending, as he claims, to renew the fight as soon as the
^Arkansas should come in sight. Late in the afternoon,
however, he received word that the Arkansas was dis-
abled about five miles up the river, and he therefore con-
tinued his retreat during the night about twelve miles to the
north, halting on a small stream known as the Ck>mit6 Biver.
During the battle. Commander W. D. Porter, with the Essex
and four other gunboats, was stationed in the river opposite
the right flank of Williams's troops, and, when the Con-
federates began to retreat, these vessels fiired on them with
considerable effect. The next morning three of the vessels
proceeded up the river, and a few miles above the town they
came in sight of the Arkansas, and immediately opened fire
upon her. One of the engines of this vessel had broken
down on the previous day, and, in stopping to repair it, she
had been prevented from taking part in the battle. On the
morning of the 6th, she got up steam, but had proceeded
only a short distance when the other engine gave way. Be-
fore it could be repaired, the Essex and other Union vessels
came in sight, and the commander of the Arkansas, deeming
his vessel in no condition to fight, ran her ashore, landed
his crew, set fire to the vessel, and turned her adrift. She
floated down the river, and blew up as soon as the fire
reached the magazine.

The Union loss in this engagement at Baton Bouge was
reported at 90 killed, and 250 wounded. The Confederate
returns make their loss 84 killed, 307 wounded, and 56 miss-
ing ; total, 447. In addition to two colonels of regiments,
the Union troops lost their commander. General Williams,
a valuable and experienced officer, who had served on Gen-

THE FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS. 27

eial Scott's staff throxigliont the Mexican War. He "mus
killed at the head of his men just before the close of the
action. Among the Confederate killed and wounded were
Generals Clark and Helm, and two colonels commanding
brigades.

Breckenridge's attack had thus been unsncoessfol, bat the
object of his expedition, which was to gain possession of
a point below the month of Bed Biver, was fuUj achieved.
Two days after the battle, instead of returning to Camp
Moore, and thence back into Mississippi, he marched his
men to Port Hudson, thirty miles above Baton Bouge, and
began the construction of heavy batteries, for which the
site was admirably adapted. On August 19th, the batteries
being well advanced, he left a portion of his command,
under Buggies, to garrison them, and with the rest rejoined
Van Dom at Jackson, Miss. Port Hudson remained in the
possession of the Confederates from this time until after
the fall of Yicksburg in the following summer. On the
other hand, the troops which had composed Williams's
command abandoned Baton Bouge and returned to New Or-
leans.

It was now within a few days of one year since Grant had
arrived at Cairo, and Polk at Columbus, and active opera-
tions for the control of the great river had begun. During
that year the river had been cleared and held .from Cairo
down to Yicksburg ; New Orleans had been taken, and the
fleet had ascended to Yicksburg. That point alone re-
mained to the Confederates, and, for a while, they held it by
the frailest possible tenure. One more effort, with a land
force of 10,000 men, at any time during the months of May
or June, 1862, and the entire river would have been se-
curely in possession of the Union forces. That effort was
not made ; whether it could, or could not have been, it is

28 THE MISSISSIPPL

diiBctilt to Bay. Perhaps Halleck might have marched his
whole army to Vicksbnrg by a rapid movement after the
evacnation of Corinth, trusting to success to establish his
base on the Mississippi ; possibly he might have sent 10,000
men via Memphis, or back via the Tennessee Biver, and
thence down the Mississippi. Bat Halleck himself did not
think so. When Farragnt rexwrted, after passing the bat-
teries on Jnne 28th, that an army was necessary to take
Ticksbnrg, Halleck answered that ''the scattered and weak-
ened condition of my forces renders it impossible, at the
present, to detach any troops to co-operate with yon at
Vicksbnrg." At all events, the effort was not made, and the
opportunity rapidly slipped away. The Confederates were
reinforced at Vicksbnrg, the navy could do nothing unaided,
and on their departure, the Confederates immediately re-
sumed the offensive, and regained control of the river, from
Baton Bouge to Helena, Ark., a distance of 300 miles in a
straight line, and twice as &r by the windings of the river.
Within this distance, batteries were erected or strengthened
wherever the river touches the eastern bluffe — at Port Hud-
son, at Natchez, at Grand Gulf, at Vicksbnrg; and a fort
was also erected a short distance up the Arkansas Eiver,
from the cover of which gunboats could issue forth and de-
stroy all unarmed vessels. The Confederacy thus gained a
lease of life for another year on the Mississippi.

CHAPTER n.

lUKA AND CORINTH.

In the second volume of this series Greneral Force has
traced the eiP'ents of the £Lrst military operations in the
West, from Fort Henry to Corinth. Although conducted
along the line of the Tennessee Biver, their object, as al-
ready stated, was to aid in the great problem of gaining con-
trol of the Mississippi, and their result was the repossession
of that river &om Cairo to Memphis. They were concluded
on May 30, 1862, by the evacuation of Corinth by the Con-
federate army, under Beauregard, and its occupation by the
Union army, under Halleck. The first great step in the
problem having thus been accomplished by the Union army,
the question arose as to what should be the next step. On
June 1st, the situation was as follows: Halleck had under
his command at, or near Corinth, the largest army ever as-
sembled west of the Alleghanies; its return is given in
full in Appendix B., but it may be summarized by saying
that, after deducting the detachments under Mitchell and
others, its strength present and absent was 173,019, of which
128,315 were present, and of these latter 108,538 were fit for
duty on the morning of that day. In addition to these
troops, near Corinth, Mitchell's division of Buell's army,
numbering about 6,500 effectives, was at Huntsville, Ala.,
moving along the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad toward
Chattanooga; another division of the same army, under

30 THE MIS8IS8IPPL

Morgan, nnmbering nearly 9,000 effectives, was at Cnmber-
land Qap in East Tennessee ; and a brigade of 3,000 men
remained in Nashville. Finally, Curtis, with an army of
abont 10,000 men, was in Northwestern Arkansas, preparing
to march toward the Mississippi. The Union armies, there-
fore, had a total effective strength,^ in round numbers, of
137,000 men, about two-thirds of which were concentrated
at Corinth, and the rest scattered in Arkansas, along the
Tennessee Eiver, and in Eastern Tennessee.

Opposed to them the Confederates had an army under
Beauregard, which was retreating from Corinth along the
Mobile and Ohio Eailroad toward Tupelo. Its return of May
28th, which is given in full in Appendix C, shows a total,
present and absent, of 112,692, of which 75,429 were present,
and of these latter 57,147 were considered effective or fit for
duty on the day of the return — over 18,000 being sick. Op-
posed to Mitchell was a brigade of 2,000 men in Chattanooga,
under General Leadbetter, who had been detached from the
army of Kirby Smith ; the rest of which army, numbering
12,000 men, was near Knoxville, confronting Morgan's divi-
sion at Cumberland Gap. The Confederates had also a de-
tachment under Lovell at Jackson, and another under M.
L. Smith, at Vicksburg, the two numbering about 8,000
men. In Arkansas their total strength was about 26,000;
although the troops were considerably scattered and were
})oorly armed.

The total effective force of the Confederates in the West
was therefore about 105,000 men, against 137,000 in the
Union armies opposed to them, although the paper strength
of the two armies was about 175,000 and 220,000. The Con-
federate armies were greatly discouraged and demoralized
hj the almost unbroken series of reverses which they had
sustained during the last four months. The Union troops

lUKA AND CORINTH. 31

were correspondinglj elated at their success. "What was to
be their next move ?

This qnestion was the most vital in character and its floln-
tion the most far-reaching in consequences, that ever arose
in the West, and it should therefore be examined in all its
bearings. It has generally been held that Halleck's action
at this juncture was the worst possible under the circum-
stances, but the case was not free from embarrassment and
complication, and these should be carefully considered. A
glance at the map will show that there were two great high^
ways leading into the heart of the Confederacy ; one was
down the Mississippi Valley to Vicksburg and thence to
Mobile, and the other was along the railroad from Chatta*
nooga to Atlanta and thence to the sea-coast. The starting-
points for both were along the railroad from Memphis to
Chattanooga, which, though much injured, was now in Hal*
leek's possession. This railroad extended northeastward
from Chattanooga to Bichmond, and was the only through
route at that time leading eastward from the Mississippi
Biver within the limits of the Confederacy. South of this
the only railroad connection between Memphis or Vicksburg
and Atlanta or Chattanooga was via Mobile. Halleck had
therefore an interior line of communications for operations
in both directions. The distances, however, were very great
— from Chattanooga to Corinth over 200 miles, and froni
Corinth to Vicksburg over 800 miles. If, then, Halleck
took the whole of his force to Chattanooga, he left the Mis-
sissippi Biver and its parallel railroads open for an advance
of the Confederates to the mouth of the Ohio, and if he
marched his whole army toward Vicksburg he left the road
open from Chattanooga via Nashville to Louisville and Cin-
cinnati. It was of far more importance to hold these cities
than to overrun the whole Confederacy. Moreover, it seemed

32 THB HI8SIS81PPL

very donbtfal if so large an army as 100|000 men conld be
supplied any longer in the vicinity of Oorinth. Up to this
time HaUeck had drawn his supplies by the Tennessee
Biver, but this river was now rapidly idling, and there was
reason to believe that the navigation would soon become so
difficult that supplies in large quantities could not be for-
warded by that route. Halleck must then resort to the rail-
loais, but these had been destroyed by the Ck>nfederates in
their retreat, all the way from Columbus. Until they could
be repaired the army must disperse to subsist.

Inhere was still another reason in the fact that McGlellan
imagined that Beauregard's troops had been sent to Bich-
mond, and he therefore urged that a portion of Halleck's
army should be brought to the Peninsula, and the Govern-
ment seemed disposed to accede to his representations. It
was evident that if any considerable part of the army was
detached to so distant a point as Virginia, all that had been
gained in the West would be lost ; and of course the larger
Halleck's army in one body the more urgent would be the
demand from McClellan.* On purely military grounds,
therefore, the propriety of keeping his army together was
at least open to question. If we consider the political
grounds, the question was still more difficult. Mr. Lincoln's
heart ached for the suffering Unionists in East Tennessee,
To be a Union man in the vicinity of Enoxville in 1862
meant something more than the mere expression of opinion,
it meant the constant facing of death. ^ Treason " to the
Confederacy was then indeed made odious, and its punish-
ment was hanging without trial. The sufferings which
these brave men had endured for their devotion to the
Union had induced Mr. Lincoln to write constant despatches

> See appendix D, at the end of the volome.

lUKA AND OOBIKTH. aa

dming the preceding winter to Halleck and Bnell niging an
advance into East Tennessee ; he had yielded his judgment
on the representation that this was not a judicious military
move ; but now that the Mississippi had been opened to
Memphis he again urged the relief of East Tennessee, and
his s^peals were not without effect. On June 5th he tele-
graphed Halleck, enclosing a despatch from McOlellan, re-
commending the occupation of Chattanooga, and later (June
30th) he tel^raphed that the expedition to East Tennessee
must not be abandoned under any circumstances. To the
fiist telegram Halleck replied that preparations for Chatta-
nooga had abeady been made, and in fact on June 2d he had
notified Buell that he might expect an order to more his
whole army eastward.

That an en^getic commander might have done more than
Halleck did seems incontestable ; he might have sent a por->
tion of Buell's army — ^not to slowly repair the railroad— but to
march with all haste to reinforce Mitchell, seize, fortify, and
hold Chattano<^a against all comers, and draw its supplies
Erectly from Nashville. With the balance of his force,
enough to largely outnumber Beauregard, he might have ^
pursued the latter with vigor, bringing him to battle without
fortifications or else continuing his pursuit to Yicksburg,
Halleck meanwhile drawing his own suppUes by boat or lail
from Memphis. But it is universally admitted that energy :
in the field was not one of Halleck's characteristics. His
orders were cautious to the extent of feebleness, and while
his troops were scattered about trying to hold and repair
300 miles of railroad — from Memphis to near Chattanooga — .
ronning parallel to the enemy's front, the enemy under
Bragg (who had superseded Beauregard) seized the initia*
tive, divided his forces, and by a movement which was pre-
es^ently remarkable for its boldness, its skUl, and its suo-^
2*

34 THE MISSISSIPPI.

oess, transferred a part of his army to Chattanooga, whence
he led Bnell a stem chase straight to LouisYiUe. The
Union opportunity was thus lost, and Bragg was allowed to
control the course of events in the West ; the Union armies
were not again united until Vicksburg had been taken, and
the whole force put under Grant's direction in order to
diive Bragg out of Chattanooga in November, 1863.

Halleck's orders for the dispersion of his army were as
follows : on June 3d, McClemand was sent with his own and
Wallace's divisions of the Army of the Tennessee to Bolivar,
on the Mississippi Central Bailroad. On June 4th, Pope,
who was pursuing Beauregard south of Corinth, was notified
not to bring on a battle, Halleck adding, "I think the
enemy will continue his retreat, which is all I desire."
Pope's army went into camp near Bienzi. On June 9th
Sherman was ordered with his own and Hurlbut's division
to move along the railroad to Memphis, and on the same
day Buell received his definite orders to march his whole
army eastward along the railroad to Chattanooga. On the
10th, the order of April 30th, by which the army had been
divided into right wing, center, left wing, and reserve, was
revoked, and Grant, Buell, and Pope, were ordered to re-
sume command of their Armies of the Tennessee, Ohio, and
Mississippi respectively. Halleck remained at Corinth for
five weeks longer, but nothing was done but slowly to re-
pair the railroads, against which the Confederates occa-
sionally made a dash. On July 16th he left for Washington,
to assume his new duties as General-in-Chief. Grant was
left in command of all troops in the vicinity of Memphis
and Corinth and as far back as Columbus, Ky., but as Hal-
leck expected to return in a few weeks and keep his head-
quarters in the West, no successor was appointed to his late
command nor did he give any definite instructions as to tha

lUKA AND CORINTH. 86

movements of troops in that region. His first telegram
to Grant, dated July 31st, is in these words: <*Yon must
judge for yourself the best use to be made of your troops.
Be careful not to scatter them too much ; also to hold them
in readiness to reinforce Buell at Chattanooga if necessary."
This dispersion of Halleok's army, combined with Bragg's
bold offensive — and possibly also the disastrous course of

UMBOLOr

Scale M^JOUjt
t.-'M^ — £ — *» iT

Memphis to Inka. 188S.

events at this time in Virginia — reduced all the Union armies
in the West to the defensive. Grant was left with about
60,000 men, composed of Pope's "Army of the Missis-
sippi" (now commanded by Kosecrans, Pope having been
ordered to Virginia) and the " Army of the Tennessee," ex-
cept Wallace*s division, which had been sent to Curtis at
Helena. But Bragg's invasion of Tennessee soon caused
such alarm that two divisions, and subsequently a third

86 THB MISSiaSIPPL

division, of Bosecrans's army were sent to reinforce Bnell,
redncing Grant's force to about 42,000. With these he was
reqnired to guard the line of road — two hundred miles
long — from Memphis to Decatur, and he was specially
directed to keep open his communications with Buell.
Under these requirements no concentration of his force nor
offensive measures were to be thought of. He therefore oc-
cupied three important points of his road — Memphis, Cor-
inth, and Tuscumbia — ^with considerable bodies, and posted
the rest of his men at Jackson and Bolivar, central points
in rear, from which they could readily be moved in any re*
quired direction. In this position he awaited the move*
ments of the enemy into whose hands the power of initia-
tive had passed.

On the Confederate side Bragg remained in camp at Tn-*
pelo. Miss., until July 22d, when he issued orders sending
the Army of the Mississippi, numbering about 35,000 men,
under Hardee, to Chattanooga by rail, via Mobile ; he went
with this column in x)erson. At Cliattanooga his army was
augmented by recruits, and by calling in detachments, and,
on August 16th, he moved northward toward Kentucky, in
conjunction with Eirby Smith's army from Knoxville. No
successor was appointed to Bragg in Mississippi, and, by
his departure, the Confederate forces in that region were
reduced to two independent bodies, each about 16,000 in
strength ; one, under Van Dom, was charged with the de-
fence of the river, and the other, under Price, was to guard
the Mobile and Ohio Bailroad south of Corinth. Van
Dom's troops were scattered from Holly Springs to Vicks*
burg, and a few days after Bragg!s departure Van Dom or^
dered the expedition against Baton Bouge, as already nar-
rated. Price's troops were less scattered, most of them
being in the vicinity of Tupelo.

lUKA AND CORINTH. 37

Nothing of any oonseqaence took place for a month. In
the latter part of Angnst a cavalry raid was undertaken by
Generals Armstrong and Jackson, who moved from Holly
Springs to the vicinity of Bolivar, with a force of 3,700
men, and did some damage to the railroad between Jackson
and Bolivar.

On September 2d, Price received a despatch from Bragg,
saying that Buell was " in full retreat upon Nashville," and
directing him to '* watch Bosecrans and prevent a junction,
or, if he escapes, follow him closely." Price immediately
communicated this to Van Dom, and proposed a junction of
their forces, but Van Dom replied that he could not get all
his men together at Holly Springs until the 12th. Price
thereupon determined to move forward alone. His advance
reached luka on the 13th, and had a skirmish with the
small garrison stationed there; on the following day his
main force came up and entered the place. Three days later
he received a despatch from Bragg, stating that documents
captured at Nashville proved that part of Bosecrans's army
had been there (which was true, as two divisions of that
army had been sent to Buell in August), and asking Price .
to hasten his advance into Tennessee. Price, however,
knew very well that Bosecrans was between luka and Cor-
inth, and felt certain that Bragg had been misled in his in- .
formation. As the spirit of his orders was to attack Bose-
crans, he had no hesitation in abandoning his expedition to
Tennessee. He therefore sent despatches on the 17th to
Van Dom, again proposing the union of their forces, and an
attack on Corinth. On the 19th he received Van Dom's an-
swer, acceding to his proposition, but asking him to move
to Bienzi in order to effect a junction. Van Dom, haying
secured Port Hudson, and the gunboats having retreated up
and down the river, had left small garrisons at Yicksburg

38 THE MISSI8SIPPL

and Port Hudson, and collected all the rest of his force at
Holly Springs, and was now ready for the offensive. Price
made preparations to march toward Bienzi the next mom^
ing, when, late on the afternoon of the 19th, his pickets
were driven in by Bosecrans at luka.

This battle was brought about in the following manner :
Grant was watching Price's and Van Dom's movements as
carefully as possible, in daily expectation of an attack ; but
on September 10th he confessed that he was unable to "de-
termine the objects of the enemy." On the following day
he telegraped that everything indicated an attack on (Cor-
inth within the next forty-eight hours. He therefore made
some changes in the position of his troops, moving Hurl-
but's division from Memphis to Bolivar, Ord's from Bolivar
to Corinth, and drawing in Bosecrans's troops from luka
and Tuscumbia to the vicinity of Corinth. His army was
then at three central points, Memphis, Bolivar, and Corinth,
ready to move promptly as soon as the enemy's movements
were developed. Price's advanced guard, as already stated,
entered luka on September 13th, and on the 15th a recon*
noissance by Bosecrans's cavalry developed the fact that
I^ice occupied luka in force. Grant immediately prepared
to attack him. In the absence of })ositive knowledge as to
the enemy's plans, three suppositions were possible. First,
that Price intended to cross the Tennessee for the purpose
of joining Bragg, or attacking Buell's rear. Halleck tele-
graphed to Grant on the 17th, to do everything in his power
to prevent this, as a junction of Bragg and Price " would be
most disastrous." Second, that Corinth was to be attacked
simultaneously, by Van Dom from the southwest, and by
Price from the east or northeast. Third, that Price would
endeavor to draw Grant away from Corinth in pursuit, while
Yan Dom should attack that place from the southwest.

lUKA AND CORINTH. 39

Whatever the enemy's plans might be, Grant satisfied him-
self that Van Dom ooxdd not reach Corinth with any con-
siderable force in less than fonr days, and he determined to
attack Price at once, and, if possible, overwhelm him, and
return to Corinth before Van Dom could arrive. Grant,
therefore, ordered Bosecrans to move sonth abont twelve
miles to Bienzi and Jacinto, leave small detachments in
those places to prevent a surprise on Corinth from the
south, thence move rapidly eastward with the bulk of his
force — about 9,000 men — till he was opposite luka, then
turn northward and attack on the roads coming from
J'acinto and Fulton. Ord, with about six thousand men,
was to move along the railroad to Bumsville, then take
roads north of the railroad, and attack on the north and
west of luka. The whole plan of attack was based on occu-
pying the Jacinto and Fulton roads, thus cutting off Price
from all retreat to the west or south. If the attack were
successful, he would be driven against the Tennessee Biver,
where it was hoped to crush him.

Grant went in person with Ord's column, which reached
Bumsville on the 18th, and encamped within six miles of
luka, its advance moving forward to within a few miles of
the town, and skirmishing with Price's cavalry. Prepara-
tions were made to attack at 4.30 a.m., the following day.
After midnight, however, word was received from Bosecrans
that, through the fault of a guide, his march had been
slightly delayed, and one of his divisions was still at Jacinto,
twenty miles from luka; he would, therefore, not be able
to reach luka before one or two o'clock on the following
afternoon. Grant thereupon ordered Ord not to attack
until he heard firing from the other side of luka. During
the 19th, the direction of the wind was such that the firing
vas not heard. Bosecrans sent word, at 12.40 p.m., that he

40

THE MISSISSIPPI

was withia eight miles of Inka, but this was not reoeiyed by
Oiant until after night. Hearing nothing from Bosecrans
during the day, and no sounds of firing, Grant and Ord con-
cluded that Kosecrans cotdd not reach the field thiKfc day,
and Ord was therefore instructed to skirmish with the en-
emy, but not to bring on a general engagement.

Bosecrans, however, had moved at daylight, and puBhing
his men with great energy, his leading division, under Ham-
ilton, reached a point about two miles southwest of Iuka«

on the Jacinto road,
about 4t p.ic Here
they encountered
strong opposition
from the enemy, and
the battle was at once
opened. Hamilton
formed his division
across the forks of
the road, on the wood*
ed knoll shown on the
aicoompanying map.
Stanley's division, as
it came up, was halt-
ed on the road in rear, and only one reg^ent of it was hotly
engaged. Hamilton posted a battery at the forks of the road,
and the battle was mainly a contest for this point. Price
had two divisions, commanded by Generals Little and
Mauiy. Little's division was in the outskirts of the village
on the south, and Maury's on the north. As soon as his
skirmishers were driven in on the Jacinto road, Price or*
dered Little's division to advance on that road, and Maurjr
to move into the village, and be in readiness to assist, if
^ecessary. He was not called upon, howevj^ri tbQ battle

laka, September 19, 1862.

lUKA AND CORINTH. 41

Ymtig fought on the C!onlederafce side by little's division,
and mlumjlj by two l^igades of it, numbering between three
and fonr thousand men. These two brigades, attacked Ham-
ilton's position at the forks of the road with great vehe--
mence, and after some imsaccessfal e£forts, finally oarried
that point, oaptnring the battery, and forcing Hamilton's
Jine back a few hundred yards, but again losing both the;
battery and the position under a determined advance of
Hamilton's men, assisted by one regiment of Stanley's.
Darkness then put an end to the fighting, and Hamilton's
division was withdrawn to the field in rear, its place being
taken by Stanley's division, which had been but slightly,
engaged. Price at once began his preparations for retreat,
and during the night, Bosecrans heard the rumbling of his
wagons moving off to the southeast. At daylight, Stanley's
men moved cautiously forward, and found that the enemy's*
p0Biti(m was abandoned ; they then pressed on to the village, -
but found nothing but a few stragglers in it. Price's whole
command had escaped by the Fulton road. Stanley's divi-
sion was pushed forward in pursuit on the Fulton road,
and Hamilton was countermarched on the Jacinto road,
but at nighty both found themselves distanced by the enemy,
and gave up the pursuit. It will be seen from the map.
that Bosecrans, in his eagerness to reach the field on the
appointed day, and in accordance with the report he had
sent to Grant (but which was not received until night),
had pushed forward on the Jacinto road, and on arriving
near the town had been immediately attacked by the enemy,
and forced into action. He therefore had no opportunity
to move Hamilton's division over to the Fulton road, as had
been arranged in the orders for the battie. This road was
thus left open, and Price availed himself of it to escape
with great promptness. Bosecrans sent word to Grant at

42 THB MISBISSIPPL

10.30 P.M. of the 19th, informing him of the engagement of
the afternoon, and asking him to attack in the morning in
force, adding, " We will try to get a position on oar right,
which will take Inka." Grant, therefore, pushed forward
with Ord's troops early on the 20th, bnt on arriving at Inka
fonnd that Price had escaped. The opportnnity to destroy
Price was lost by the nnf ortnnate, bnt nnavoidable, lack of
concert on the 19th, and by the precipitation with which
Bosecrans came to the field, and was forced to fight without
occupying the Fulton road. Price, as we have seen, had, at
that time, no intention of going to Tennessee, but he sue*
ceeded in returning southward, and subsequently in joining
Van Dom, in accordance with the agreement which had
been made between them.

Bosecrans reported his losses in the battle of luka at 144
killed, 598 wounded, and 40 missing — total 782, nearly 700 of
which were in Hamilton's division, which brought only 2,800
men into action. There is a great discrepancy in the reports
of the Confederate losses. Price, in his report dated Sep-
tember 26th, puts them at 86 killed and 408 wounded — ^total
496; but Bosecrans*s Provost-Marshal certifies that he-
buried 265 who were found dead on the field, that 120 more
died in hospital, that 342 wounded were found in luka, 361
were taken prisoners, and it was estimated that 350 wounded
were carried off — ^making a total of 1,438. General Little
was killed just as his division was coming into action.

Price retreated southward and reached Baldwyn, on the
Mobile and Ohio Bailroad, on September 23d, and imme-
diately notified Van Dom at Holly Springs of his arrival.
Bosecrans and Ord returned to Corinth.

Previous to this time Grant had found that it was impos-
sible to maintain the railroad from Memphis to Corinth,,
which ran parallel to the enemy's front and was subject ta

lUKA AND CORINTa 43

frequent raids by the enemy's cavalry. This line had there-
fore been practically abandoned from Chewalla to the vicin*
ity of Memphis, and commonioation was kept up by means
of the railroads in rear, forming two sides of a triangle from
Memphis to Hnmboldt and Hnmboldt to Corinth. The rail-
road east of Corinth was also practically abandoned, as noth-
ing had been heard directly from Buell for several weeks.
In order to put himself in direct communication with both
wings of his army, at Memphis and at Corinth, Grant estab-
lished his headquarters at Jackson, on October 1st. The re-
turns of his army on that day show that he had 48,000 effec-
tive men, as follows: 7,000 under Sherman at Memphis,
12,000 under Ord at Bolivar, 23,000 under Bosecrans at
Corinth, a small reserve of 6,000 at Jackson, ready to be
used whenever needed. On September 30th, movements of
the Confederates were apparent in the vicinity of Grand
Junction, on the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad. These
movements were of such a character that Grant was left in
doubt whether Bolivar or Corinth was to be the point of
attack. On the following day, however, it was learned that
the Confederates were concentrated at Pocahontas, about
twenty miles northwest of Corinth, and Grant became con-
vinced that Corinth was to be the objective. He imme-
diately notified Bosecrans to be prepared, and directed
Hurlbut at Bolivar to watch the enemy's movements and at-
tack him on the flank if an opportunity offered.

Meanwhile, on September 25th, Van Dom had received
Price's letter announcing his arrival at Baldwyn, and had
immediately requested him to move to Bipley, and had put
his own forces in motion for the same place. These latter
consisted of a division under Lovell, containing three bri-
gades under Generals Bust, Villepigue, and Bowen. Bust's
brigade was composed of a portion of the troops that Breck*'

4i THE MISSI8SIPPL

enridge had led to Baton Bonge (Breckenridge having now
gone in person to join Bragg), Yillepigae's of the troops
that had f onnerly garrisoned Fort Pillow and had since been
stationed on the Mississippi Central Bailroad, and Bowen's
of a portion of Lovell's original command at New Orleans
and Jackson. Van Dom and Price met at Biplej on Sep-
tember 28th, and Van Dom took command, being the senior
officer. The retnm of his troops on that day shows that,
after deducting the garrisons left at Yicksbnrg, Port Hud-
son, and other places, he had about 22,000 in the field.
Price's troops numbering about 14,000 and Lovell's about
8,000. About 15,000 exchanged prisoners had lately arrived
in the interior of Mississippi, but they had not yet been
armed. On the other hand, new regiments had been formed
at the North, and several of them were destined to Grant's
command, but they had not yet arrived.

Van Dom having got his army together at Bipley on
September 28th, moved northward on the following day,
and reached Pocahontas on October 1st. Here he carefully
surveyed the field in front of him and matured his plans for
the offensive. The reasons governing his action are stated
with great cleamess in his admirable report of these opera-
tions, dated October 20, 1862. Three points in front of him,
Memphis, Bolivar, and Corinth, were strongly fortified,
forming the arc of a circle of which the chord was about
one hundred miles long. He judged that to take Memphis
would give no militaiy advantage, and it was doubtful if it
could be held without heavy guns against the Union gun-
boats. To attack Bolivar was to penetrate into the re-en-
trant of the three fortified places and to render himself liable
to disastrous attacks on both flanks. But *' if a successful
attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and north-
west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut

lUKA AND CORINTH. 45

ofif» Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, npon
the arrival of the exchanged prisoners of war, West Tennes-
see wonld soon be in our possession, and communication
with General Bragg effected through Middle Tennessee.
The attack on Corinth was a military necessity requiring
prompt and vigorous action." There can be no doubt that
this reasoning was perfectly sound ; a successful attack
upon Corinth would in all probability have forced Grant
back to Kentucky in the same manner that Bragg had car-
ried Buell back to Louisville, and all the results of the cam-
paign from Fort Henry to Corinth would then have been lost.

Van Dom, therefore, started to attack Corinth with the
utmost energy. Having reached Pocahontas on October 1st,
he turned sharply to the east, crossed the Hatchie, and biv-
ouacked at Chewalla on the night of the 2d. The march
was resumed at daylight on the 3d, Lovell's division in ad*
vance, marching on the right of the Memphis and Charles-
ton Bailroad. Arriving near Corinth, about 10 a.m., his line
of battle was formed with Lovell's three brigades in line,
each supported by a reserve, on the right or south of the
Memphis and Charleston Bailroad ; Price's corps was on the
left, in the angle between the two railroads, Maury's divi-
sion, with two brigades in line and one in reserve, connect^
ing with Lovell, and Hubert's (formerly Little's) division,
similarly formed, on Maury's left. Jackson's cavalry bri-
gade was on the right of the whole line, and Armstrong's on
the left. Van Dom's intention was to open the attack with
LoveU's division, in the hope that Bosecrans would strength-
en his left by withdrawing from his right, and then his main
force. Under Price, was to make the principal attack on
Bosecrans's right

In the meantime, Bosecrans had been fully informed of
the enemy's approach, and had drawn into Corinth all the

THB HISSIB^PPL

detaohm

I the exterior. His

force oonsisted of the two diviaioDs of his own arm;, under
Stanley and Hamilton, and the 2d and 6th dimione of the
Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Davica and Mc-
Eean, His poaition was wall defended by a line of re-

CoTisth,

doubto, coQBtraoted within a short distance of the town, and
by an outer line of intrenchments, about two miles in ad-
yance, which had been bnilt by the Confederates prior to
their evacnation in Mkj. During the night of October 2d
to 8d, Bosecrons iseued orders, directing his divisiona to
move at 3 a.ii., and take post in advance of his line of

lUKA AND CORINTH. 47

redoubts, and about half-way to the outer line; Hamil'*
ton's division was on the right, facing north, Dairies in the
centre, and McKean's division on the left, on the Ghewalla
road, with three regiments advanced to the outer line of
works. Stanley's division was just south of the town, in
reserve. These positions were assumed about 9 A.K.

Van Dom, meanwhile, had been advancing from Ghewalla^
skirmishing all the way with the outposts of McKean's divi-
sion, and about 10 a. m., he deployed into the formation pre*
viously given. Lovell, on the right, at once came in contact
with the three regiments of McKean's division, posted in an
advantageous position on a hill at the intersection of the
Memphis Bailroad with the outer line of works. Deeming
it important to hold this hill. Brig. Gen. J. McArthur, com-
manding the first brigade of McKean's division, moved
forward with four regiments to the support of the three
already posted there. At the same time, Davies asked, and
obtained, permission to move his division forward to the
outer line of works. These two advances were eccentric,
and the* result was a considerable gap between Davies and
McKean's divisions. A severe contest took place on this
outer line, Lovell's division being opposed to McArthur,
and Maury's division attacking the left of Davies's, The
Confederates finally penetrated between Davies and Mc»
Arthur, and the whole Union line was forced back, and took
up a second position about half a mile in advance of the
inner redoubts, Davies refusing his left flank, and McArthur
his right. Lovell's division was now moved past the left of
McKean's division, and came in front of the redoubts on the
southwest of the town. This caused McArthur, as well as
Crocker's brigade of McKean's division, to fall back to these
redoubts, and, at the same time, Price's entire corps made
another violent attack upon Davies's division, and forced it

48 THB MISSISSIPPI

back upon Battery Bobinett, where it re-foTmed and Held its
|)osition until night. One brigade of Stanley's division was
sent to Davies's assistance during his retreat, and the rest of
this division was preparing to assist, when, about 5.30 p.m.,
the enemy's attack ceased. Meanwhile, Hamilton's division,
on the extreme right, had taken but little active part in the
action. In the morning it was formed on the east of the
Mobile and Ohio Bailroad, facing north, and from there ad-
vanced to the outer line of intrenchments. The enemy's
attack, however, was entirely beyond Hamilton's left, and
upon Davies's division. Hamilton changed front to the left,
so as to face the railroad. He then intended to attack the
enemy's left flank, as he was advancing against Davies, but
one of his brigades diverged too far to the right, and the
other was considered too weak to attack alone. Before this
error could be corrected, the enemy had ceased his attack,
possibly alarmed, as Hamilton claims, by the presence of the
latter on his left flank.

The battle closed for this day at sunset, a little before six
o'clock. It had been most encouraging for the Confederate
arms. Bosecrans had been driven back for a distance of
about two miles and had taken refuge in the redoubts just
outside of the town ; the Confederates passed the night
within a few hundred yards of these redoubts, and they
hoped on the morrow to complete the destruction of the
Union army. This army, however, was by no means de-
moralized or disheartened. During the night its position
was rearranged so as to make a strong defence in the morn-
ing. McKean's division was placed on the extreme left in
the vicinity of Battery Phillips, south of the Memphis Bail-
road ; Stanley's division took post across that road in Bat-
teries Williams and Bobinett, relieving Davies's division
which retired to Battery Powell on the north of the town,

lUKA AND CORINTH. 49

and there formed fooing northwest; Hamilton's division
formed the extreme right, beyond Daides's division and
facing north. Bosecrans's force of 23,000 men was there-
fore concentrated on the arc of a circle around Corinth less
than two miles in length, and the prominent points of this
line were defended by strong redoubts.

Van Dom also rearranged his troops during the night.
Lovell's division was placed on the south of the Memphis
railroad, facing east toward the town. Maury's division
was in front of Battery Bobinett with three batteries estab-
lished so as to cover the whole ground on the west of the
town ; and Hubert's division was formed on his left. His
orders were that at daylight Hubert should open a vigorous
attack on the left, pivoting on his own right and swinging
his left down along the Ohio Bailroad against Battery Powell
and the town ; at the same time Maury's batteries were to
opeE on the west against Battery Bobinett and his infantry
were to move straight on Corinth between the two railroads.
When Hubert's and Maury's divisions were well engaged
Lovell was to attack vigorously from the southwest.

This whole plan miscarried, in Yon Dom*s opinion, owing
to the delay in Hubert's division, which was to open the en-
gagement. This division did not attack at daylight, and at
7 A.M. Hubert reported in person to Van Dom, saying that
he was sick. His senior brigade commander was ordered
to take command of the division and carry out the move-
ment ordered. But it was nearly nine o'clock before the di-
vision got started, and meanwhile Maury's men were already
engaged, so that the attack was somewhat disjointed. It was,
however, conducted with great gallantry and determination.
Hubert's division, imder Brig. Gen. Martin E. Green, advanced
with four brigades in echelon, the left thrown forward ; the
whole division pivoted on the right and swung around until
VIII.— 5

60 THE MISSISSIPPI

it occupied a position facing south in the woods north of
Corinth. It then rushed forward from these woods, the two
brigades on the right, composed of Missouri troops, direct-
ing their attack against Battery Powell, and the other two
against Hamilton's line to the east of that battery. These
latter brigades were warmly received by Hamilton and were
driven off after a severe contest without reaching his works ;
but the Missouri troops captured Battery Powell with all
its guns, forcing back the infantry in and near it, and spread-
ing confusion among the artillery posted for its support. A
portion of Davies's division subsequently rallied, however,
and assisted by a brigade of Hamilton's division, recaptured
Battery Powell with its guns, driving out the Missouri
troops with great loss.

As soon as Maury heard heavy firing on his left he gave
the order for his division to move forward straight toward
Corinth. Two regiments of Moore's brigade on his right
at once came against Battery Bobinett, which they en-
tered and there engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand en-
counter with the men of Stanley's division defending it. In
this they were worsted. Colonel Bogers, commanding the
2d Texas, being killed in the midst of the work; they
were then driven out. The rest of this brigade, and Phi-
fer's brigade on its left, moved straight forward against the
left flank of Davies' division, swept it away, and penetrated
into the heart of the town. Here they were met by some re-
serve regiments of Sullivan's brigade, which formed the left
of Hamilton's division, and being in disorder in the streets
and subjected to cross fire of artillery from both flanks
of the Union army, they lost heavily and were forced to re-
treat. The remaining brigade (Cabell's) of Maury's division,
was sent to reinforce the Missouri troops that had captured
Battery Powell, but before they arrived the latter troops

lUKA AND CORINTH. 51

had already been routed; Cabell charged tip against Battery-
Powell bnt was met by a terrible fire and was unable to
reach the parapet ; he was at once forced to join in the re-
treat, although a portion of one of his regiments on the right
was able to reach the town in company with the rest of
Maury's men, and retreated with them.

The duration of this fighting in and around Corinth did
not exceed an hour, but its character was most sanguinary.
While it had been in progress, Loyell was preparing to
make an attack on the southwest, and had entered into some
skirmishing in front of Battery Phillips. But before his
preparations for assault were complete, he received an order
to send one brigade to check the onslaught upon Maury*s
troops at they came out of town ; and this order was quickly
followed by another to employ his whole division as a rear-
guard for the army, which was now in full retreat.

The fighting was over, and the Confederates were all
moving off by noon. Bosecrans rode over the field, and
satisfied himself of the enemy's retreat, but decided not to
begin pursuit until the following day. (General Grant
blamed him for this delay, but Bosecrans justified it on the
ground that his men were worn out by '' two days of fight-
ing, and two almost sleepless nights of preparation, move-
ment, and march." He notified his troops to rest them-
selves, replenish their ammunition, and be ready to start
after the enemy in the morning.

While the battle wits going on during the 3d, Brig.-Oen.
J. B. McPherson, who had been charged with the reconstruc-
tion of the railroads, but had held no command, arrived at
Jackson from Columbus, and was ordered by Grant to take
command of two unassigned brigades stationed along the
railroad between Jackson and Corinth, organize them into
a division, and push on to Corinth. He picked up his four

52 THB MISSISSIPPL

regiments during the 4th, carried them by train to within
twelve miles of Corinth, then disembarked, and marched
the rest of the way, reaching Corinth, and reporting to
Bosecrans at 4 p.m. He was ordered to move his division
at daylight in pursuit of the enemy on the road to Chewalla.
On the morning of the 4th, also, Hurlbut, in obedience to
orders from Grant, moved with his division from Bolivar to
Pocahontas, with orders to intercept the Confederate re-
treat. He bivouacked for the night on the west bank of
the Hatchie Biver, just south of the railroad. On the fol-
lowing morning Ord arrived and took command of this
column. Van Dom*s army x)assed the night at Chewalla.
f Early on the morning of the 5th, Van Dom continued

his retreat, and Bosecrans's troops moved out from Corinth
in pursuit, McPherson in the lead, followed by Stanley,
and McEean's and Hamilton's divisions on parallel roads.
Through some mistake in taking the roads, all four divisions
ran against each other about seven. miles from Corinth ; the
colunms were delayed, and had gone no further than Che-
walla by nightfall. Van Dom reached the Hatchie, oppo-
site Ord*s command at Davis's Mills, early in the morning,
and his advance guard seized the bridge, but it was imme-
diately attacked by Ord and driven back across the bridge.

A very considerable afilEdr ensued between Ord's little
command and the whole of Van Dom's aimy, in which Ord
was severely wounded. Van Dom was not pressed in his
rear by Bosecrans, whose troops were over twelve miles
away, and he managed to defend himself against Ord, and
to continue his retreat on the east bank of the Hatchie for
six miles to Cmm's Mill. Here there was a bridge on which
he crossed his whole army during the night. The following
day he continued his retreat to Bipley, and thence to Holly
S|>rings. Bosecrans and Hurlbut puraued as far as Bipley,

lUKA AND CORINTtt 53

\7hen, owing ix> their lack of preparation for an extended
movement, Grant ordered them to return to Corinth and
Bolivar.

For the numbers engaged, this was one of the most hotly
contested battles of the war. Boseorans reported his losses
at 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 missing ; total, 2,359.
Concerning the Confederate losses there is the usual dis-
crepancy. Their official returns give 505 killed, 2,150
woimded, and 2,183 missing; total, 4,838. On the other
hand, Bosecrans states that he took 2,268 prisoners, and his
Medical Director savs that 1,423 Confederates were buried
on the field. The usual proportion of wounded to killed,
being about five to one, this would make Van Dom's total
loss, including prisoners, over nine thousand. On the
Union side General Hackleman was killed ; General Ogles-
by and a number of colonels commanding brigades or regi-
ments were also wounded.

Upon hearing of Van Dom's defeat at Corinth, Jefferson
Davis nominated J. C. Pemberton to be Lieutenant-General,
and directed him to proceed forthwith to Mississippi He
arrived at Jackson, Miss., and assumed command on Octo-
ber 14th. Van Dom was severely blamed for the loss of the
battle of Corinth, and one of his brigade commanders pre-
pared charges against him for " undertaking an important
expedition . . . without due consideration," and for gen-
eral failure and neglect of duty. He applied for a court of
inquiry, and one was ordered, consisting of Generals Price,
Tilghman, and Maury. This court completely exonerated
Van Dom, and unanimously reported that every allegation
made against him was fully disproved, and that no further
proceedings were necessary. Van Dom continued in com-
mand of a division, under Pemberton, and subsequently
under Bragg, until his death in May, 1863.

54 THB MISSISSIPPI

Bosecrans, on the other hand, leceived fall credit for his
two victories. Immediatelj after luka he was made a Major-
General, his commission dating back to March, 1862; and
three weeks after the battle of Corinth he was ordered to
Louisville, and appointed to the command of the Armj of
the Cumberland, in place of Buell.

As the battle of Antietam (September 17th) brought Lee's
invasion of Maryland to a close, and the battle of Perryville
(October 8th) was the culmination of Bragg's advance into
Kentucky, so this battle of Corinth (October 5th) marks the
&rthest point reached in the Confederate wave of reaction
along the MissiBsippi, which had followed the unsuccessful
naval operations at Yicksburg, and the dispersion of Hal-
leok*s army. From this time forward, the Confederates were
thrown on the defensive ; the Union army resumed the of-
fensive and steadily advanced, slowly at first, but none the
less surely.

CHAPTER UL

THE FIRST MOVB AGAINST VICKSBURG.

On October 24th the order was issued from the War De-
partment ordering Bosecrans to supersede Buell, and de-
nominating the troops under Grant, as the Thirteenth Armj
Corps. The '^Armj of the Mississippi" thus lost its dis-
tinctive designation. The troops in the whole of Grant's
department numbered about 48,500 at the middle of the
month, and were thus distributed :

District of MemphiB, Major-Greneral Sherman 7,000

DiBtrict of Jackson, Major-General Horlbnt 19^300

District of Corinth, Brigadier-Oeneral Hamilton 17,500

District of Golumbas, Brigadier-General Dodge 4,800

Total 48,500

The reverses sustained by the Union armies in the East
during the summer, had necessitated a further call, on Julj
2d, for 300,000 volunteers, to serve for three years or the
war, and in October a large number of these were already
raised and organized. As early as October 8th, Halleck had
notified Grant that he might expect *' a large body of new
levies." In view of the favorable turn of affairs in Vir-
ginia and Kentucky, the defeat of Van Dom, and the pros-
pect of reinforcements. Grant now felt at liberty, for the
first time since Halleck's departure in July, to make prepa-

56 THE MISSISSIPPI

rations for the offensive, and he immediately tnmed his
thoughts in that direction. On October 26th, he addressed
— somewhat hesitatingly — a letter to Halleck, suggesting
*' the destruction of the railroads to all points of the com-
pass from Corinth," and the concentration of his forces near
Grand Junction. He then thought that he " would be able
to move down the Mississippi Central Boad, and cause the
evacuation of Vicksburg, and capture or destroy all the boats
on the Yazoo River.** Grant hastened to add, *' I am ready,
however, to do with all my might whatever you may direct,
without criticism."

It does not appear that any answer was returned to this
letter, or any notice taken of it. Grant was therefore
forced either to lie idle, or to do what he could on his own
responsibility in the absence of instructions. He was not
authorized to abandon Corinth or any other of the many
positions held by his scattered force, but he thought that
by taking two divisions from Bolivar, under McPherson,
and three from Corinth, under Hamilton, he might assemble
a force of about 30,000 men in the vicinity of Grand Junc-
tion, and from there move southward, while Sherman made
a slight demonstration out from Memphis. Orders to this
effect were issued on November 1st, and on the 4th the
troops arrived at Grand Junction and La Grange, where
Grant joined them in person on the same day. Halleck was
informed of this movement on November 2d by a telegram, ,

in which Grant stated his intention to move on to Holly i

Springs, and possibly to Grenada, repairing the railroad
and telegraph as he advanced. Halleck telegraphed his ap-
proval of the advance, " as soon as you are strong enough
for that purpose." He also added that orders had been sent
to the troops at Helena (in the department commanded by
Curtis, at St Louis) to cross the river and threaten Grenada.

THE FIBST MOVB AGAINST VICK8BURG.

67

On the receipt of this despatch, Grant ordeTed Hamilton
to posh out reconnoissances with his caTahy toward H0II7

MemphiB to Yiolmbaig. 1863-1863.

Springs and Biplej, and develop the position of the enemj.
Bnt on November 6th he received a telegram from Halleck,
promising a reinforcement of 20,000 men in a few days.
8*

58 THE MISSISSIPPI

The prospect of so large a reinforcement induced Grant to
suspend his operations nntil thej should arrive, and he im-
mediately sent a despatch to Sherman, coontermanding the
order for his advance. McPherson, however, was directed
to send two divisions of infantry to reconnoitre toward
H0II7 Springs. He came upon a force of the enemy, esti-
mated at 10,000 men, behind the Coldwater, in advance of
Holly Springs, and learned that there were two other
bodies of 10,000 and 13,000 men respectively, at HoUy
Springs and Abbeville. He then returned to the vicinity of
Grand Junction, reaching there on the evening of the 9th.

On the same evening Grant telegraphed to HaUeck that
the reinforcements were arriving very slowly, and if they
did not come on more rapidly, he should attack as he was.
Halleck replied that several regiments had already left Illi-
nois for Memphis, and more were to leave in a few days.
He added, ''Memphis will be made the depot of a joint
military and naval expedition on Vicksburg." This was
very vague, and, as rumors had been floating about for sev-
eral days that an independent expedition was fitting out to
descend the Mississippi, under McClemand, it became ne-
cessaiy for Grant to learn definitely what his status was, and
whether these rumors were true. As he said in his letter to
Sherman, of November 6th, it was impossible for him to
make any plans until he learned where and how the other
Union armies were to advance, so that all might co-operate.
He therefore telegraphed to Halleck in these words : *' Am
I to understand that I lie still here while an expedition
is fitted out from Memphis; or do you want me to push
south as far as possible ? Am I to have Sherman move sub-
ject to my order, or is he and his forces reserved for some
special service? Will not more forces be sent here?"
Halleck replied : ** You have command of all troops sent to

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 59

your Department, and have permission to fight the enemy
where you please." On the 13th, Grant telegraphed that his
cavalry had entered Holly Springs, the enemy having re-
treated behind the Tallahatchie, but stated that he did not
deem it advisable to move forward until he was prepared to
follow np any success. He also asked for additional locomo-
tives to be sent to Memphis. To which Halleck replied that
it was not advisable to repair the railroad south of Memphis ;
that operations in Mississippi ''must be limited to rapid
marches upon any collected forces of the enemy,'* and that
" the enemy must be turned by a rapid movement down the
river from Memphis as soon as sufficient force can be col-
lected.*' This was the first intimation of any definite plan,
and was an outline of the movement executed by Grant and
Sherman during the month of December.

The explanation of the contradictory despatches above
quoted, and the lack of instructions from Halleck to Grant,
is found in the fact that the authorities in Washington were
at this time acting at cross purposes. In the month of
August, Maj.-G^n. John A. MoClemand, then command-
ing a division under Grant, had obtained leave of absence,
and had gone to Washington. His correspondence with
the President and the War Department is not on record,
but it is known that he had frequent interviews with the
President, with whom he had long been acquainted, both
personally and politically, in Illinois. In these interviews
McClemand endeavored to impress upon the President
the great importance, in a political, military, and com-
mercial view, of opening the Mississippi Biver to New
Orleans. He suggested an independent expedition as the
best means to accomplish this purpoie. Both the President
and the Secretary of War were conTioiisd by his arguments,
and, on October 21st, the latter issiiad a secret order, direct-

60 THB MISSISSIPPI

ing McOlemand to proceed to IndisDa, lUinois, and Iowa,
raise and organize volnnteers, and send them to Memphis
or Cairo, " to the end that, when a sufficient force, not re-
quired by the operations of General Grant's command shall
be raised, an exx>edition may be organized, under Greneral
McClemand's command, against Yicksbnrg, and to clear
the Mississippi liiver, and open navigation to New Orleans."
Mr. Lincoln endorsed on the back of this order, that, though
confidential, it might be shown to the Governors of States
and other persons, in General McClemand's discretion, and
that he took a deep interest in the success of the expedition.
No intimation of this order was given to Grant, but it was
necessarily communicated to HaUeck. As an educated sol-
dier, Halleck could not but see that McClemand's course
was in violation of all military discipline, that the exx>edi-
tion must necessarily have a demoralizing and disorganizing
effect on Grant's army, and that two commanders on the
Mississippi, having the same object in view, were not only
unnecessaiy, but liable to bring about disaster. McCler-
nand had also served under his command, and he probably
did not entertain so high ah opinion of his abilities as did
the President and Secretary. It is believed — though writ-
ten evidence of this is not extant — that Halleck protested
against the entire proposition, but without avail. McCler-
nand undoubtedly left Washington with the impression that
he was to have sole command of the expedition; and he
proceeded to Illinois, whence he reported, on November
10th, that twenty regiments had been raised and fom'arded,
and twelve more were nearly ready. These were the very
troops to which Halleck referred in his despatches to Grant
as coming to reinforce him, McClemand seems to have
gained some inkling of this, for, on the 13th, he telegraphed
Stanton : '* I infer that General Grant claims the right

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 61

. . . to control all trooxm sent to Colnmbos and Mem-
phis;" to which Stanton replied that the troops were not
-withdrawn from his orders, bnt sent temporarily to Mem-
phis and Helena for organization.

Thus, while Stanton and McOlemand were making their
plans for an independent movement down the river, Halleck
and Grant were arranging an advance with the whole force
along the Mississippi Central Railroad, Grant being in ig-
norance of McClemand's propositions and Halleck not feel-
ing at Ubertj to communicate them, because McClemand's
status was not publicly announced, and, possibly, not fully
determined. Meanwhile Grant resolved to push forward on
his own responsibility, and on November 15th he notified
Sherman to meet him at Columbus, where he explained his
intentions in detaiL With the troops near Grand Junction
he would move direct to Holly Springs, while Sherman was
to move out with part of his force from Memphis and join
him on the Tallahatchie. Curtis was to be asked to send a
force across the river from Helena to threaten the enemy's
rear at Chrenada. The orders for this movement had already
been given, when, on November 23d, Grant received a de-
spatch from Halleck, inquiring how many men could be
spared to go down the river to Vicksburg, " reserving merely
enough to hold Corinth and West Tennessee." Grant re-
plied that 16,000 men could be spared from Memphis (where
reinforcements had arrived), but none from the rest of the
Department, as orders had already been given for an advance
against Pemberton, an outline of which was given. He
asked if these orders should be countermanded. Halleck
replied, ''Proposed movement approved. Do not go too
far."

Accordingly Sherman moved out from Memphis on the
24th, Mcpherson and Hamilton from Grand Junction on the

62 THE MISSISSIPFL

27th, and a portion of the troops from Helena, under Brig.-
Gen. A. P. Hovey, on the 27th. Grant reached Hollj Springs
with the main body on the 29th; his cavalry crossed the
Tallahatchie December 1st, his infantry occnpied Abbe-
Tille on the 2d, and Sherman reached the Tallahatchie at
Wyatt on the 2d. Washburn's cavalry, forming the ad-
vance of Hovey's column, pushed to within seven miles of
Grenada on the 29th and on the following day destroyed a
small portion of both railroads about ten miles north of
Grenada. He then moved up the Memphis road to Panola,
and thence back to the Mississippi, the entire force reaching
Helena on the 8th. There was constant skirmishing be-
tween all of these advancing columns and the retreating
Confederates, during the six days beginning with November
28th, but at no point did it rise to the importance of an en-
gagement.

On the Confederate side the operations during the month
of November had been limited to observation of the enemy's
movements, eveiy detail of which, including the reports of
McClemand*s projected river expedition, seems to have been
promptly and accurately reported to them. Femberton kept
his headquarters at Jackson, and Van Dom commanded the
troops near Holly Springs and Oxford ; which were formed
into two corps, under LoveU and Price, each of two di-
visions. The losses at Corinth had been more than made up
by returned prisoners, and Van Dom's effective strength was
about 24,000. M. L. Smith still conmianded at Yicksburg,
with about 6,000 men, and Brig.-Gen. W. N. R Beale at Port
Hudson with 5,500. There was also a small force at Jack-
son, so that in aU Pemberton had something less than 40,000
men. He constantly reported to the authorities at Bich-
mond that his force was entirely inadequate to hold his posi-
tions, and asked for reinforcements from Bragg, and from the

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 63

Trans-Mississippi Department under Holmes, stating that
unless these were sent he must withdraw his whole force to
Yicksburg for its defence. When Grant first advanced from
Grand Junction, Pemberton ordered Van Dom (November
8th) to retire from Holly Springs to behind the Tallahatchie,
and again urged upon the authorities his desperate situa-
tion. When Grant renewed his advance at the close of the
month, and the troops from Helena moved against his rear,
Pemberton promptly abandoned his fortifications on the
Tallahatchie, and fell back behind the Yallabusha at Gre-
nada. He established his troops in the latter position on
December 5th, and on the same day Grant entered Oxford
and Sherman arrived at College Hill, a few miles northwest
of that place.

Grant had now advanced about sixty miles from Grand
Junction, but his supplies were still drawn from Columbus,
Ky., over a single-track road, 180 miles long, to Holly
Springs, where he established a depot. His request for
additional locomotives and cars had been disapproved,
and he had been instructed not to repair the railroad
south from Memphis. A good deal of rain had lately
&dlen, making the roads very difficult for hauling, and it
was impossible for him to advance farther, without some
more permanent arrangements for his supplies. He had
received no definite instructions as to the movements re-
quired of him, or the general plans of the War Depart-
ment. His advance had been conducted without any hearty
support from Washington and apparently somewhat in oppo-
sition to the plans of the authorities, for three times within
a month it had been arrested by telegrams from Halleck.
If his advance was to be continued the railroad from Mem-
phis must be repaired and the other roads abandoned or de-
stroyed. In order to learn, if possible, what it was intended

6i THE MISSISSIPPL

that he should do, he telegraphed Halleck on December 4tli,
** How far south would you like me to go ? ** and he stated
that it would be impossible for him to advance beyond Gren-
ada and hold his present line of communications. He sug-
gested, therefore, that he might cut the Mobile and Ohio
Bailroad at Tupelo, and hold the enemy on the Yallabusha,
while a force from Memphis and Helena descended the
river to Yicksburg. This was in accordance with Halleck'a
despatches of November 10th and 15th.

Halleck replied on the following day, approving of the
plan of cutting the railroad at Tupelo, but doubting the pro-
priety of attempting to hold the country south of the Talla-
hatchie. He preferred simply to hold the line from Mem-
phis to Corinth with a small force, while the main body
descended the river. The troops for Yicksburg were ordered
to be back in Memphis on the 20th. On the 5th, Grant tele-
graphed that the roads were becoming bad, and again ex-
pressed his confidence in the result of an expedition down
the river against Yicksburg, provided the troops from He-
lena took part. On the 7th, Halleck replied, giving Grant
authority to move his troops as he thought best, and also to
retain aU troops from Curtis's command which had crossed
the Mississippi Upon receipt of this discretionary author-
ity Grant immediately sent for Sherman to discuss the
matter. He had two plans in view, first, to send Sherman
back to Memphis with two divisions, there to be reinforced
by troops lately arrived and the troops at Helena, and then
to move down the river in transports to the mouth of the
Yazoo, land there and attack Yicksburg in rear, while he
himself pressed forward from Oxford in co-operation ; or sec-
ond, to bring his entire force to Grenada, establish a depot
there, repair the railroad back to Memphis, and then move
rapidly against Jackson and the rear of Yicksburg. There

THE PmST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 65

^Fere veiy grave objections to the first plan, because the
enemy had a short interior line of railroad from Grenada to
Vicksbni^, enabling him to concentrate rapidly at either
point, while the two parts of the Union army would be prac-
tically cut off from direct communication with each other,
and if any accident should happen to delay either column
co-operation between them would be impossible. Neither
column would be in any danger of disaster, for Sherman
could return to his transports and Grant could easily defend
liimself in retreat, if necessary, against Pemberton ; but there
were many chances against complete success. On the other
hand, the direct movement by land would necessitate the re-
■pair of the railroad to Memphis, which would require con-
siderable time ; beyond Grenada, there would be no railroad,
and the common roads were in a very bad condition for
hauling. The advance would necessarily be very slow,
and meanwhile the Confederates might be reinforced. By
going down the Mississippi it was thought that much time
might be saved, and that possibly Sherman might arrive
on the Yazoo without the knowledge of the Confederates
and surprise them before troops could be brought from
Grenada.

After a full discussion of the matter Grant decided in
favor of the first plan, and on December 8th, gave Sherman
his orders to return to Memphis with one division, take
command of all troops in Memphis and on the east of the
Mississippi opposite Helena, organize them into brigades
and divisions, and proceed down the river in co-operation
with the gunboat fleet under Admiral Porter, to reduce
Yioksburg in such manner as his judgment should dictate.
These orders were reported the same day to Halleck, who
telegraphed his approval, but added that ** the President
may insist upon designating a separate commander ; if not.

66 TUB MISSISSIFFL

assign snch officers as yon deem best. Shennan wonld be
my choice as the chief nnder yon."

Sherman left College Hill the next morning, sending a
detachment of cavalry across the country to Helena to no-
tify General Steele of his part in the expedition, and taking
Morgan L. Smith's division with him to Memphis, where he
arrived December 12th. There he fitted out his expedition
and descended the river, as will be subsequently described.

It had been his intention to leave Memphis on the 18th,
but the transports did not arrive in time, and the embarka-
tion took place on the 19th, and the expedition started on
the 20th. On the 18th, Halleck telegraphed to Grant that
the President directed that McClemand should command
the river expedition. Grant forwarded this order by tele-
graph the same day to McClemand at Springfield, and to
Sherman at Memphis. Both telegrams had to go by way of
Columbus, Ky., and as Forrest cut the line on the morning
of the 19th, neither reached its destination. Sherman thus
proceeded in accordance with the original programme, in
complete ignorance of McClemand^s assignment; and he
had already arrived in the vicinity of Yicksburg before Mc-
Clemand left Illinois.

Meanwhile the Confederate authorities had become thor-
oughly alarmed for the safety of the Mississippi, and on No-
vember 24th General J. E. Johnston had been assigned to
the command of all Confederate troops between the Alle-
ghanies and the Mississippi ; the principal part of which
were in Bragg's and Pemberton's armies. He reached Chat-
tanooga on December 4th, and had barely time to communi-
cate with Bragg before Jefferson Davis arrived to give his
personal attention to affairs in Mississippi. After consulta-
tion with Bragg, Davis ordered Stevenson's division and
Vaughn's brigade of McCown's division— about 9,000 men

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 67

in all—to be detached from Bragg's army and sent to Pem-
berton's relief. He then started in person for Jackson and
Yicksburg, requesting Johnston to accompany him. They
arrived at Jackson on December 19th, the day that Sherman
was embarking at Memphis. After visiting Vicksbnrg and
Grenada, Davis returned to Richmond, leaving Johnston in
general charge of all operations in the West. His position
was anomalous and unsatisfactory, for the two armies of
Bragg and Pemberton were so widely separated that they
could not act in concert, and communication between them
was so precarious and uncertain that it was impossible for
one man to efficiently direct both. On the other hand,
two commanders with either one of the armies were un-
necessary. Johnston appreciated this and asked Davis to
assign him to some other duty, but his request was refused.
Upon arriving at Chattanooga and learning the condition
of Pemberton's army, Johnston had at once telegraphed to
Bragg, asking him to send a force of cavalry from Tennessee
to fall upon Grant's communications with Columbus. Bragg
did not receive the despatch, but he had already made the
dispositions requested, on the strength of information re-
ceived direct from Pemberton. Brig. -Gen. N. B. Forrest
was detailed for the duty with a force of about 2,500 cavalry.
He left Columbia, Tenn., on December 11th; and on the
same day Rosecrans, at Nashville, telegraphed Grant as fol-
lows : " Tell the authorities along the road to look out for
Forrest." No point was indicated, but Grant at once in-
structed the commanding officers at Corinth and Jackson to
be on their guard against a movement by Forrest. Forrest
reached the Tennessee at Clifton, about fifty miles east of
Jackson, on the Idth, crossed it on an old flat-boat — ^his ani-
mals swimming — on the 14th and 15th, and advanced toward
Jackson ; on the 16th he reached Lexington, where he met

68 THB MISSISSIPPI

a force of 700 cavalry and two gans nnder €k>l. Bobert G.
IngersoU, who had been sent from Jackson by General
Snllivan to reconnoitre. (See map on jpBge 35.)

This force was entirely ronted, and nearly one-f onrth of it,
including Col. Ingersoll, was captured. On the 19th, For-
rest pushed on toward Jackson. Meanwhile, Brig.-Gten.
Sullivan, commanding the District of Jackson, had received
information, on the 15th, of Forrest's arrival at difton, and
on the 17th, of his having crossed the river and being in
motion toward Jackson. He communicated these facts to
Grant on the same days. Grant immediately telegraphed
to Sullivan to attack Forrest in front, and to Dodge, at
Corinth, to move out and attack him in flank; also to
Brig. -Gen. Lowe, at Fort Henry, to move south and prevent
any more Confederates from crossing. These orders were
repeated in vigorous terms on the 18th. Dodge moved
promptly with two brigades, leaving Corinth at midnight of
the 18th, and marching toward Jackson; but Sullivan's
troops were scattered, and he had been able to send out
only two regiments when Forrest arrived in ihe vicinity of
Jackson, and attacked them on the 19th. Forrest drove
this force back into Jackson, but not deeming it prudent to
attack that place, which was well fortified, he hastily with-
drew during the night, and turning northward on the line of
the Mobile and Ohio Boad, he attacked and captured in suc-
cession all the small posts, and destroyed the railroad as fjKr
as the Kentucky line, where he rested on the 25th. Thence
he began to retrace his steps toward the southeast, along
the branch railroad running from Union City through
Dresden. (See map, Frontispiece.) Meanwhile, Sullivan
had been reinforced at Jackson by troops sent back by
Grant from Oxford, and had collected a force of about
4000 men. He sent this force forward to Humboldt

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 69

and Trenton, and then, hearing that Forrest was at Dresden,
marched across to Huntington to intercept his retreat. For-
rest, however, passed aronnd his rear, between Huntington
and Humboldt, and would have escaped easily, but for
delay in crossing his wagons through a muddy stream,
where the bridges had been destroyed. As soon as this was
passed he continued his march toward Lexington, and Sulli-
van pushed after him with all haste, moving south on the
direct road fi-oin Huntington to Lexington. On December
Slst, at a point known as Parker's Cross Beads, a few miles
north of Lexington, the leading brigade of Sullivan's com-
mand, and Forrest's troops came in sight of each other on
converging roads, and a fight was inevitable. This bri-
gade numbered about 1,500 men, and Forrest was more
. than a match for it ; he gradually drove it eastward and
southward from the cross-roads, but the fighting lasted
several hours, and during this time Sullivan was advancing
with his other brigade, and; about 3 p.m., came upon For-
rest's rear. Forrest was then obliged to extricate himself
as best he could, and he succeeded in escaping with a loss
of about 300 men, six guns, and several caissons and am-
munition wagons. Continuing his retreat through Lexing-
ton that night and the following day, he was approaching
Clifton, on the morning of January 1st, when he discov-
ered a regiment of Union cavalry, sent by Dodge from
Corinth, across the road. This was quickly driven off, and
he reached the river bank at noon. Baising the same old flat-
boat which had served him two weeks before, but which had
since sunk, he ferried his men and wagons over, and swam his
animals, and by eight o'clock in the evening he was safe on the
eastern bank of the Tennessee. An additional force of cav-
alry sent from Corinth did not reach Clifton until January 3d,
and was then merely able to exchange shots across the river.

70 THE MISSISSIPPI.

•

In this raid Forrest had destroyed the railroad from point
to point throughout the distance of sixty miles from Jack-
son to Columbus ; and with a loss of less than 400 men, he
claims to have killed^ wounded, and captured nearly 2,500 of
his enemy. Grant's communications with Columbus and
Washington were cut off from the 19th to the 30th of De-
cember, and the transportation of supplies was interrupted
for a longer period.

While Forrest was thus striking against the upper part of
Grant's communications, another move was made against
that portion of them between Holly Springs and Grand
Junction. Just prior to that time, viz., on December 13th,
Grant had sent the greater part of his own cavalry on a raid
against the Mobile and Ohio Boad in the vicinity of Tupelo.
They were engaged on this expedition, when, on. tfas- 19^
word was received that a considersJale- Isody of Confederate
cavalry had left Grenada. tlHf day previous, and was moving
northward past Gtsnt's left flank, with the evident intention
of striking his rear. Van Dom had, in fact, taken personal
oeittmand of all the cavalry in his army — about 3,500 men —
and moved northward for this purpose. Grant immediately
collected what cavalry he had left and sent them back as
rapidly as possible to defend the railroad, and at the same
time telegraphed to the commanding officers of Holly
Springs, Grand Junction, and other points in rear, notifying
them of the movement of th^ enemy's cavalry, and directing
them to be prepared, and to defend their posts at all haz-
ards. These orders were received and acknowledged on
the afternoon of the 19th, yet, nevertheless, at daylight on
the 20th, Col. Murphy, commanding at Holly Springs, was
completely surprised by Van Dom, and surrendered his
whole command of 1,500 m^ almost without firing a shot.
Van Dom stopped for a day to bum up the supplies form-

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 71

in^ Grant's depot, estimated at $1,500,000 in yalue, and then
poshed on northward to Davis's Mills, just south of Grand
Jnnction, where he was beaten off on the 21st. He then ad-
iranced to Bolivar, where he was nnsnccessfnl in a skirmish
on the 24th, which induced him to retrace his steps. He
attacked the little post of Middleburg, just south of Bolivar,
where he was met by a most gallant defence, and was driven
off. He then passed to the east of Grand Junction, and
reached Bipley on the 25th. Grant had sent all his available
cavalry in pursuit, under Col. Mizner, but the pursuit was
feeble, and Van Dom was not overtaken. Mizner gave up
the chase beyond Bipley, and Van Dom returned in safety
to Grenada, passing again beyond Grant's left flank.

These two simultaneous raids of Forrest and Van Dom
had a most decisive, effect upon the issue of the campaign.
Van Dom destroyed the depot of accumulated supplies, and
Forrest destroyed the only road by which fresh supplies
could be brought up. The country had been exhausted by
the support of two armies subsisting on it in part for several
months. There was no alternative for Grant but to fall
back and open direct communications with Memphis. He
immediately put his army on three-quarter rations, made
preparations to gather up whatever food was still left in the
country, and issued orders to fall back behind the Talla-
hatchie on December 21st. On the 23d Grant wrote from
Holly Springs to "The Commanding Officer, Expedition
down the Mississippi," saying that the Confederate raids
had broken up his communications, that he had fallal back
behind the Tallahatchie, and that any farther advance on
his part was impracticable. He would therelbre be unable
to hold the enemy on the Tallabusha, except by a mere de-
monstration. This was six days before Sherman attacked at
Chickasaw Bluffs, and, had the letter reached him, it would

72 THE MISSISSIPPI.

doubtless have modified Sherman's operations. Bnt it had
to go by courier to Memphis, and there await a boat going
down the river. McClemand arrived at Memphis before
any boat left, and the letter was delivered to him. Sher-
man, therefore, did not hear of its contents until communi-
cated to him by McClemand on January 3d, several days
after his assault had been made. There was no communica-
tion of any kind between Grant and Sherman from the time
the latter left the vicinity of Oxford, on December 8th, until
the arrival of the steamer which brought McClemand.

During the last week in December, Grant gradually with-
drew a portion of his troops from the Tallahatchie, sending
them to the vicinity of Grand Junction, with orders to re-
open and g^uard the railroad from Memphis to Corinth. He
remained in person at Holly Springs, and the greater part
of McPherson's command was posted in advance on the Tal-
lahatchie. Telegraphic communication had meantime been
re-established with Washington, via Columbus, and on
January 8th Grant received a telegram from Halleck, dated
the night before, saying that Bichmond papers had been
received, giving full accounts of Sherman's repulse at Chick-
asaw Bluffs, and urging him in the strongest language to
take all disposable force in Mississippi and West Tennessee,
and reinforce Sherman at once. Grant immediately gave
orders to abandon Holly Springs and move back to the
vicinity of Grand Junction. He then repaired to Memphis,
arriving there on January 10th, sent letters of inquiry to
McClemand and Porter, and telegraphed to St. Louis for
transportation to take 16,000 men to Yicksburg.

It is now necessary to follow the course of Sherman's move-
ments down the Mississippi. He reached Memphis on his
return from Oxford, as already stated, on December 12th ; and
immediately sent dispatches of Grant's and his own to Por-

THE FIRST MOVB AGAINST VICKSBURG, 73

ter, at Cairo, asking for the co-operation of his fleet, and to
the Chief Qnartermaster at St. Louis, requiring transports
for 30,000 men to be at Memphis in time to start on the
18th. It was short notice, but by the energy of Col. Bobert
Allen and Capt. L. B. Parsons, sixty-seven boats arrived at
Memphis on the morning of the 19th, and the embarkation
began on the same day. Porter's fleet had arrived the pre-
vious day. Sherman had brought back with him the divi-
sion of M. L. Smith, and at Memphis he found the new regi-
iments sent forward by McQemand; these he organized
into two divisions, under A. J. Smith and G. W. Morgan.
The troops at Helena were organized into a fourth division
under Brig. -Gen. F. Steele. The whole force amounted to 50
regiments and 10 batteries, and numbered in all about 32,000
men with 60 guns. The expedition left Memphis on De-
cember 20th, stopped at Helena on the 21st to pick up
Steele's division, resumed its journey on the 22d, and reached
Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg, before day-
light on the 25th. Here A. J. Smith's division was landed
on the Louisiana shore, to advance against and break up the
railroad coming into Vicksburg from the west, over which
great quantities of supplies were transported to the Confed-
erates. On the 26th, the remaining three divisions contin-
ued on to the mouth of the Tazoo Biver, and moved up that
river thirteen miles, where they disembarked on the bottom
lands between the Yazoo Biver and the Walnut Hills. A. J.
Smith's division rejoined them the next day.

These hills are simply a portion of the great bluff bound-
ing the valley of the Mississippi Biver on the east. The
waters of the Mississippi run sharp against this bluff at
Vicksburg, but just above that city the river and bluff
diverge, the latter trending off to the northeast, and not
being met again by the Mississippi short of Memphis, a dis-
VIII.

74 THE MISSISSIPPI.

tance of over two hundred miles in a straight line. The
space between the river and the bluff, which is sixty miles
wide at its widest part, is low bottom land filled with innum-
erable creeks and bayous and lakes marking former beds of
the river. All of these waters are drained southeastwardly
into the Tazoo Biver, which runs along the base of the
bluff for over one hundred miles, and is formed at its head
by the Yallabusha and Tallahatchie Bivers, draining the
high land north and east of Grenada.

It was Sherman's intention to descend the Mississippi
as rapidly as possible, and, while Grant held the bulk of
Pemberton's force on the Tallabusha, near Grenada, to
surprise, if possible, the Confederates at Yicksburg, and
gain possession of a point of the Walnut Hills, near
Haines' bluff, twelve miles northeast of Yicksburg, from
which his force could be supplied by the Mississippi
and Yazoo Bivers. Then, if he was strong enough, he
would take Yicksburg himself ; if not, he hoped to cut
the railroad between Yicksburg and Jackson, ^and then
defend himself on the banks of the Yazoo until Grant's
force, pushing Pemberton south from Grenada, could join
him. The whole plan was based on the idea of a surprise
on Sherman's part, and a co-operation between the two
armies. It entirely miscarried. The co-operation of Grant's
force was rendered impossible, as we have seen, by the de-
struction of his supplies and communications by Yan Dorli
and Forrest ; and the anticipation of a surprise was not real-
ized. The Confederates not only had spies in Memphis,
and in every plantation along the river bank, but they had
small detachments of cavalry, partisans, and guerillas con«
cealed along the river. Sherman's progress was reported by
them with great accuracy twice a day from the hour of leav*
ing Memphis. These reports reached Pemberton on De-

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBXJRG. 75

cember 23d and 24th from so man^ different sources as to
leave no doubt of their accuracy. The whole plan was
thus revealed to Johnston and Pemberton, who immediately
took ateps to frustrate it.

On the 23d, Vaughn's brigade was ordered from Grenada
to Vicksburg, followed on the 25th by one brigade, and
on the 26th by the other brigade of Maury's division.
These movements were quickly made by raiL On the 26th
word was received that Sherman's troops were landing up
the Yazoo, and Pemberton immediately went in person to
^cksburg, ordering Price's corps, at Grenada, and Steven-
son's division, lately arrived at Jackson from Chattanooga,
to follow him. Instead, then, of having to contend with

•

the 6,000 men forming the garrison of Yicksburg, She]|-

*

man had not less than 12,000 men in front of him in for-
tified positions along the bluff. The bluff was fully two
hundred feet high, and had an unbroken view of the
whole bottom land as far as the Yazoo. A thousand men
posted in trenches on this bluff ought easily to keep
oSf and slaughter ten thousand moving to attack, and this
enterprise was doomed to failure. Sherman, however,
knew nothing of the arrival of Confederate reinforcements,
and having proceeded thus far, it was out of the ques-
tion for him to withdraw without making a vigorous as-
sault

Sherman landed his troops at Johnson's plantation, oppo-
site the mouth of Steele's bayou, on December 26th. The
triangular space between Yicksburg, Haines' Bluff, and
Johnson's plantation is bounded by the Yazoo Biver on one
side, and the Walnut Hills on the other. It is low, allu-
vial land, overflowed in the highest stages of the river,
and filled at all times with a number of bayous and swamps.
In the whole twelve miles between Haines' Bluff and Yicks-

76

THE MISSISSIPPL

burg there were but five points where it was practicable
to pass from the Yazoo through the network of bajoos to

VlCKSBURO

Scale ^f Mtlm^

«M»s\

Ohidkaaaw Bluffs. Deoember S9, 1803.

the blnffs. All of these points were commanded by Con-
federate batteries. At the point where Sherman landed he
had Chickasaw Bayou on his left and a former bed of the

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBUBG. 77

Tazoo, commonly known as " the Lake," in his front. Still
farther to his left was another stagnant bayou called Thomp-
son's Lake. Chickasaw Bayon, Thompson's Lake, and '' the
Lake " all unite at a point about two miles from the Yazoo
and half a mile from the blufifs, and at this point a small
brook running out from the hills empties into them.

In landing, Steele's division formed the extreme left, on
the left of Chickasaw Bayou, Morgan's division came next
on the right of that bayou, M. L. Smith's division next, and
A. J. Smith's on the right, following the road leading from
Johnson's plantation direct to Yicksburg. These positions
were taken on the 27th, and during that day the four col-
umns moved forward skirmishing slightly with the enemy.
On the 28th a general advance was made, in the nature of
a reconnoissance, as far as the lake in front of the bluff ; in
this reconnoissance M. L. Smith was seriously wounded
in the hip and obliged to leave the field, a loss greatly
regretted by Sherman in his report. On the left, Steele
found his way blocked by Thompson's Lake, which could
only be crossed on a narrow corduroy causeway, completely
enfiladed by one of the enemy's batteries, which would mow
down the narrow head of column as fast as the men could
show themselves ; he was therefore ordered to return to
the Yazoo Biver, cross back in the transports to the other
side of Chickasaw Bayou, and come up in support of Mor-
gan's division ; this he did during the afternoon and night
of the 28th. In the centre, Morgan, who had the only pon-
toon train in the command, laid it across a small bayou sup-
posing it to be the old lake near the bluff; on reaching the
latter he found that there was a natural crossing over it.
On the right A. J. Smith advanced along the main road on a
line with the other columns. There was considerable skir-
mishing throughout the day with the advanced pickets of

78 THE MISSISSIPPI.

the Confederates, but the losses were slight, the Confed-
erates retiring to the bluff. The troops passed the night
of the 28th in position along the lake parallel to the
bluff and about flye hundred yards from it. The next
morning (29th) further reconnoissances were made and or-
ders were then given for the assault. The main attack was
to be made against the centre of the enemy's line by Mor-
gan's division, supported by Steele's ; A. J. Smith, with the
division of M. L. Smith and one brigade of his own, was to
cross a narrow sand bar across the lake about a mile below
the point of Morgan's attack, and then advance against the
levee, on the other side of which the Confederates were
strongly intrenched ; this attack was to be a demonstration
in the nature of a diversion in favor of Morgan, or a real at-
tack, according to the amount of success achieved. On the
extreme right the rest of A. J. Smith's division was to make
a demonstration on the road to Yicksburg.

At twelve o'clock the signal for the assault was given and
immediately De Courcy's brigade of Morgan's division
crossed the lake and advanced through a terrible fire over
the half mile of gently sloping ground in the nature of a
glacis, which led up to the Confederate works on the bluff.
On his left, Blair's brigade of Steele's division crossed the
lake near its junction with Chickasaw Bayou, and made a
similar advance through an equally hot fire. These two
brigades reached the enemy's works, but they were entirely
unsupported; Thayer's brigade of Steele's division took a
wrong direction and only one regiment was brought into ac-
tion. ; Lindsey's brigade attempted to build a bridge across
the lake on De Courcy's right, but did not succeed and did
not cross the lake at all ; Sheldon's brigade of the same di-
.vision was not brought into action further than to come up
in rear of Lindsey where it lost a dozen men by stray shots.

THE PmST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBUBG. 79

The attack of M. L. Smith's division was not successful ; one
regiment in the lead, the Sixth Missouri, crossed the sand-
bar but found that the only way to climb the levee was by a
narrow path barely wide enough for two men abreast ; the
Confederates were almost over their heads, and but forty feet
from them, and it was impossible to advance against their
fire on this narrow path ; this regiment therefore sheltered
itself by digging out part of the bank of the levee with their
hands and remained there until darkness enabled them to
retreat The whole brunt of the assault was made by the
two brigades of De Courcy and Blair, and one regiment
(Pourth Iowa) of Thayer's brigade, numbering not more
than 6,000 men in all ; they advanced with the utmost gal-
lantry right up to the Confederate works, but arrived there
they looked around and saw that nothing was coming to
their support. The other two brigades of Morgan's divi-
sion did practically nothing to assist them. Cut to pieces
by front and cross fire, De Courcy's and Blair's men were
finally forced to yield, and between 3 and 4 p.m. they fell
back and recrossed the levee. De Courcy's brigade lost
jabout 700, Blair's 743, and the Fourth Iowa 111 men ; the
losses in the rest of the force amounted' to less than 400,
the exact total being 1,929, viz.: 191 kOled, 982 wounded,
and 756 missing. The batteries against which the attack
was made were defended by only six regiments of S. D.
Lee's brigade, which formed a part of the original garrison
of Yicksburg under Martin L. Smith. Their loss was less
than 100 men, and the entire losses of the Confederates dur-
ing the skirmishing of the 27th and 28th and the assault of
the 29th was only 57 killed, 120 wounded, and 10 missing ;
total 187.

. Sherman's troops remained in their positions close to the
. lake during the night of the 29th. He at, first thought of

80 THE MISSIBSIPPL

renewing the assanlt in the morning, but concluded that the
position was too strong, especially as the enemy would now
concentrate all his force npon the point where the attack
had been made. He therefore determined to hold his pres-
ent ground, but send 10,000 men to try an assault higher
up the river at Haines' Bluff. Porter agreed to escort the
transports and cover the landing, and the movement was
fixed for the night of December 31st. The troops were
selected and embarked during the night, and Sherman
then returned to his original position, intending to engage
the enemy there as soon as cannonading should be heard
above. At daylight, however, he received word that the fog
was so dense that the boats could not move, and the aSait
must be postponed until the next night. During the day
he received further word from Porter that, on the next
night, the moon would not set until 5.25 a.m., so that the
landing could not be made in darkness. Porter considered
the affidr too hazardous under these circumstances, and it
was therefore abandoned.

The position in which Sherman's troops were now situated
was extremely disagreeable and dangerous ; they were biv-
ouacked in the low, marshy, bottom land, where a slight
rise in the river any night might swamp and drown the
whole command; the water-marks on the trees ten feet
above the ground had an ominous look, and all were of
opinion that any further assaults were impracticable. Sher-
man therefore determined to re-embark his men, and return
to the mouth of the Tazoo Biver, which was done without
opposition from the enemy on January 2d. Here he met
McClemand, who had reached Memphis on December 28th,
left on the 30th, and arrived at Milliken's Bend on Janu-
ary 1st. He exhibited his orders placing him in com-
mand of the river expedition, and Sherman immediately re-

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICESBUBG. 81

iinqnished the command, and, in his own words, '' subsided
quietly into the more agreeable office of a corps com-
mander," with the intention to ''endeavor to make it a good
one."

The project of a combined movement on Yicksburg,
partly by land and partly by the river, thus ended in com-
plete failure. The failure was due to the destruction of
Giant's supplies through the cowardice or incapacity of the
officer in command at Holly Springs, and to the formidable
character of the Confederate position for defence, both of
which were contingencies which could not have been fore-
seen. Tet it cannot be forgotten that the Mississippi was
opened from Cairo to Memphis in the most brilliant and suc-
cessful manner by the campaign from Fort Heniy to Corinth,
conducted in rear of the river by a united army ; that all at-
tempts against Yicksburg by the river failed, and, after
months of unsuccessful efforts through creeks and bayous, it
was finally taken by a campaign against its rear, starting from
the south of Yicksburg. It is therefore a question for dis-
eussion whether it would not have been better to have estab-
lished a base at Memphis, repaired the railroad south of that
point, and advanced with every available man united in a
single force, along the Mississippi Central Railroad, for the
purpose of bringing Pemberton to battle and crushing him.
If he declined battle, he must either have retreated on Mo-
bile, leaving Yicksburg free, or else have retreated into Yicks-
burg, whence he could have been followed as far as Haines'
Bluff, and a base established there, as was done in the
spring of 1863. The risks of such a movement were far less
than in the final campaign from Bruinsburg through Jack-
son to Haines' Bluff. It will be remembered that a direct
movement from Memphis against the rear of Yicksburg was
the one suggested by Grant in his letter to Halleck, of Oc-
4*

82 THE MISSISSIPPL

tober 26th, before he had any intimation of the plans of
Halleck or the President. Grant, however, had only a lim-
ited discretion in the matter, and the responsibility for the
movements in December, 1862, whether wise or unwise,
mnst rest with the authorities in Washington. While Grant
approved, and even urged, the movement down the river,
yet all other movements were rendered impossible by his
orders.

There is one other feature which must be stated in order
to complete the discussion of this first movement against
Yicksburg, and that is the co-operation expected from New
Orleans. No allusion has hitherto been made to it, because
there was no such co-operation, but it was fully intended
that there should be, and in nearly all of Halleck's tele-
grams to Grant in November and December, 1862, reference
was made to the co-operation of General Banks. That offi-
cer had been directed to supersede Butler in command of
the Department of the Gulf by orders issued on November
9, 1862 ; and his instructions laid special stress on the im-
portance of moving up at once to open the Mississippi.
Owing, however, to the delay in collecting the reinforce-
ments which were to accompany him, Banks did not saU
from New York till December 4th, nor reach New Orleans
till December Mth. A large part of his force was immedi-
ately sent up the river, without disembarking at New Or-
leans, to Baton Bouge, of which they took possession with-
out resistance. But they did not feel strong enough to
advance against Port Hudson until three months later. The
troops on the lower Mississippi had, therefore, no influence
upon the movements of December, 1862, against Yicksburg.

The question of what was now to be done with the troops
forming the river expedition cannot be more clearly stated
than in the following words, taken from a letter written to

THE FIRST MOVE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 83

Halleck by Shennan, dated " On board Forest Qaeen, Jan-
nary 5, 1863 ; '^

•

" I reached Yicksborg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted, and
failed. Re-embarked my command nnc^posed and turned it over to
mj sQooessor, General MoGleraand. At first I proposed to remain
near Vioksburg to await the apiwoach of General Grant or General
Banks to co-operate* bnt as General MoClemand had brought intelli-
genoe, the first that had reaohed me, that General Grant had fallen back
of the Tallahatchie, and as we could hear not a word of Greneral Banks
below, instead of remaining idle I proposed we should move our entire
force in concert with the gunboats to the Arkansas, which is now in
boating condition, and reduce the Post of Arkansas, where seven thou-
sand of the enemy are intrenched and threaten this river. One boat,
the Blue Wing, towing coal barges for the navy and carrying dis-
patches, has been captured by the enemy, and with that enemy on our
rear and flank our communications would at all times be endangered.
General McGlemand agreed, and Admiral Porter also cheerfully as-
sented, and we are at this moment en route for the Post of ArVi^T'gft",
fifty miles up the Arkansas River.**

MoClemand bad assumed formal command on Jannazy
4tb, styling bis troops the <* Army of tbe Mississippi " and di-
viding tbem into two corps, the first under Morgan consist-
ing of Morgan's and A. J. Smith's divisions, and tbe second
under Sberman, consisting of Steele's and Stuart's (formerly
M. li. Smitb's) divisions. Tbe entire force left Milliken's
Bend on tbe 5tb, and proceeded up tbe Mississippi to tbe
moutb of Wbite Biver, arriving there on tbe 8tb ; ascending
that stream a few miles tbey passed through a cut-off into
tbe Arkansas, and on tbe evening of tbe 9tb, tbey came in
sigbt of tbe Arkansas Post, called by tbe Confederates Fort
Hindman.

A portion of tbe Mississippi squadron accompanied tbe
transports as an escort. During tbe six months which bad
elapsed since it left Yicksburg in July, 1862, this squadron

84 THB MIS8ISSIPPL

had been largely angmented, and it now numbered 11 iron-
clads, 38 nnarmored gunboats, 6 rams, and 15 tngs and des-
patch boats, in all 70 vessels with a capacity of 16,905 tons,
a force of 5,500 men, and an armament of 304 guns.

Porter had with him on this expedition the following de-
tachment from his squadron, viz. :

DeKalb (formerly St. LoaiB), LieateDant-Conmumder Walker. 18 gniuL

Cincinnati, Lieutenant Baohe 13 ^^

LooiBville, Lieutenant-Commander Owen 18 *^

Monarch, Colonel A. W. E!llet Ram.

Black Hawk, Lieutenant-Commander Bieeee 8 guns.

Lexington, Lieutenant-Commander Shirk 7 ^^

Battler, Lieutenant-Commander Smith 6 ^*

Glide, Lieutenant Woodworth 6 **

66 guns.

Fort Hindman was a four-sided bastioned work, about one
hundred yards on a side, built on a bluff about twenty-five
feet above the river level, at a bend of the river where it had
an unobstructed view for over a mile in either direction ; it
was supplemented by a line of trench running from one
angle of the fort in a direction perpendicular to the river for
about a mile, where it terminated in an impassable bayou.
About a mile and a half lower down the river were some
other trenches built on the levee. The entire armament
consisted of two 9-inch columbiads, one 8-inch columbiad,
and 14 field guns ; the garrison numbered about 5,000 men
under command of Brig.-Gen. T. J. Churchill.

McClemand's expedition proceeded up the Arkansas on
January 9th, the gunboats in the lead, followed by Sher-
man's corps, and then Morgan's, in transports. Late in the
afternoon they halted about three miles below the fort, and
began landing during the night. At noon of the 10th, Sher-

THB FIRST IIOVB AGAIHfiT TICKSBDRG. 65

Joan's corps began the march, Steele's diTiaion in the lead.
This division took a wrong direction, owing to igaoranoe of
the roads, and was recalled during the afternoon, bat did not
rejoin its corps until the next morning. The other division,
onder St^nart, moved along the river bank, and fonnd the
oater defences on the levee abandoned, they being completely

~W

Juauy 11, ISeS.

enfiladed by the Ate of the gnnboats. Continning its march,
and arriving in the vicinity of the fort, Stuart's division
left the river, and moved off to the right. Iilorgan's corps,
which was following, came in on its left next to the river
bank. During the night, Sherman's corps took position
abont one thonsand yards in front of the trenches, with
his right resting on the bayon ; Uorgan, with three bri-

86 THB MISSIS81PPL

gades, being on his left, and extending to the river. One bri-
gade (De CJoorcy's) of Morgan's corps was left in reserre to
guard the transports at the point of landing, and another
(Lindsay's), with fonr g^ins, had been landed on the other
bank on the river, marched across the neck of the bend, and
taken position above the fort, so as to cat off all retreat up
the river, and prevent the arrival of reinforcements from that
direction. Dnring the evening, the g^nnboats moved np
toward the fort, and opened a vigorous fire, which did great
damage. Their superiority in artillery was so great that
the Confederates were entirely unable to answer the fire.
The troops passed the night in the position above men-
tioned.

On the morning of the 11th further reconnoissances were
made of the ground in front of the enemy's trenches, and
the troops were slightly moved so as to take the most advan-
tageous places for the assault. About noon, MoClemand
sent word to Porter that eveiything was ready, and asked
him to begin the bombardment of the fort, as previously
arranged. The gunboats then moved up the river to within
a few hundred yards of the fort, and, at 1 p.m., opened
fire with their 66 pieces. The artillery of the fort was
goon silenced, the larger guns being all destroyed, and the
bombproofs being knocked to pieces. As soon as the sound
of the navy guns was heard, the field artillery, numbering
about 45 pieces, which was disposed in the intervals of
Sherman's and Morgan's line, immediately opened fire, and
kept it up for the space of about half an hour. The ar-
tillery then ceased, and the infantry rushed forward to the
assault along the whole line. They had a distance of about
four hundred yards to cross in order to reach the trenches,
part of it open and part cut up by gn^llies and depres-
sionsy which afforded a certain amount of shelter. Their

THE FIRST HOVB AGAINST VICKSBURG. 87

progress was ai first rapid, but they soon enooontered a
withering fire from behind the intrenchments, which stag-
gered and sobered them, and retarded their progress. About
3 P.M., Sherman sent word to Morgan that his left was yery
heayily pressed, and Morgan directed A. J. Smith to send
three regiments to Sherman's assistance, and sent back word
for De Courcy's brigade to come up and join him. The
firing, meantime, was kept up without any relaxation, and
the Union troops gradually worked their way forward until
they were within less than one hundred yards of the in-
trenchments, and were preparing for a final assault, when
the cry ran along the Confederate line, ''Baise the white
flag, by order of General ChurchilL Pass the order up the
line." Churchill and his brigade commanders all deny hay-
ing given any authority for such an order, and the origin of
it cannot be traced. But the flags appeared at several
places at the same moment, and both Sherman and Morgan
gave orders to cease firing, and sent aides-de-camp into the
work. At the same time they moved their troops close up to
the parapet in order to be prepared for any emergency, and
Sherman directed Steele to move along the bayou around the
left of the enemy's line, and prevent any escape in that direc-
tion. Sherman now entered the trenches in his front, and
Morgan rode into the fort, and both demanded a surrender.
An awkward moment ensued, as one of the brigade com-
manders opposed to Sherman refused to snrr^ider, claiming
that the white flag had been raised without authority. A
single shot might have produced great loss of life, but, for-
tunately, before any accident happened. General Churchill
arrived, and told this officer there was nothing to do but
surrender, and he sullenly ordered his men to stack arms.
Churchill himself sorrendeied the fort to McClemand about
4.30 RM.

88 THE MISSISSIPPI.

The Confederates lost abont 200 men in killed and
wonnded, and the nnmber of their prisoners connted and
sent North on the following day was 4,791. The Union loss
was, 129 killed, 831 wonnded, and 17 missing; total, 977,
exclusive of 31 killed and wounded on the gunboats. Their
trophies were the fort and everything in it, including 17
pieces of artillery, large and small, and a very considerable
amount of ammunition and subsistence stores.

McClemand remained at Arkansas Post for the next three
days, occupied in gathering up captured property, sending
off prisoners, and destroying the fortifications. During this
time he was in some doubt as to his future movements. On
the 14th he had consultations with Porter and Sherman, and
addressed letters to them stating his fixed intention to as-
cend the Arkansas to Little Bock, and thence march against
a force stationed at Brownsville, about midway between the
Arkansas and White Bivers. He was also in correspondence
with the commanding officer at Helena for the purpose of
securing his co-operation in a movement to the interior of
Arkansas, the two expeditions to act as a diversion for the
Union troops operating in Missouri. But McClemand hesi-
tated to ascend the Arkansas with his transports, as the
river was falling and he might not be able to return. In the
midst of his doubts a peremptory order from Grant arrived
on the evening of the 14th, directing him to return forthwith
to the Mississippi. It appears that on January 8th, while
entering the White Biver on his way to Arkansas Post, Mc-
Clemand had written to Granii stating his movements and
the reasons for them. Besides giving the perfectly valid
reason that the Post of Arkansas was a constant menace to
the navigation of the Mississippi he hinted vaguely at the
possibility of co-operating with Curtis's force in Arkansas
and creating a diversion for the troops in Missouri^ Grant

THB FIRST MOVB AGAINST VICKSBURG. 89

teoeived this on the 11th ; he at once feared that MoCler-
hand might become involved in a campaign in Arkansas
which it might require weeks to complete, and meanwhile
his troops would be detached from the all-important object
of capturing Yicksburg. He therefore wrote on the 11th to
McClemand, disapproving of his project, which might an-
swer for some of the purposes suggested but would have no
bearing on Yicksburg, and directed him to return at once to
the Mississippi unless he was acting under orders from su-
perior authority. At the same time he telegraphed Halleck
that " McClemand has gone on a wild-goose chase to the
Post of Arkansas," to which Halleck replied on the follow-
ing day, "You are hereby authorized to relieve General
McClemand from command of the expedition against Yicks-
burg, giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself.*'
On the 13th Grant received a report from McClemand an-
nouncing the capture of Arkansas Post, to which Grant re-
plied directing him to return to Milliken's Bend unless he
had some object not visible from a distance. McClemand
received this on the 15th, and thereupon issued orders to re-
turn. Sherman embarked on the 16th and Morgan on the
17th, and all united at Napoleon, at the mouth of the Ar-
kansas, on the 17th. Here they were joined by General
Grant, who had come down from Memphis to gain a personal
knowledge of the course of affairs. After remaining two days
he returned to Memphis to complete his preparations for re-
inforcing McClemand, and the latter descended the river to
Milliken's Bend.

Before leaving Arkansas Post on the 16th, McClemand ad-
dressed a private letter to the President, enclosing his cor-
respondence with Grant, complaining in bitter language
that " my success here is gall and wormwood to the clique
of West Pointers who have been i)ersecuting me for months,**

90 THE MISSISSIPPL

and urging that his annj " shonld be made an independent
command, as both yon and the Secretary of War, as I be-
lieve, originally intended." It is doubtless an nngracions
act to disapprove a man's projects at the very moment of sac-
cess ; nor can there be any donbt that the utilization of Mc-
Clemand's force by a prompt move on Arkansas Post and an
immediate return was a judicious project, and it was well
executed. But the correspondence of January 14th, above
quoted, shows conclusively that Grant's perceptions were
perfectly correct, and that McClemand did not intend to
stop at Arkansas Post but to initiate an independent cam-
paign in Arkansas by going to Little Bock and beyond;
which would have been indeed a " wild-goose chase," lead-
ing to various complications and deranging all plans against
Yicksburg by the abstraction of 30,000 men. It was fortu-
nate that such a scheme was nipped in the bud.

CHAPTER IV.

BAYOU ESXPEDITIONS.

Thb conise of events, as narrated in the last chapter, no
less than his instmctions from Washington, now compelled
Grant to direct his operations against Yicksburg by the river
route, and to rednce everything east of Memphis to the de-
fensive. He determined to take command of the river expe-
dition in person, as anthorized by Halleck, and to reinforce
it with all available troops, as directed by the latter's tele-
gram of January 7th. Orders of the War Department, dated
December 18, 1862, had directed the troops in General
Grant's command to be organized into four army corps, to
be known as the 13th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, and to be
commanded respectively by Major-Generals McClemand,
Sherman, Hnrlbut, and McPherson. This organization
was now effected. McGlemand's and Sherman's corps were
idready down the river. McPheison's corps was formed
of the divisions of McArthnr, Logan, and Qoinby, the first
of which was sent forthwith down the river, the other
two being directed to march to Memphis and hold them-
selves in readiness to embark on transports whenever or-
dered. The remaining troops on the line of the Memphis
and Charleston Bailroad, and in rear of it as far back as
Colnmbns, composed Hnrlbnt's corps. They were to re-
main in observation and defend the points where they were
stationed. The troops in Helena and at other points in

92 THB HISSISSIPPL

Arkansas were also placed under Grant's orders, and were
assigned to McClemand's corps. A brigade nnder Ewing,
jnst arrived from the north, was sent forward to Sherman.

McClemand's and Sherman's corps meantime moved from
the mouth of the Arkansas to Young's Point, opposite Ticks-
burg, with instructions to cut a canal across the peninsula.
Grant had visited these troops at Napoleon on January 17th,
and then returned to Memphis to hasten the movements of
McFherson's corps, and to give orders for the guidance of
the troops along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
From Memphis on January 20th he reported to Halleck con-
cerning the condition of affairs in his department and his
plans for the future. From his conversation at Napoleon
with Porter, McClemand, and Sherman, he had formed the
opinion that the work of reducing Yicksburg was one of time
and would require a large force in the final struggle. His
first inclination would have been to strike across the low
lands of the Tazoo Delta from Milliken's Bend, and come to
the Yazoo above Haines's Bluffs, thus turning the right flank
of the Confederate position ; but this plan was out of the
question at the present time, for the low lands in the Delta
were all under water. He therefore considered it necessaiy
to get below the city in order to use his troops effectively,
and as the best means of accomplishing this he proposed to
cut a canal across the peninsula opposite Yicksburg, but in-
stead of following the line of Williams's canal, he intended to
start the head of it higher up stream at a point where the
current impinged with more velocity, and to have the lower
end of it debouch below the bluffs at Yicksburg, so that the
canal should not be enfiladed by the batteries. By the aid
of this canal he expected to go pasi Yicksburg and land on
the east bank of the Mississippi.

All this was written by Grant before he had ever been at

BATOU EXPEDITIONa 03

Yicksbnrg. The canal scheme seemed feasible from what
he had heard, and the authorities in Washington approved
highly of it. Halleck telegraphed back to pay particular
Attention to the canal, for the President attached much im-
portance to it. Grant's views of the value of the canal,
however, changed very quickly after his arrival on the
ground.

In this same report of January 20th he announced his in*
tention to command in person the troops on the river, un-
less otherwise directed. After remaining a week longer at
Memphis, and receiving no orders to the contrary, he left
for Yicksburg and arrived there on the 29th, assuming com-
mand on the 30th. McClemand protested vigorously
against this, but Grant had ample warrant for his action
and merely forwarded his protest to Washington, whence
nothing more was heard of it. On his arrival at Young's
Point, Grant found the 15th Corps stretched across the penin-
sula, working hard at the canal, and its right flank resting
on the river below Yicksburg ; the 13th Corps and one divi-
sion of the 17th were on the left of the 15th. Porter was
present with a fleet of gun-boats. Upon examining the line
of the canal Grant " lost all faith in its ever leading to any
practical results." It was on the same line that had been
previously excavated, except that its upper end had been
slightly deflected in the hope of catching the current. It
was '* at right angles with the thread of the current at both
ends, and both ends were in an eddy, the lower one coming
out on the bluffs completely commanding it. Warrenton, a
few miles below, was capable of as strong defence as Yicks-
burg," and the enemy had turned his attention to that xx)int.
He therefore ordered other routes to be prospected, although
the troops were still kept employed on the canal, as it was
not yet considered advisable to abandon it entirely. The

94 THE MISSISBIPPL

other routes were,^ first by way of Tazoo Pass (nearly oppo-
site Helena) into the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, and Yazoo
Biversy so as to get at the enemy's rear beyond hia xi^^
flank at Haines' Blnff ; muSL iw^uJ by way of Lake Provi*
dence» oa tte Louisiana shore sixty miles above Yicksbnrg,
into Bayon Macon, the Tensas, Washita, Bed, and Mississippi
Bivers, by which the enemy^s rear might be reached beyond
his left flank at Warrenton.

It will be seen that Grant's army was in the low bottom
lands of the Mississippi, the roads of which were submerged
in places to snch an extent as to prevent all movements over
them. Yicksbnrg, in his front, was unassailable, and the
problem was to turn its flanks by means of canals, creeks,
and bayous. By the Yicksburg Canal and the Lake Provi^
dmeft nHEta it wa& intfinded to turn the enemy's left flank ;
by the Yazoo Pass route and a route subsequently attesipled
through Steele's Bayou it was intended to turn his right
flank. The efforts of the army throughout the months Of
Februaiy and March were directed with unremitting and as-
siduous labor to these flanking projects. They will be de-
scribed in turn.

The work on the canal was prosecuted, mainly by Sher-
man^3 corps, from January 22d to March 7th. Dredge-boats
were brought to assist the labors of the troops, and it was
planned to excavate a canal sixty feet wide and nine feet
deep. The excavation was nearly completed when, on
March 7th, the river rose suddenly, broke down the barrier
at the upper end, and flooded the whole peninsula, driving
the troops on to the levee to escape drowning. The direc-
tion of the canal was such, however, that this body of water
simply flooded its banks, but produced no scour through

I See map on page 67.

BAYOU KXPKDinONa 95

it. After this, work was continned for about two weeks by
the dredge-boats, but the Warrenton batteries soon got the
range of the latter so accurately, that they were driven ofi^
and work on the canal was then abandoned. The canal
scheme was a failure.

It is a most sing^ular fact that the project upon which
such a vast amount of labor was unavailingly expended in
the midst of the war, has since been substantially accom-
plished by nature, at a time when it was not desired, and in
a manner which has caused great disaster, and threatens ab^
solute destruction to the town of Vicksburg. •♦Grant's
Canal" can still be traced in the low ground opposite Vicks-
burg, in a narrow ditch, with two or tkree feet of stagnant
water; while the Mississippi flows through the peninsula,
just south of the former railway terminus called Do Soto, in
a channel a mile wide» tfnd at times one hundred feet deep,
leaving Vicksburg confronted at low water by a^ bar of mud,
completely cutMng off all access to tte rfver. For several
years after the war, the ctBTKnt gradually cut away the
shore of the peniMOis near De Soto, until it was finally less
than one hxBldred yards in width on either side of the rail-
road eimbankment. On the afternoon of April 27, 1876, this
embankment gave way, and the water broke through the
peninsula; the next morning a steamboat passed through
the break, and the next year the break was the main channel.
The result has indicated the point ** where the current im-
pinged most strongly," and where the canal should have
been located to insure success ; but it was a point where
the Confederate batteries had such complete control in 1863
that no working party could have lived under them for a
moment, nor could any transport have passed through had
the canal been completed.

The Jj0ike Providence project seemed at first to be more

96 THB MISSISSIPPI

promising. It would have been a long and tedions ronte^
had it ever been used, as the distance from Lake Providence
to the month of Bed Biver is over 200 miles, and from there
back to Vicksbnrg by the Mississippi, 150 miles more ; bnt
it might have been nsefnl in sending reinforcements to
Banks, had snch a movement proved feasible or advisable.
With the navigation of the Bed, Washita, and Tensas Bivers
there was no diifficnlty, nor did Bajon Macon offer any seri-
ons obstacle to the passage of boats. Bnt between Bayon
Macon and Lake Providence — ^a distance of about six miles
— ^the only connection was by a small stream known as Bayon
Baxter, which, about midway of its course, spread out into
a broad cypress swamp in which the stream was lost. The
operations necessary to make this route navigable were to
clear a channel through this swamp, to dig up the stumps
of trees with which it was filled, and to cut a hole in the
levee opposite Lake Providence.

Upon his arrival at Young's Point, Grant had immediately
sent an officer to reconnoitre this route, a brigade of McAr-
thur's division of McPherson's corps accompanying him.
His report being favorable to the success of the undertaking.
Grant went to Lake Providence in person on February 5th,
and from there sent orders to McPherson at Memphis to
bring his entire corps to the same point and prosecute this
work vigorously. Lack of transports, however, delayed Mc-
Pherson for nearly three weeks, and on his arrival he found
the work of clearing a channel through the swamp much
more serious than had been anticipated, the cutting of
stumps below the surface of the water being very difficult in
the absence of proper tools. McPherson continued to work
at it throughout the month of March. The levee was cut
on March 18th, and the water rushed through Bayon Baxter,
giving a very good channel with two exceptions, viz.: there

BAYOU BXPEDITIONa 97

were twelve or fifteen stumps under water which, oonld only
be cut hj a sawing machine, and there was a shoal at the
point where Bajon Baxter entered Bajon Macon, which
could be removed in a few days by dredging. With these
obstacles removed the route would be navigable for boats
having a draught of six feet. McPherson so reported at the
end of March, but by this time Grant had formed plans for
moving south from Milliken*s Bend by land. The Lake
Providence scheme was thus of no avail.

The Yazoo Pass project was the most &vorable of all, and
for a time gave promise of definite results. Nearly opposite
Helena the distance from the Mississippi to the Goldwater
is only ten miles in a straight line, and along this line runs
a winding bayou called the Yazoo Pass. The Goldwater,
Tallahatchie, and Yazoo Bivers are all navigable for light-
draught boats, and through this Pass in former times was
the direct route from Memphis to Yazoo Gity. The bottom
lands being, however, lower than the surface of the Missis-
sippi in high water, some years prior to the war a substan*
tial levee, nearly 100 feet thick and 18 feet high, had
been built across the Yazoo Pass in order to reclaim the
overflowed land. This destroyed the use of this Pass as
a navigable route; it was now desired to restore it, and
the problem was simply to cut the levee and allow the
water to resume its former course. Gol. Wilson of Grant's
staff had been sent from Young's Point on February 1st to
eut the levee, and Gen. Gorman, commanding at Helena,
was instructed to lend him any assistance required. The
levee was cut by exploding a mine in it on February 3d, and
the water immediately rushed through in a torrent.

On the 7th the current had so far subsided that a gun-
boat was able to enter the Pass, when it was discovered that
although the channel was deep enough it was greatly ob-
VIII. -5

98 THB MISSISSIPPI

structed by oyerhanging trees, large nnmbers of wMch had
been felled by the Confederates within the last few days.
The Pass as well as the Coldwater ran through a dense for-
est, and it required bnt a few minutes' labor to cut down
trees, forming obstructions which could not be removed in
several days. Additional troops were at once brought over
from Helena and set to work removing these obstructions,
but it was not until the 21st that they were sufficiently
removed to allow vessels to reach the Coldwater. Mean"
while, on receiving fiavorable reports from Col. Wilson, Grant
had issued orders on February 15th, to the commanding
officer at Helena to send Boss' division through the Pass
into the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, and Tazoo Rivers, to test
its availability for the movement of a large body, and to
destroy the railroad bridges on the Yallabusha at Gre-
nada. Porter had sent four light-draught g^^boats, two
iron-clads, and one ram to accompany the troops, protect
the transports, and destroy any Confederate boats on the
rivers. For lack of proper boats Boss did not leave Helena
until the 23d. It required six days for his men to force
their way through the Pass, but they entered the Coldwater,
with boats more or less damaged, on March 2d. By this
time Grant had received a further report from Wilson,
dated February 24th, announcing the Pass as open, and
navigable for vessels under 180 feet in length and of pro-
portionate beam. Grant thereupon determined to attempt
to utilize this route for a large force, possibly his entire
army, in order to effect a landing above Haines^ Bluff;
and on March 5th he sent orders to McPherson, who was
nearest to the Pass, to move his whole corps in that direc-
tion as soon as transports could be obtained. Quinby's di-
vision, just arrived at Lake Providence from Memphis but
not yet disembarked, was to return at once to Tazoo Pass ;

BATOU EXPSDITIONa 99

the large transports were then to be sent back to bring
Logan's division and snbseqnentlj McArthnr's ; and J. E.
Smith's division, then ready to embark at Memphis, was to
be stopped at Yazoo Pass. This wonld give McPhei*son five
divisions, or abont 30,000 men, with which he was to make
his way down the Yazoo and effect a lodgment at Yazoo
City. Simultaneously a cavahy division was to move east
from Helena, and another, from Hurlbut's command, south
from La Grange, to break up the enemy's communications
east and south of Grenada.

While these preparations had been making by the Union
army and navy, the Confederates had been by no means idle.
Their pickets and spies along the river gave them prompt
and accurate information of each departure of troops from
Memphis, and of the movements of transports from point to
point. When McClemand returned to Young^s Point, on
January 22d, they feared an attack upon Warrenton, and
made preparations to meet it. But they were equally vigi-
lant in regard to the Yazoo. As early as January 23d, troops
were sent from Grenada to obstruct the Yazoo Pass; this
was a week before Grant had even thought of this route.
At Haines' Bluff, a raft, which had already been con-
structed^ was considerably enlarged and strengthened ; de-
tachments were also sent to out the levees above Young's
Point, and flood the country where McClemand's troops
were bivouacked. Nothing was left undone to obstruct and
hinder the eniemy's approach. Not only Jefferson Davis,
but several of Pemberton's subordinate commanders were
native Mississippians, personally ^miliar with the country
they were defending, and their knowledge enabled them to
anticipate any possible plans of the Union commander.

At the same time considerable changes were made in the
position of the Confederate troops, which about this time

100 THE MISSISSIPPI.

were disposed as follows, viz., at or near Yicksbnrg, about
25,000 men (of whom 20,856 were reported fit for duty),
under Stevenson, guarding the defences from Haines' Bluff
on the right to Warrenton on the left ; at Grenada, about
20,000 men (15,590 for duty), under Loring, charged with
guarding the Yazoo ; at Jackson and other points were de-
tachments not brigaded, amounting in all to perhaps 4,000
men, making a total effective force of about 40,000 men.
Johnston had returned to Chattanooga during the latter part
of January, but still exercised a general supervision over
afiaiis on the Mississippi. Pemberton kept his headquarters
at Jackson, whence he could go to Yicksburg or Grenada, as
required, in a few hours by train. Van Dom, with all the
effective cavalry, amounting to about 6,000 men, had been
ordered to report to Bragg in Tennessee, and during the
month of February he marched past the Union left at Cor-
inth to Columbia, Tenn.

Constant reports were received by Pemberton of the prog-
ress of the Federal troops and boats in cutting the levee at
Yazoo Pass, and removing the obstructions in the Pass. As
soon as he heard that boats had entered the Coldwater, he
sent orders to Loring, at Grenada, to proceed at once to the
mouth of the Yallabusha, taking enough troops with him to
defend that point. A few heavy guns were sent by boat up
the Yazoo to assist him in the defence. Loring reached
Greenwood with two regiments on February 21st, and imme-
diately approved the selection, just made by an engineer
officer, of a site for a fortification at a point about five
miles below the mouth of the Yallabusha. At this point,
the Tallahatchie and Yazoo Bivers are only 500 yards aparfc,
and by holding the narrow neck of land between them, all
passage down the Tallahatchie would be prevented, while
the Yazoo and Yallabusha Bivers remained open for the

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 101

Confederate boats carrying supplies to Grenada. The con-
Btmction of a line of works, called Fort Pemberton, was at
once began, and a raft was prepared to block the navigation
of the Tallahatchie. Beinforcements and artillery also ar-
rived, and on March 10th the earth-and-cotton parapets
were in a good state of defence, mounting eight gons, and
defended by about 2,000 men.

The Union gunboats and transports arrived in front of
this position on the 11th. The troops consisted only of
Ik>S8' division, numbering about 4,000 men, it having
been impossible to obtain transports of a proper size to
convey any of McPherson's corps. The journey through
the Pass and down the Coldwater and Tallahatchie had
been one of extraordinaiy difficulty, in consequence of the
overhanging trees and other obstructions in the narrow
channel, and the fleet moved very slowly — only a few miles
a day. All opportunity for surprise was thus lost. The
ground in front of Fort Pemberton was overflowed so that
the troops could not approach the fort. It could only be
attacked by the navy, and the gunboats moved forward and
opened Are on the 11th. A few casualties were sustained
on either side. On the following day a battery was con-
structed on a piece of dry land, about 800 yards from
the fort, and, on the 13th, the bombardment was renewed.
The fleet suffered considerable injury, and inflicted almost
none upon the fort; it thus became evident that farther
progress on the Yazoo expedition was at an end, and in a
few days it started back up the Tallahatchie. On the 21st,
about midway between Fort Pemberton and the mouth of
the Coldwater, it was met by Quinby with one brigade of
his division. This officer had arrived at Yazoo Pass from
liake Providence on the 8th, and had disembarked his divi*
Bion on the shore near Helena, nearly all his transports

1 .1

N:^;/^'-l.

102 THE MISSISSIPPI.

being too large to enter the pass. Aiter waiting here six
days and despairing of receiving a sufficient nnmber of
small boats for his whole division, he had finally taken the
few boats he had with him which were suitable for navigating
the Pass, and had started forward on the 14th with one bri-
gade. He encountered the same difficulties that had delayed
Boss, and his boats were equally injured in this extraordinary
navigation. On meeting Boss, Quinby assumed command,
being the senior officer, and at once turned the whole expe-
dition back again to Fort Pemberton, arriving there on the
28d. A feeble fire was opened by the gunboats on the same
afternoon, but nothing was accomplished by it. Quinby
had hoped to find a landing-place for his troops while his
transports were sent back for the rest of his division, but in
this he was disappointed. There was no ground suitable
for camping or moving any large body of mien. He then
formed a plan to move around the east side of Fort Pember-
ton, crossing the Yallabusha on a pontoon bridge, and thus
cutting the communications of the fort and compelling its
surrender. He sent a boat back to Helena on the 27th to
bring the bridge materials, but it was met on the way, about
April 1st, by another boat bringing an order to abandon
the whole expedition and return to the Mississippi as
quickly as possible. Grant had found that it would be
impossible to procure the necessary number of light-draught
boats to carry a large force into the Yazoo by this route,
and had notified McPherson, about the middle of March,
to send no more troops after Quinby. On the 28th, the
Steele's Bayou expedition having returned without suc-
cess. Grant had determined to bring his entire force to Mil-
liken's Bend, and had sent orders to McPherson to recall
Quinby at once. Quinby's entire force withdrew from
Fort Pemberton on April 5th, and the Yazoo Pass project

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 103

thus followed the i&ie of those at the oanal and at Lake
Providence.

While it had been in progress, Grant had received infor-
mation that the Confederate troops at Grenada had been
sent to Yazoo Gify and Greenwood, and that thesia troops
were being reinforced by others from Vicksbnrg. It looked
for the moment as if Boss might be surrounded by supe-
rior forces, his precarious line of water communication
barricaded, and his entire command captured before as-
aistanoe could reach him over the same route that he had
travelled. It therefore became necessary to take prompt
measures to relieve him, and, in reconnoitring for this pur-
pose, in company with Porter, Grant discovered a route by
which he thought he could not only relieve Boss, but per-
haps also effect a landing for a large body on the Yazoo.
This led to the fourth, and last, of these abortive projects,
which was known as the Steele's Bayou Expedition.

The route proposed was up the Yazoo to Steele's Bayou,
up that bayou, about forty miles, to a small cross creek,
known as Black Bayou, through that into Deer Creek, and
up Deer Creek, about thirty miles, to another cross creek,
called Boiling Fork, through that to a comparatively large
stream, called the Sunflower, and thence, down that stream,
about fifty miles, coming into the Yazoo about midway be-
tween Haines' Bluff and Yazoo City. The entire distance
from Young's Point to Haines' Bluff by this route would
have been nearly 200 miles. Porter and Grant recon-
noitred the route as &r as Black Bayou, and were con-
vinced that with some slight cutting of trees, it would be
navigable for any class of river steamers. There was a
depth of five fathoms of water in Steele's Bayou. But the
difficulties of the route were in the two cross bayous. Black
and Boiling Fori^, where the channel was not wide enough

104 THB MISSISSIPPI.

for a boat to turn, and where axemen conld quickly barri-
cade the channel by felling trees across it. It was hoped,
however, to get into the Sunflower before the Confederates
were aware of their approach. Once in that stream nothing
oonld prevent the descent of the g^onboats.

On his return from the reconnoissance, March 16th, Grant
ordered Sherman to take a part of his corps and thoroughly
reconnoitre this route, with reference to its adaptability for
moving a large force. Porter was to accompany him with a
fleet of Ave iron-dads, four mortar-boats, and two tugs.
Sherman immediately put one regiment, the 8th Mis-
souri, many of whose men were boatmen, on board of two
boats, which were placed at his disposition, and sent them
into Steele's Bayou to remove trees, etc., while he ordered
three regiments of Stuart's division to go up the Missis-
sippi, and disembark at a point above Milliken's Bend,
where the Mississippi and Steele's Bayou are only a mile
apart. The next day, 17th, Sherman started after Porter on a
tug, and overtook him just after he had passed through Black
Bayou. The gunboats had been greatly delayed at this
point by trees, drift-wood, etc., and had made but four miles
in twenty-four hours. Porter continued his movement, and
Sherman returned to hasten forward his troops ; which were
brought up in relays by the two boats as &r as Black Bayou,
and then disembarked to move forward by land. Porter
proceeded at the rate of about half a mile an hour during
the 17th and 18th, and at evening of the latter day was
within a few miles of the Boiling Fork. No enemy had yet
been seen, but on resuming work on the 19th, smoke was
seen through the woods in the direction of the Sunflower,
and soon afterward shells began falling from the same direc-
tion. Porter landed a force of seamen to prevent any ad-
vance against him, but they were not strong enough for the

BAYOU BXPBDinONa 105

purpose, and were obliged to re-embark that eyening. Dar-
ing that day and the next sharpshooters swarmed throngh
the woods, picking off any men who showed themselves on
the boats or attempted to remove obstructions, cutting down
trees in front and in rear of the ships, and sinking a coal-
barge to obstruct the channeL Porter's situation now be-
came most critical. The Confederates had heard of the ex-
pedition the day after its departure, and had immediately
dispatched a brigade of infantry, and several pieces of artil-
lery from Haines' Bluff up the Sunflower. These had ar-
rived at the junction of the Sunflower and Boiling Fork,
erected a battery there, and were preparing to pass in rear
of Porter, completely obstruct the channel, and capture his
entire force. Porter realized his situation, and was even
meditating the destruction of his vessels, and the escape of
his men through the swamps to the Mississippi ; but before
doing this he sent a negro back through the swamp to in-
form Sherman of his critical condition, and to ask the assist-
ance of his troops at the earliest possible moment. Sher-.
man received the message during the night, and immediately
sent forward the men with him, about 800 in number, and
then went back alone in a canoe to meet the remainder and
hurry them forward. He met the latter on boats during
the same night, and the boats immediately increased their
speed, and came crashing forward through the trees, regard-
less of damages, until flually their progress was arrested
in Black Bayou. Here Sherman disembarked his men and
pushed forward by land, picking his way through the cane-
brake by lighting candles. Porter was already in retreat on
the 21st, when the advance column came to his relief ; Sher-
man, with the second column, was but a few miles in rear,
when at noon of that day he came in contact with a force of
CSonfederates, who retreated after a short skirmish. The.
5*

106 THB MISSISSIPPI

latter had passed around Porter^s boats, and between Sher-
man's columns, and were preparing to permanently block
the channel, in accordance with the plan already mentioned,
when Sherman arrived jnst in time to prevent it. Sherman
now went forward to meet Porter, from whom he learned
the state of affidrs, and the hopelessness of any farther
efforts. They then tnmed back ; but the gunboats had to
back out, stem foremost, all the way to Steele's Bayou —
thirty miles — and they were three days in passing over this-
distance. Sherman^s troops finally regained their camps op-
]x>site Vicksburg on the 27th.

Grant was greatly disappointed at the failure of this his
fourth effort to find some way to reach solid ground on the
flanks of the Vicksbui^ position. Every possible route by
bayous and creeks in the whole bottom land between Vicks-
burg and Memphis had now been tried, and all without suc-
cess. He therefore issued orders to MoGlemaad on March
29th to move toward the little hamilets of Bichmond and
New Carthage, with a view to making his way to the Missis-
sippi at some }>oint below the batteries at Warrenton and
Grand Gulf, which formed the left flank of the enemy's
position at Vicksburg. At the same time he addressed a
letter to Porter, stating the nature of this movement, and
suggesting that the gunboats be sent past the batteries at
Vicksburg to act against those at Grand Gulf, and cover a
landing in that vicinity. Porter replied at once, expressing
his entire willingness to co-operate in any possible manner,
but stating that once the gunboats were below Vicksburg it
would be impossible for them to return. In that case there
would not be enough vessels left to protect a landing on the
Yazoo near Haines' Bluff, should such a movement become
desirable. Before abandoning all efforts, therefoue, to reach
hard ground by way of the Yazoo, Grant determined to make

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 107

a reconnoissance of tlie position at Haines' Bluff, which he
did on a gunboat in company with Porter and Sherman on
April 1st. The result of this reconnoissance was thus stated
by Grant, in a letter to Porter dated April 2d : " I am satis-
fied that an attack upon Haines' Bluff would be attended
with immense sacrifice of life, if not defeat. This, then,
closes out the last hope of turning the enemy by the right.
.. . . Having, then, fully determined upon operating from
New Carthage, either by the way of Grand Gulf or "Warren-
ton . . I renew my request to prepare for running the
blockade at as early a day as possible."

Grant was now at the turning-point, not only of this cam-
paign but of his whole career. He had not then the world-
renowned fame with which we have so long been accus-
tomed to associate his name ; at that time he occupied a po-
sition in popular estimation similar to that held by Hooker,
Bosecrans, and Banks, who then commanded the other prin-
cipal armies, and like them he was on trial. He had gained
a great victory at Fort Donelson, and he had fought a most
desperate battle, which was not a defeat yet hardly a victory,
at Shiloh in the previous year. But for twelve months he
had apparently done nothing, the defence of the Memphis
and Charleston Bailroad and its attendant battles of luka
and Corinth having made but little impression on the pub-
lic mind. For the last three months his army had been lost
to sight in the overflowed swamps of the Mississippi, whence
.came rumors of abortive expeditions, camp fevers, and dis-
.satisfaction. Many people were beginning to believe that
Grant belonged to the same dreary class of failures as Mc-
Clellan, Bumside, Fremont, and Buell, and they importuned
the President to relieve him. It was a gloomy period. The
war had been in progress for two full years, and as yet the
North had gained no really decisive victozy except at Fort

108 THE MISSISSIPPI

Donelson. Daring the preceding snmmer the Army of the
Potomac had been driven back into Maryland, and the Army
of the Cumberland to the Ohio Biyer. Both armies had par-
tially regained their ground, and then everything had come
to a standstill for months; in trying to break which the
>Army of the Potomac had only incurred renewed defeat and
slaughter at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Such
was the general situation, and in Grant's particular opera-
tions the prospect was as unpromising as everywhere else.
He was on a wrong trail — that was evident to every one ; and
it would not have been difficult to prove that the responsi-
bility for it did not rest upon Grant. But Grant's mind did
not run in the direction of arguing responsibility upon other
people's shoulders. He was accustomed to take things as
they were and to devote his whole energies to making the
best of them. He had now for two months tried every cou'-
ceivable plan for crossing the low lands of the Yazoo Delta
and reaching the high ground beyond the enemy's right
flank. They had all failed. What should now be done?
Three plans only were possible. First, to assault the enemy's
batteries. Second, to go back to Memphis and recommence
a campaign along the Mississippi Central Bailroad. Third,
to find a way through the swamps opposite Yicksburg, cross
the Mississippi near Grand Gulf, and operate against the
rear of Vicksburg, trusting to victory for suppHes.

The first plan would lead to slaughter and almost certain
defeat. The second was the only plan which could be jus-
tified by general military principles. It was urged by Sher-
man in a well-known letter, quoted at length in his memoirs,
but it was not accepted by Grant because in this particular
instance those political necessities which always override
purely military reasons demanded an advance and forbade
anything which might have the appearance even of turning

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 109

back. The third plan was fall of dangers and risks ; lack
of success in it meant little less than complete destmction.
If it did succeed, however, the success would be complete
and decisive, and to Grant's mind the emergency seemed to
be one which warranted the risk, though he was well aware
of its desperate nature, which nothing but success would
ever justify. The third plan was adopted ; and from it first
Yicksburg, and then Chattanooga and Appomattox followed
in regular succession.

The final project thus determined upon was to open up a
series of circuitous bayous running from Milliken's Bend,
and also from the vicinity of Young's Point past Kichmond to
New Carthage, on the west bank of the Mississippi, about
thirty miles below Yicksburg.^ Water was to be let into
this system by cutting a canal from Duckport near Young's
Point, and troops and supplies were to be forwarded on flat-.
boats and barges, urgent requisition for which had been
made on the Quartermaster at St. Louis. A force of at
least 30,000 men was thus to be assembled at New Car-
thage, and at the same time the gunboats and a number of
transports were to be run past the batteries. All being.
assembled at New Carthage the troops were to be embarked
on the transports and flat-boats, and were to attack Grand
Gulf, after its batteries had been silenced by the gunboats.
Once in possession of Grand Gulf, the whole army was to be
brought over and the campaign prosecuted in rear of Yicks-
burg along the Big Black.

Orders were accordingly given to begin work on the canal
at Duckport, to open the bayous, reconnoitre and repair
the roads along them, make the necessary bridges, collect
supplies, and bring McPherson's corps and all other avail-

1 See Map fMiiig page 185.

110 THB MISSISSIPPL

able troops to Milliken's Bend. At the same time Steele's
division of 8hennan's oorps was sent up the river to Green-
yille, about one hundred and fifty miles above Yicksburg,
where it disembarked and marched through the country
along Deer Greek as far down as Boiling Fork, collecting
subsistence for its own use, destroying all su^^ilies of any
value to the enemy, and distracting the hitter's attention
from the'main movement toward New Carthage.

While the work was being prosecuted on the canal, Oster-
haus' division of M cClemand's corps was gradually feeling
ibs way toward New Carthage. Bichmond was occupied on
March 31st, and New Carthage on April 6th. Osterhaus
skirmished on the way with a small detachment of cavalry,
reinforced on April 4th by three regiments of infantry from
Grand Gulf, which did little or nothing to retard their prog-
ress.

Between April 12th and 14th, the feasibility of this route
having been established, the remaining divisions of McCler-
nand's corps took up the march from MiUiken's Bend for New
Carthage, but owing to the necessity of making and repair-
ing roads through the soft, black soil, and of constructing a
large number of bridges over various minor bayous, the'
march was so much delayed that it was the 20th of Ai>ril be-'
fore the corps could be assembled.

On the night of April 16th the. gunboats ran past the bat-
teries of Vicksburg. This was not an untried experiment.
On the morning of February 2d, the ram Queen of the West^
commanded by Col. Charles B. Ellet, had run the gaunt-
let-in broad daylight, the intention to run by just before
dawn having been frustrated by some accident to the ma-
chinery which caused a slight delay. This vessel was in no
way ai^mor-plated, and her only protection was found in
bales of cotton. She was under fire for fifty minutes and

BATOU EZPBDinONS. m

was stnick twelve times, had one gun dismounted and de*
stroyed, and her cabin knocked to pieces, bat she sustained
no damage impairing her efRdeaej. On the way she at-
tempted to ram the Confederate vessel Yicksborg, lying at
the levee, bat in this she was only partially saccessfal. She
then proceeded down the MiBsissippi, in company with the
transport £>e Soto, to the mouth of Bed Biver and up that
river lor some distance, capturing several transports convey^
ing Confederate supplies.

On the night of February 13th, the gunboat Indianola,
•under Lieat.-Com. George Brown, also ran the batteries
with perfect success, and proceeded down the river to assist
the Queen of the West. Just after passing Natchez, on Feb-
ruary 16th, she met a small steamboat carrying Col. Ellet
and a portion of his crew. Ellet reported that the Queen
of the West had engaged a Confederate battery in Bed Biver
•on the l^h, and in the midst of the engagement had ran
aground and been abandoned, 21 persons of her crew being
captured. With the rest Ellet had at first esGai>ed in the
I>e Soto, hut Oiis boat had run into the bank in a fog, and
broken off her rudder. He had then set fire to her and
abandoned her, transferring his men to the captured boat
New Era, and with her making good his escape. In the
same boat be proceeded up the river, running past the bat-
teries at Grand Gulf, and finally reachiug the vicinity of
Vicksburg.

The Indiano^ remained in the vicinity of Bed Biver for a
•lew days, and then began to retrace her steps up the river.
The Confederates had quickly raised and repaired the Queen
of the West, and with this vessel, the ram Webb, which had
been for some time in Bed Biver, and two smaller boats
•protected by cotton — ^making a fleet of four vessels in all —
they oautioasly followed the Tndianola from point to point

112 THB MISSISSIPPL

up the river, and, on the night of February 24th, jnst after
passing Grand Qnlf, they steamed np rapidly to the attack.
The Indianola was encumbered by coal barges, bnt imme-
diately tnmed to meet them, and a veiy severe engagement
followed, lasting an hour and a half. The Indianola was
superior in armament to all the other vessels combined, bnt
the night was very dark, and her gans could not be used
effectively. The Confederate vessels relied upon ramming,
and in the course of the engagement the Indianola received
seven severe blows, the last of which left her helpless and
in a sinking condition. Her guns were then thrown over-
board, and she was run ashore, where her officers and crew
were surrendered.

This left the Confederates again in command of the river
navigation between Yicksburg and Port Hudson, but on the
night of March 14th, Farragut passed the batteries at Fort
Hudson — ^as will be subsequently described — with the 'Haxt-
ford and a small vessel called the Albatross, with which he
arrived below Yicksburg on March 19th. He considered
these two vessels insufficient to maintain the blockade of
Bed Biver, and he therefore desired that Porter should send
one iron-clad and two rams below Yicksburg, to assist him
in that enterprise, as well as to break up the batteries near
Warrenton, which were increasing in strength at that time
from day to day. Porter was then absent on the Steele's
Bayou Expedition, but Brig. -Gen. A. W. Ellett, commanding
the Marine Brigade, offered to assume the responsibility of
sending two rams. These vessels, the Lancaster and Swits&-
erland, started to run past the Yicksburg batteries before
daylight on March 25th. Owing to delay — ^as in a previous
case — ^they went past in broad daylight, and one of them,
the Lancaster, was blown up by the enemy's shells and com-
pletely destroyed, while the Switzerland was very seriously

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 113

disabled. Farragat was thus obliged to return to the Bed
Biver without the assistance of any of Porter's vessels.

The result of these various attempts, successful and un-
successful, justified the belief that suitable vessels could
run the gauntlet of the batteries without veiy great risk,
provided proper precautions were taken as to the time 6t
passage, and the protection of unarmored boats by cotton.
Porter, therefore, had no hesitation in determining to run
past with his iron-dad fleet, as soon as Ghrant had decided
that it would not be necessary for them to return up stream*
Preparations were made to undertake the passage on the
night of Apnl 16th. At ten o'clock on that night, the fleet
cast loose from its moorings at the mouth of the Yazoo
Biver, and slowly steamed down the Mississippi. Porter
led in his flagnship, the Benton, followed ht short distances
by the Lafayette, with the captured vessel Price lashed on
the starboard side, then by the Louisville, Mound City,
Pittsburg, and Garondelet. Three transports, the Forest
Queen, SUver Wave, and Henry Clay, protected by cotton
bales and loaded with army suppUes and ammunition, ioU
lowed next, and the gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear.
Each vessel had a barge in tow, carrying ten thousand
bushels of coaL The Benton rounded the point at Vicks-
burg a few minutes after eleven o'clock, and was almost im-
mediately discovered by the Confederate batteries, which
opened fire, vigorously. At the same time the torch was ap-
plied to houses and other inflammable material on both
banks of the river, thus lighting np the entire scene of ac-
tion. Each vessel was under fire for about half an hour at
Vicksburg, and a few minutes at Warrenton, the entire du-
ration of the cannonade being about an hour and a half;
and in return each one poured its broadside into the streets
of Vicksburg as it went by within a few yards of the shore.

114 THB MIS&l!S8IPPL

About 2 ▲.]£. the fleet polled up and anchored at New Car-
thage. It was found that every vessel had been stmck a
number of times, but the amount of real damage was sur-
prisingly small ; a few coal barges had been sunk or lost in
the m61^e, and the transport Henry Clay had been aban-
doned by her crew in a panic, after which her cotton had
taken fire from a bursting shell, and she had burned up.
With these exceptions, there was no damage done thai
could not be repaired in a very few days. The only casual-
ties were ten or twelve men slightly wounded.

Grant had gone to New Carthage on the 17th, and having
seen that the passage of the fleet was a c<»nplete success he
xetumed to Milliken's Bend to hasten the movements of hi»
army. It was impossible to move his troops by barges and
flat-boats through the system of bayous, as had been origin-
ally intended, partly because only a small number of barges
bad been received, and partly because the canal and bayous
were not yet ready for navigation. Water had been let into
the canal, near Duckport, on April 13fch, but much work still
remained to be done in dredging out the bottom, trimming
the banks, cutting trees, etc. Grant, therefore, determined
to move on by the roads until the canal should be ready,
but, in fact, it never was of any service. On the 22d, it had
been dredged out so that small steamers passed through it as
far as Bichmond, but a day or two later there was a sudden
fall of several feet in the river, and it was rendered totally
useless. The troops were, therefore, forced to inake the
movement by land, constructing several miles of corduroy
roads for the artillery and wagons; and the supplies were
seut partly by the roads, and partly by transports running
past the batteries.

On April 20th, the final orders were issued for the move-
ment across the peninsula. McClemand's corps formed

BAYOU BXPBDITIONS. 115

the right wing, McPheiB(»L*s the centre, and Sherman's the
left wing ; and the troops were to move across in that order,
following each other as rapidly as the narrow road wonld
permit. At that date, MoClemand's corps (four divisions)
was assembled along the road near New Carthage ; two divi-
sions of McPherson's eorpa were already at Milliken's Bend,
and the third was on the way down the river from Lake
Providence; two divisions of Sherman's corps were near
Puckport and Young's Point, and the other division (Steele's)
was under orders to return from Greenville.

McPherson's leading divisions were immediately put in
motion toward Richmond, and six more transx)orts were
loaded with supplies, and protected with cotton to pass the
batteries. They took twelve barges iu tow, and were manned
by volunteers from the army, mainly from Logan's division.
They made the passage on the night of April 22d, five of
them getting through safely, and one, loaded with hospital
stores and appliances for the wounded, beiug sunk. Having
seen these vessels safely started. Grant moved his headquar-
ters, on the 2dd, over to Smith's plantation, near New Car-
thage, to take personal control of the movements for crossing
the river. When he arrived he found that New Carthage
was still surrounded by water, and was entirely unsuitable :
for concentrating a large force. MoCleniand had already
been reconnoitring to find a suitable point lower down the
river, and had discovered a road leading from Smith's plan-
tation around Bayou Vidal to Perkins' plantation, about
eight miles below New Carthage. By repairing this road,
and building about two thousand feet of bridges over cross
bayous, it would be practicable for moving the army. Or-
ders were at once given for putting this route in order.
Porter had made a reconnoissance of the batteries at Grand
Gulf, on the 22d, and being convinced that they should be

116 THB MISSISSIPPI

attacked before they became any stronger, he had called
npon McClemand for troops for this purpose. Osterhaus'
division had accordingly been embarked on the morning of
the 23d, but it was not thought that this was sufficient, and
it was dermined to await the arrival of more transports. On
the 24th, Grant made a reconnoissance of the same batteries
in company with Porter. He found the batteries to be very
strong, and the distance from Perkins* plantation to Grand
Gulf was so great (over twenty miles) that with his limited
transportation he did not feel justified in attempting an
attack from his present position. It was necessary to seek
a point still farther down the river, near enough to Grand
Gulf to enable the transports to make frequent and rapid
trips in ferrying the troops across the river when a landing
should be effected. McClemand was, therefore, directed to
reconnoitre in search of a road to such a point, and he dis-
covered one leading around another bayou, called Lake St.
Joseph, to a hamlet, called Hard Times, just above the bend
on which Grand Gulf is situated. While this route was
being examined, work on the bridges between Smith's and
Perkins' plantations was prosecuted with the utmost vigor,
so that on the 27th the whole of McClemand's corps was
assembled at Perkins'. On the following day, two divisions
of this corps were moved down to Hard Times by the river,
the transports returning at once for the other two divisions..
At the same time, McPherson's two divisions, Logan in the
lead, were moving by the land route from Smith's around
Bayou Vidal to Perkins', and from Perkins' around Lake St.
Joseph to Hard Times. On the 29th, everything was in
readiness for the long-expected crossing of the river, and on
that day an attack was made by the gpinboats upon the bat-
teries at Grand Gulf.
Before describing this, it will be necessaiy to refer to the

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 117

course of events on the C!onfederate side daring this month
of April, in which Grant's army had been so laboriously
threading its way through the overflowed lands opposite
Yicksburg. On the last day of March, Pemberton's return
showed the paper strength of his command to be 82,318
men, of whom 61,495 were present, and 48,829 fit for duty
on that day. This effective force of 50,000 men, in round
numbers, was divided into three principal commands. The
first, consisting of about 22,000 effectives, commanded by
Maj.-Gten. G. L. Stevenson, occupied the main Yicksburg
position, extending from Haines' Bluff on the right to
Grand Gulf on the left. The second, consisting of over
16,000 effectives, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Frank Gardner,
garrisoned the fortifications at Port Hudson. The third,
consisting of 7,000 effectives, under Maj.-Gen. W. W. Lor-
ing, was stationed at Fort Pemberton, Grenada, and other
points in that immediate vicinity. In addition to these
three main bodies there were some 4,000 or 5,000 men sta-
tioned in Northern Mississippi, in observation of Hurlbut's
troops on the Memphis and C!orinth Bailroad. The distance
from Fort Pemberton to Port Hudson is two hundred miles
in a straight line, and this was certainly a long line for fifty
thousand troops to hold, even when well fortified ; but they
had some advantages in being on dry land, with railroad
and telegraph facilities, while their adversaries were in the
swamps, dex)ending entirely on water transportation. The
left flank of the Yicksburg position was at Grand Gulf, a
point about thirty miles by land below Yicksburg, and pos-
sessed of very nearly the same natural features as that city.
Pemberton had given orders to occupy and fortify it on
March 5th, at a time when it seemed very probable that
Grant's canal would prove a success. The troops sent for
this purpose consisted of the Missouri brigade of six regi-

118 THE MISSISSIPPI.

ments and four batteries, numbering in all about 2,500 men,
and commanded by Brig.-Qen. J. S. Bowen. When McGler-
nand's troops began to advance from Bicbmond to New
Carthage, skirmishing with a small detachment of cavaliy,
Bowen sent three of his regiments across the river to hold
them in check, or at least observe their movements. Bat
neither Bowen nor Pemberton attached much importance
to this operation and both discredited the mmors that it
was being conducted by a large force. Pemberton's atten-
tion was principally directed to his right flank ; the Tazoo
Pass expedition had hardly left the vicinity of Fort Pem«
berton before Steele's division made its appearance on Deer
Greek, and Pemberton feared a renewal of the attempts to
turn his right flank. Bumors began to arrive, m<»eover,
from Memphis that Grant bad determined to abandon his
operations against Vicksburg by the river, and was about to
retnim to Memphis and thence reinforce Bosecrans in Ten-
nessee, or else begin another campaign southward on the
high land. Pemberton, in fact, was very much in doubt as
to Grant's intentions ; lus telegraphic report of April Qth to
the Adjutant-General in Biohmond stated that the enemy
was constantly in motion, that his principal efforts were ap-
parently directed against Deer Creek on his right, for which
provision had been made, and that there were rumors of
a movement across the peninsula on the west of the river,
which were not credited. A few days later he received re-
newed information that a larg^ part of Grant's army had gone
up the river (Ellet's Marine Brigade, numbering about 2,000
men, had in fact been ordered to the Tennessee) and that
steamers had been sent down to biing the rest. Pemberton
communicated this intelligence as a certainty to Johnston,
and quickly received in reply an order to send reinforcements
to Chattanooga. There had just arrived at Jackson two bri-

BAYOU BXPEDITtONS. 119

#

gades, soon consolidftted into one, numbering 4,000 men, who
had been ordered from Port Hudson to Yicksbnrg, on receipt
of intelligence that Banks had gone to the Bed Biyer conn-
try. These troops (Bnford's brigade) were immediately put
on the cars for Chattanooga, via Meridian and Mobile. On
the next day, April 14th, Johnston ordered more troops to
be sent to him, and Pemberton designated Yaughn*s bri-
gade from Vicksbnrg and Tilghman's brigade from Gre-
nada. This force, numbering about 4,000 men, was or-
dered to proceed via Jackson as soon as transportation could
be had. Hardly had Pemberton given his orders, however,
before information began arriving from Yicksburg that the
report of Grant's return up the river was a mistake. On the
15th, therefore, Tilghman's brigade was halted at Jackson,
and Vaughn's near Yicksburg ; the other two brigades were
already on the way. Meanwhile some skirmishes had taken
place across the river, and Bowen had reported from Grand
Gulf that the movement there began to look serious ; but
Stevenson, who was in command at Yicksburg, was of a dif-
ferent opinion, believing that the attack would be made on
the Yazoo. Pemberton himself was at Jackson, fifty miles
from the river, and of course had to rely upon his subordi-
nates for information. On the 17th, however, came the news
of the passage of Porter's fleet. This quickly settled the
question of any retreat up the river, and Johnston was at once
appealed to for the return of the troops on the way to Ten-
nessee. Green's brigade at Edward's Station was ordered to
reinforce Bowen at Grand Gulf, and Bowen was ordered
to withdraw his infantry detachment from across the river
immediately, if it was not already too late. It succeeded in
crossing the river that night. Johnston ordered the Port
Hudson troops back to Pemberton, but some of them had
already reached Chattanooga, and the rest were strung along

120 THE MISSISSIPPI.

the road at Atlanta, Montgomery, and other points. It waa
April 22d before they reached Meridian on their return.

By this time fresh complications had arisen, in conse-
quence of the movement of Union columns, reported to be
very strong, southward from the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad. Pemberton was at this time very deficient in cav-
alry, nearly all of that arm in his department having been
sent, under command of Van Dorn, to Tennessee, where they
were operating in conjunction with Bragg's army. Pember-
ton's requests to have them returned had all been answered
to the effect that their services were indispensable in Middle
Tennessee. Consequently, he was unable to keep track of
the expeditions which were now rei)orted to be rapidly ad*
vancing southward through the State.

In fact, one of the most thoroughly successful cavalry
raids of the whole war was now in progress. It was com-
manded by Col. B. H. Grierson, of the 6th Illinois Cavaliy.
With his own and two other regiments, about 1,700 men in
all, he left La Grange on April 17th and moved directly
south. Northern Mississippi was at that time garrisoned by
about 1,000 men, under Brig. -Gen. Chalmers, who were
posted behind the Coldwater; and, in order to occupy their
attention and prevent them from interfering with Grierson,
a small force of infantry was sent out from La Grange and
another from Memphis.

Grierson thus got a good start, and moved rapidly through
Bipley and Pontotoc, following the roads about twenty
miles west of the Mobile and Ohio Bailroad. On the 21st,
having reached a point midway between the villages of
Houston and Starksville, he detached one regiment, under
Col. Hatch, to break up the railroad between Columbus
and Macon, and then make his way back to La Grange.
Columbus was garrisoned by more than 2,000 men, and

BAYOU BXPBDITIONS. 121

Hatch had a very brisk engagement there, losuig 40 men ;
after which he retreated up the railroad, destroying it at
Okolona and Tnpelo, thence retnming through Bipley*
where he had a brush with Chalmers, and reaching La
Grange on April 26th. Grierson meanwhile continued his
own moyements without any delay, striking the Yicksburg
and Meridian Railroad, at Newton Station, on April 24th,
and destroying several miles of it west of Meridian. Thence
he moved to the southwest, crossing Pearl Biver at George-
town, and destroying the Jackson and New Orleans Bailroad
at various points between thirty and forty miles south of
Jackson. On the 28th, a skirmish took place with a small
detachment of cavalry sent out from Grand Gulf; after
this had been driven off, Grierson moved rapidly down the
New Orleans Bailroad, skirmished with some of the troops
sent out from Port Hudson, but avoided the main body of
them, and, finally, on May 2d, reached the Union camp at
Baton Bouge. With a force numbering barely 1,000 men
(after Hatch had been detached), he had ridden entirely
through the State of Mississippi, marching 600 miles in 16
days, had destroyed between fifty and sixty miles of railway
and telegraph, and a large amount of other propeiiy, had
captured a number of horses and mules, and had inflicted
on the enemy a greater loss than he had himself suffered.
But) far more important than all this, he had distracted the
enemy's attention in an extraordinary degree at a most criti-
cal moment. Grierson had been in motion on Pemberton's
rear at the very time that Grant was making the final pre-
parations for the attack or crossing at Grand Gulf, t.e.,
during the last ten days of April. Being so short of cav-
alry, Pemberton was unable to keep track of Grierson, and
the most exaggerated rumors were current of his presence
in ft do;5en places at once. At the same time, the slight de-
Till.— a

122 THB MISSISSIPPL

monstration from Memphis against Chalmers' force on the
Coldwater was magnified by rumor into an advance in large
force in the direction of Grenada. Pemberton was thus
obliged to send ont expeditions in all directions to try to in-
tercept this handfnl of bold troopers. One brigade was taken
from Fort Pemberton and sent toward Grenada ; Tilghman's
brigade, which had been stopped at Jackson en route to
Chattanooga, was also sent back toward Grenada ; Buf ord's
brigade, which had just reached Meridian on its return
from Chattanooga, was sent up toward Columbns ; Adams'
brigade was sent out from Port Gibson toward Jackson;
Chalmers was sent across toward Okolona, with the idea of
intercepting Grierson when he shonld return; finally, a
large part of the garrison of Port Hudson moved out and
lay in wait for him. Not one of all these various expedi-
tions succeeded in coming up with Grierson, more than to
exchange a few shots with skirmishers ; and by calling out
so many men, and by cutting the railroad west of those at
Meridian, Grierson assisted very materially in diverting at-
tention from Grand Gulf, and in delaying the movement of
troops to that place. Pemberton, however, had become
convinced, as we have seen, that the movement in that di-
rection was serious, and he had ordered Green's brigade
from Edward's Station as a reinforcement. On April 28th,
he received word from Bowen that '* transports and barges
loaded down with troops are landing at Hard Times." On ,
receipt of this, Tilghman was immediately recalled from the I
direction of Grenada to Jackson; Buford was directed to
march around the break in the railroad at Newton Station,
and come to the same place ; another brigade (Gregg's) was
ordered up from Port Hudson, and Stevenson was directed
to hold 5,000 men in readiness to move at a moment's notice
to Bowen's assistance, whose force, including Green's bri-

BAYOU BXPIBDITIONS. 123

gade, numbered about 4,700 men. None of Stevenson's
men were, however, actually sent, for Pemberton did not
think that the movement was yet sufficiently developed, and
was not entirely convinced that it was not a feint to cover
an attack in the direction of Haines' Bluff. This was the
condition of affairs on the Confederate side on April 28th.

At 7 A.!!., on April 29th, Porter's squadron left its moor-
ings at Hard Times, and slowly steamed down toward Grand
Gulf. Immediately in rear of it were all the transports
and flat-boats available, loaded with all the men they could
carry, which was three divisions of McClemand's corps.
These remained just out of range, above the point opposite
Grand Gulf. Grant was on a tug in the middle of the
stream, where he could follow closely the progress of the
fight, and send in his troops whenever the favorable mo-
ment should arrive. Porter's squadron consisted of the
f oUowing vessels :

Benton, lieatenant-Commander J. A. Greer 16 guns.

Lafayette, Captain H. Walke 10 "

lioaisville, Lieatenant-Commander E. K. Owen 13 ^*

Toflcombia, Lieatenant-Commander J. W. Shirk 3 '^

Moond Citjf Lieutenant-Commander Byron Wilson 13

CSanmdelet, Lientenant J. M. L Murphy 13

Plttebnrg, Lieutenant W. R. Hoel 13 **

Total Slgnns.

The vessels averaged about six hundred tons each.

Grand Gulf was an insignificant village, the river terminus
of a few miles of railway running to Port Gibson. But it
was situated near the mouth of the Big Black Biver, which
was navigable for several miles, and behind it rose a shaip
line of blufib, attaining a height of something over a hun-
dred feet. Just above the village these bluiis come close to

it

124 THB MISSISSIPPI.

the water's edge. They were fortified by a strong line of
earthworks, forming two pi'incipal sets of batteries, one
above and one below the landing, the two being connected
by a trench or covered way for infantry abont a thousand
yards in length. Work had been prosecuted diligently on
the batteries during the seven weeks which had elapsed
since the troops had occupied this point ; they were now
nearly completed but were only partially armed, containing
in fact only thirteen guns, eight of which were of the cali-
bre of thirty •pounder Parrots or less. They were but a poor
match for Porter^s eighty-one pieces, many of them 11-inch
Dahlgp:ens or 9-inch rifles. The cannonade opened about S
A.M., and kept up furiously and without intermission until
1 P.M. By that time the Confederate guns were sil^^u^ed,
and their batteries were somewhat ploughed Up by the
2,500 projectiles which Porter had sent against them. But
the troops had lost only 3 men killed (one. of them being
Col. Wade, Chief of Artillery) and 15 wounded. On the
other hand. Porter had lost 19 killed and 56 wounded, and
his vessels had received several hundred shots. The Tns-
cumbia had been hit 81 times, many of the shells penetrat-
ing her thin plating and bursting inside ; she was so badly
damaged as to be unfit for service for some time. The Ben-
ton had been struck 47 times and had lost 26 men, and the
other vessels had received minor injuries.

It was very evident that although the few Confederate
guns were temporarily silenced, the batteries were just as
capable of resisting assault as before the bombardment be-
gan — their guns, in fact, resumed firing later in the day — and
the infantry parapet was practically uninjured for defence.
It was impossible to bring frail transports, loaded to the
gunwales with men, in front of batteries which had held
their own against iron-plated gunboats. Onoit, therefore.

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 125

determined to move stiU lartfaer down the river and effect a
landing which would tnm the flank of these batteries ; and
as soon as Porter withdrew — about 2 p.h. — McQemand
was ordered to land his meD. at Hard Times and march them
across the point opposite Grand Gulf, coming out on the
Mississippi at Pe Shroon's plantation, about three miles down
the riyer. As soon as it was dark, Porter was requested to
renew the bombardment, under cover of which the trans-
ports all slipped by with very little damage, and tied up at
De Shroon's. McClemand's entire corps was in that vicin-
ity at daylight the next morning.

Grant had at first intended to move down as far as Bod-
ney» from which point it was known that a road led to Port
Gibson, and thence to the various points in rear of Vicks-
burg, but during the night he learned from a negro that
there was a good road leading to Port Gibson from a land-
ing-place called Bruinsburg, just below the mouth of Bayou
Pierre, and only five miles below Pe Shroon's. Grant deter^
mined to effect a crossing at this place. At daylight on
April 30th the traiispprts and gunboats were all brought
into requisition to ferry the troops across, and by noon the
whole of McClernand's corps — four divisions, numbering
over 18,000 men — were on the east bank. There were no
Confederates in sight, and it was most important to get
possession of the bluffs, which are here about three miles
back from the river, as quickly as possible. But for some
unexplained reason rations had not been issued to McCler-
nand's corps before landing; their wagons had been leffc
away back at Perkins* two days before, and it was known
that the first advajuce beyond the river would necessarily
be made without them. Nevertheless the usual three days'
rations in haversacks had not yet been issued, and a delay
of four hours occurred on the bank just after landing in

126 THE MISSISSIPPI.

order to distribnte them. This delay at such a critical
period might have been disastrons, but forttmately it was
not 80 ; and at f onr o'clock McClemand took up his line of
march, Can-'s division in the lead. At snnset he reached the
bluffs, and finding no enemy, pushed on during the night
toward Port Gibson. About one o'clock in the night Carres
leading brigade met the enemy about ten miles from Bruins-
burg and four from Port Gibson ; a slight skirmish ensued,
after which the whole division lay down on their arms until
daylight should enable them to reconnoitre the ground and
the force in front of them.

These troops were a portion of Green's brigade, which
had been hastily dispatched from Grand Gulf by Bowen on
the afternoon of the 30th. Immediately after the bombard-
ment of Grand Gulf on the 29th, Bowen had telegraphed
the result to Pemberton, and stated the urgent necessity for
prompt reinforcement. The wires then failed to work, and
nothing more was heard from Bowen until the afternoon
of the 30th, Pemberton became alarmed at this, and
telegraphed Stevenson to send at once the 5^000 men he
had previously ordered to be held in readiness. These
were Tracy's and Baldwin's brigades, and they left Vicks-
burg for Grand Gulf late on the afternoon of the 29th.
Pemberton also ordered Tilghman to collect all available
troops in Jackson — about a brigade — ^and proceed to Ed-
ward's Station, and there await further orders. Pemberton
was at first somewhat disconcerted by reports from Steven-
son of the presence of Union troops at Haines' Bluff,
where Sherman with one division of his corps, escorted by
eight gunboats, was making a vigorous demonstration, in
pursuance of orders to that effect given by Grant on the
27th. But Stevenson expressed himself as being ready to
meet any attack at that point, and it soon became evident

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 127

that the important move was at Grand Golf. Late on
the afternoon of the dOth, Pemberton received word from
Bowen that 3,000 Union troops were within ten miles of
Port Gibson at 3 p.m. of that day, and that more were still
landing at Bminsbnrg. On receipt of this, Pemberton gave
orders to his detachments at Grenada, Columbus, Meridian,
and other points to come at once to Jackson ; after which
he took the train f or Vicksburg. Tracy's brigade reached
Grand Gulf on the afternoon of April dOth, and Baldwin's
brigade came in during the night, the men of both brigades
in a jaded condition from hurried marching. Green's bri-
gade, as already stated, had been sent from Grand Gulf to
Port Gibson on the afternoon of the 30th, and its advance
had met Carr's division on the road to Bruinsburg soon after
midnight. Tracy's brigade came to his assistance a little
before daybreak.

On the morning of May 1st, the Confederates were discov-
ered posted across the roads, about three miles west of Port
Gibson. At this point the road from Bruinsburg divides
into two roads, which, diverging nearly at a right angle, curve
around and unite at Port Gibson. Green's brigade was
posted across the southern road and Tracy's across the
northern. The country was extremely rough and unsuita-
ble for mancBUvres, being composed of short, steep hillsides,
following no regular system, and separated from each other
by ravines, filled with a dense growth of cane and under-
brush. Carr's^ Osterhaus', and Hovey's division of McCler-
nand's corps were all on the ground at daylight, and A. J.
Smith's division was so close behind them that it reached
the field at 7 a.h. Logan's and Quinby's divisions of Mc-
Pherson's corps were crossing at Bruinsburg during the
night of the 30th and the following morning, so that it was
certain they could be relied on during the day, if necessary.

123 THB MISSISSIPPL

There was an abnndanoe of force present : the only difficnltj
was in bringing it into action on such difficnlt ground.

At 5.90 A.H., McClemand opened the battle bj sending
forward Osterhans' division on the left along the northerly
road. His leading brigade (Garrard's) was quickly met by a
hot fire from Tracy's Confederate brigade, and its advance was
checked. The other brigade (Sheldon's) having then come
to its assistance the Confederates were slightly driven back,
but soon made a stand, and Osterhaus' division was unable
to make any farther progress until late in the afternoon. On
the right, Carr's division moved forward at 6.15 a.11., one
brigade (Benton's) on the right of the southerly road, and the
other (Stone's) on the left of it. Their routes lay through
broken country covered with dense underbrush and their
progress was slow. The enemy (Green's brigade) was posted
in an advantageous position on a commanding ridge. In
advancing, Benton's and Stone's brigades had diverged from
each other, leaving a gap, into which Hove/s division was
ordered about 7 A.M. The two brigades of this division
worked their way laboriously forward through the cane and
underbrush, and finally came within one hundred and fifty
yards of the Confederate ridge, where a battery was posted,
well supported by infantiy. A determined assault was then
made by Hovey's division, and Benton's brigade of Carr's
division, and the ridge was carried, two pieces of artillery,
three caissons, and 400 prisoners being captured. Green's
brigade then fell back toward Port (Hbson.

Bowen had sent a short report to Pembertpn from Grand
Gulf early in the morning, stating the probability of an en-
gagement; after which orders were given to Baldwin to
move his brigade to Port Gibson, and to Cockrell (tempo-
rarily in command of Bowen's own brigade of Missouri
troops) to move to Fort Gibson with three regiments, leaving

BAYOU EXPBDITIOKS. 129

the other three posted respectively at Grand Gulf, at Thomp- ,
son's Bluif on the Big Black, and at the Grindstone Foid
on Bajou Pierre. Bowen then rode orer to Port Gibson,
reaching the battl»<field at some time before 9 a.m. At the
latter hour Baldwin's brigade passed through Port Gibson,
and abont a half hoar later Green was driven back, as already
stated. Baldwin was immediately ordered to form a new
line abont a mile in rear of Green's first position, and
Green's brigade was re-formed and sent over to the assistance
of Tracy on the northern road. Cockrell arrived abont noon,
and two of his regiments were sent to support Baldwin and
one to support Tracy.

Hovey's and Oarr's divisions poshed on as rapidly as the
ground would permit in pursuit of Green's brigade, and early
in the afternoon they came under the fire of Baldwin's bri-
gade and a veiy severe contest ensued, lasting over an hour
and a half. While this was in progress Bowen took two of
Cockrell's regiments and made a desperate effort to turn
McGlemand's right flank. McClemand called up one bri-
gade (Bnrbridge's) of A. J. Smith's division and sent it to
meet this attack, and at the same time Hovey brought four
batteries into position on a ridge from which they could enfi-
lade Cockrdll's regiments moving through the ravine toward
the right. Under this combined fire Cockrell's attack was
defeated, and he was driven to and across the southern road,
where he joined Baldwin, who still held firm.

The other brigade (Landram's) of A. J. Smith's division
now came up and joined Hovey's division and Stone's bri-
gade of Oarr's division in an attack on Baldwin. The odds
were very great, even with the advantages of ground, and
Baldwin made a most gallant defence, holding his ground
until after the brigade on his right had been driven off the
field, just before sunset, and then covering the retreat.
6*

180 THB MISSISSIPPI

Grant had left Bminsbtirg early in the morning and had
reached the field about ten o'clock, just as Hovey's and Garr's
divisions had carried the first ridge on the right. Having
examined the whole field on the right, he rode over to the
left to inspect Osterhaus* position, and he remained there
with the intention of using MoPherson's corps on that flank
as soon as it shotQd arrive. Two brigades (J. E. Smith's and
Stevenson's) of Logan's division of this corps were put in mo-
tion from Bminsburg as soon as they landed, on the morning
of the 1st. Hearing the sound of the battle, they marched as
rapidly as possible through the heat, McPherson and Logan
both being with the advance, and came on the field about
noon. Owing to repeated requests for reinforcements from
McClemand (although he had already three divisions under
him opposed to about a brigade and a half), Grant ordered
McPherson to send one brigade (Stevenson's) to McCler-
nand, but to bring the other one (J. E. Smith's) to the sup-
port of Osterhaus on the left. McPherson accompanied this
brigade in person and was ordered by Grant to move it in
such manner as to turn the Confederate right flank. As
soon as the ground was reconnoitred, a judicious position
was selected by McPherson from which this movement
could be effected, but owing to the tangled and broken
character of the country it was several hours before the
movement could be accomplished. Having finally got into
position about 5 p.m., an attack was made by J. E. Smith's bri-
gade in line on the enemy's right flank at the same time that
Osterhaus renewed his front attack along the road. The
result was the complete defeat of the enemy's right, soon
followed by the rest of his line, Baldwin's brigade in the
centre bringing up the rear. Green conducted the men
from the right (Tracy having been killed early in the action)
along the direct road to Grand Gulf, burning the bridge over

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 181

Bayon Pierre as soon as he had crossed, and taking a posi-
tion on the hills north of that stream. Baldwin retreated
through Port Gibson, destroying the bridge over the south
fork of Bayon Pierre. The retreat was conducted in good
order, every foot of the way being contested, so that dark-
ness closed Qver the field before Grant's troops could reach
Port Gibson. Under the circumstances, pursuit was impos-
sible that night. Before daylight the next morning Bald-
win continued his retreat to the Grindstone Ford, on the
north fork of Bayou Pierre, crossed the bridge at that point
and then burned it, and finally rejoined Bowen and Green
by way of Willow Springs.

Bowen's force engaged in this action numbered about
8,500 men, according to the latest returns prior to the bat-
tle. In his official report, made three months later, he gave
his strength at 5,500, although he stated to Loring, who
joined him May 2d, that he then had 7,000 men, after de-
ducting the losses in the battle. It is hardly necessary to
figure down his strength ; his defence was most gallant, even
with 8,500 men, against the odds of a whole corps and two
brigades of another, numbering in all 23,000 men. He re-
ported his losses as follows :

Killed. Woanded. Missing.

CookreU*B brigade 13 97 96

Green's " 17 83 123

Baldwin's " 13 48 27

Tracy's ** 18 113 148

Total 60 840 387

Aggregate 787

According to the Union reports, the Confederates lost over
GOO in prisoners alone. Grant's losses were as follows :

132 THE MISSISSIPPI

- Killed. Wounded. Miasing.

OBterhaus' diviflion 37 171 5

A. J. Smith's " 2 16

Hovey's *' 42 263 3

Carr's " 42 222

Log»ii»s •♦ 6 38 3

Total 129 710 10

Ags^^e^it^ ^0

Dnring the whole of this day Pemberton had been in
Yicksburgy sending telegrams in all directions for the pur-
pose of collecting his scattered forces. Loring, who was in
Meridian, was directed to come by rail, via Jackson, to Ed-
ward's Station, bringing with him any troops that were ready
to move. No troops were ready at Meridian or Jackson;
but at the railroad bridge over Big Black Biver there were
two regiments and a battery of Tilghman's brigade, which
were put in motion during the day. Loring left the raih^oad
at the Big Black and proceeded on the road to Port Gibson,
overtaking these troops before night. They did not arrive
within twenty miles of the field that day. Finding that it
would be impossible for Loring to arrive in time, Pember-
ton ordered another brigade of Stevenson's division to move
from Vicksburg to Bowen's relief. This brigade (Reynolds')
started on its march a little before dark. The next morning
the two remaining brigades of Stev^ison's division (Barton's
and Taylor's) started for Port Gibson with Stevenson in

command.

On the morning of May 2d, the Union troops entered
Port Gibson, and immediately began to construct a bridge
over the south fork of Bayou Pierre. This was completed
lkt 4 P.M., and Crocker's (formerly Quinby's) division of Mc-
Pherson's corps, which had come up during the day from
Bruinsburg, took the lead, followed by Logan's division of

BAYOU EXPEDITIONS. 133

the same corps. They advanced as far as the north fork of
Bayou Pierre, eight mUes, where the bridge was found still
burning. The fire was put out, and the bridge was repaired
during the night, so as to be ready for use at daybreak the
next morning.

Loxing reached Bocky Springs with the two regiments
and battery of Tilghman's brigade on the morning of the
2d, and, hearing of Bowen's retreat to Grand Gulf, and fear>
ing that he might be cut ofif from Yioksburg, he hastened
Tilghman forward to Grindstone Ford on the north fork of
Bayou Pierre, with instructions to hold that point at all
hazards. He then rode on himself to Giund Gulf, and,
learning the condition of affairs from Bowen, it was at once
determined to abandon Grand Gulf and retreat across the
Big Black. One regiment was left in Grand Gulf until
night, when the guns were dismounted, magazines blown
up, and the batteries abandoned. Porter's gunboats came
up and took possession on the morning of May 3d. Bowen
retreated in the direction of Hankinson's Ferry, where he
was joined by the three brigades of Stevenson's division
which had left Vicksburg that morning and the previous
evening. The total Confederate force now present consisted
of the whole of Stevenson's division (four brigades), and
Bowen's, Green's, Baldwin's, and Tilghman's brigades — in
all, about 17,000 men; but the men were worn out with
sudden and long marches and fighting, and were somewhat
demoralized. The retreat across the Big Black was begun
at Hankinson's Ferry on the evening of the 2d, a force
being left behind to protect the crossing. This force was
attacked by Crocker's division, of McPherson's corps, on
the morning of the 3d, near Willow Springs, but it stood
firm, contesting its ground, and retreating very slowly until
late in the afternoon, when Logan's division came upon its

134 THE MISSISSIPPI

flank, and cansed it to hasten its progress toward the ferry.
The Confederate troops all crossed safely, but McPherson's
men were so close npon them that they were nnable to de-
stroy the boat bridge.

On the evening of the dd, Grant took a dozen cavalrymen,
and, otherwise unattended, rode over to Grand GqI^ in
order to establish his base at that point, and make prepara-
tions for a speedy advance. Having issued the necessary
orders, he rejoined his troops at Willow Springs before day-
light of the 4th. McPherson's corps was moved forward to
Hankinson's Ferry, and McOlemand's to Willow Springs,
where they remained in bivouac for three days, awaiting the
arrival of Sherman's corps, and of ^tions and ammunition
necessary for an advance.

CHAPTER V.

THE CAMPAIGN IN BEAR OP VICKSBURG.

Grant's army was at last on hard gronnd. A footing had
been gained on the east bank of the river, the enemy had
been in a measure surprised, his flank had been tamed, and
his troops were scattered. It was an opportunity to strike
hard and strike quickly in order to gain decisive results —
one of those opportunities, the seizure or neglect of which
marks the difference between a great and an incompetent
leader. It was no longer a question of going to Banks'
assistance, or of diverting troops on any side issue ; the op-
portunity could only be improved by a prompt movement
between the enemy's fdrces, dividing them and beating
them in detail. Grant was equal to the emergency; and
eighteen days from the time the first regiment landed at
Bruinsburg, the Confederate forces at Jackson had been de-
feated and driven off, while those near Yicksburg had been
routed and shut up within their fortifications, never to come
out, except as prisoners. The deeds of these eighteen days
challenge comparison with the most brilliant campaigns of
history.

Pemberton's returns for the last day of March showed an
effective strength, as already stated, of 50,000 men. This in-
cluded the Port Hudson garrison, all of which, except 6,000
effectives, had now been recalled to Yicksburg. But at
Pemberton's urgent request. Gist's and Walker's brigades.

136 THB MISSISSIPPL

nambering 5,000 men, from Beanregard's command, in
South Carolina, were ordered to bis relief on May 5tb, and
3,000 cavalry, from Bragg's army, were sent from Tennessee
to Northern Mississippi. He thus bad an available force of
over 50,000 men for the defence of the short line from
Yicksburg to Jackson. Grant's ret^m for the month of
April showed the effective strength of the force operating
against Yicksburg to be 50,068. These numbers vere not
actually present on the east bank of the river. McAr-
thur*s division of McPherson's corps was still up the river,
one brigade being left at Lake Providence throughout the
camx)aign, and the other two not coming up in time to
be of service prior to the assaults at Yicksburg. Blair's
division of Sherman^s corps was also left behind to guard
the roads from Milliken's Bend, but rejoined the army the
day before the battle at Edwards* Station. After deducting
these divisions, the force with which Grant began the cam-
jmign was about 41,000, and at no time prior to the siege
had he over 45,000 available. These divisions in rear, how-
ever, being occupied in guarding his communications, it is
proper that they should be counted as part of his effective
strength.

The numbers were therefore practically equal. The ad-
vantages of position were all on the side of the Confed-
erates, they being in their own country, with which they
were perfectly familiar, and which afforded admirable op-
. portunities for defence, while the Union forces were entirely
ignorant of the country, and were dependent for supplies
upon seventy miles of wretched road, through overflowed
lands, passing within a short distance of the Confederate
position, and thus open to attack at all times. On the
other hand, those who fought for the Union had an enor-
mous advantage in their naval resources, which gave thent

THE CAMPAIGN IN BEAR OF VICKSBURG. 137

unquestioned oommand of the river navigation, and withont
which the campaign never could have been prosecuted in
the manner that it was prosecuted. At the time of the Bat-
tle of Port Gibson, the armies on both sides were scattered,
one corps of Grant's army being at MilHken's Bend, seventy
miles from Bruinsburg, and one-third of Femberton's being
at or near Jackson, forty-four miles by rail from Yicksburg.

It was thus about an even thing on both sides, all things '
considered, except the quality of the commanders. Here
the difference was enormous. On the Union side were the
foremost chiefs — Grant, Sherman, and McPherson — which
the Northern armies produced throughout the whole war.
Johnston and Pemberton belonged to a different category.
Johnston's abUities were undoubtedly great, and it is univer-
sally conceded that he showed great ability in extricating
an army from a dangerous position ; but he seldom struck
back, and he lacked that divine fire which gains battles. On
the Peninsula, in Mississippi, in Georgia, and in North Caro*
lina, he had as good opportunities as ever fell to Lee or Jack"
son, but he never dealt any such blows as those of Gaines*
Mill, Chancellorsville, Manassas, and the Wilderness. His
mind inclined more to disputatious writing than to bold and
vigorous movements in the field, and, in the midst of his
campaigns, he found time to write letters of interminable
length, for the purpose of showing that the responsibility
for his failures rested with Jefferson Davis, or with some one
else, but not with himself.

Pemberton did not belong to the grade of second-rate
generals ev^i. He had seen no active service in the Civil
War prior to his assignment in Mississippi, in October, 1862,
and his appointment to that important command was then an
anomaly; his conduct of that command made the anomaly only
mofe striking, and he was never again employed as a general.

138 THE MISSISSIPPI

On the eyening of April 29th, after the nnsnccessfol naval
attack on Orand Gulf, Grant had \mtten to Sherman that
he felt confident of effecting a crossing the next day, and
he therefore desired Sherman to cease his demonstration
against Haines' Bluff and join him as quickly as possible
with two divisions, leaving the third to guard the road for
the present. Sherman received this near Haines' Bluff,
May 1st, and immediately sent back orders for Steele's and
Tuttle's divisions at Milliken's Bend to take np their march
for Hard Times. During the night he withdrew down the
Tazoo Biver with Blair's division, and the following day
reached Milliken's Bend. Leaving Blair's division to guard
the road, he went on in person, overtook his other two divi-
sions, and reached Hard Times on the 6th. While on the
march he received an order from Grant, dated at Grand Gulf,
May 3d, directing him to organize a train of 120 wagons,
bring them to Perkins' plantation and thence ferry them
over the river to Grand Gulf, where they were to be loaded
with 100,000 rations from the transports. This would give
five days' rations for Sherman's corps after crossing the river,
and two days' for McGlemand and McPherson in addition
to the three days' which they had already drawn. These
five days' rations for the whole command were all that they
received until a base was established at Chickasaw Bayou
nearly three weeks later. The troops virtually lived on the
country until Vicksburg was invested.

In order to avail himself of the services of McArthur's
division of McPherson's corps and Blair's division of Sher-
man's corps, orders were sent, on May 5th, by Grant to Hurl-
but at Memphis to send forward Lauman's division o£ the
Sixteenth Corps to Milliken's Bend as soon as transports
could be obtained.

On May 2d, at Port Gibson, Grant received a letter from

THE CAMPAIGN IN REAR OF VICKSBURG. 139

Banks, sent by Farragut on the ram Switzerland from the
month of Bed Biver. The whole snbject of the projected
co-ox)eration between Grant's and Banks' armies will be
folly discussed in a subsequent chapter. It is only neces-
sary to say here that when Grant determined on March 29th
to move across the peninsula from Milliken's Bend and turn
the Confederate left flank, it was his intention to prosecute
a campaign along the Big Black against Vicksburg after
crossing the river. But on April 10th he received a letter
from Halleck, dated April 2d, calling special attention to the
necessity of co-operating with Banks. Halleck said: ''If
he cannot get up to co- operate with you on Vicksburg, can-
not you get troops down to help him on Port Hudson?" This
letter caused a modification of Grant's plans. He still de-
termined to cross the river at or near Grand Gulf, but once
across he proposed to send an army corps down the east
bank of the river to Bayou Sara, near Port Hudson, to co-
operate with Banks in the reduction of that place. McCler-
nand was notified on April 12th that his corps would make
such a movement, and on the 14th a despatch was sent to
Banks informing him of the project. But Banks did not re-
ceive the despatch until May 5th, and the letter which was
now received from him, and which was dated April 10th,
was not in answer to this despatch, but to a previous letter
of Grant's dated as far back as March 23d, in which Grant
had proposed sending a corps by the Lake Providence
route, which at that time seemed to be favorable. Banks
stated that he intended to return to Baton Bouge by May
10th, in order to co-operate against Port Hudson, and that
he had 15,000 men available for field service. It was now
May 2d. To send troops to co-operate at Port Hudson on
the 10th and to await their return, even if successful, was
to lose a month at least in exchange for a reinforcement

140 THK iaa»I8SIPPl

of only 15,000 ixieiL It was to wait for the enemy to col-
lect his Bcattei'ed troops and to draw reioforeements from
other points, as, according to rumors which Grant receiyed,
he was already doing. To have carried out any snch ar-
rangement would have been to throw away an opportunity
which Grant's army had been working {or months to obtain,
and which was at last within their grasp. There could be
no question of Grant's duty in the premises ; it was to fol- .
low up promptly the advantage he had gained at Fort Gib-
son, and to use all his force to beat the enemy nearest to
him. All idea of detaching any troops at present to Banks*
assistance was therefore abandoned.

From the 3d to the 6th of May McClemand^s and McPher^
son's corps lay at Willow Springs and Hankinson's Ferry,
waiting for supplies and for Sherman's corps. On the 7th,
Sherman being across the river, the advance was resumed*
Beconnoitring had been carried on during the last three
days, but nothing definite had been developed. At that time.
Grant's information as to the enemy's position and movements
was simply that the force at Hankinson's Ferry had retreated
toward Yicksburg ; and there were rumors that a force was
being collected at Jackson. His intention, therefore, was
to advance along the line of the Big Black toward Ed-
wards' Station, midway between Yicksburg and Jackson,
keeping a close watch of the ferries, so as to prevent any
attack on his left flank ; he would thus inove with his main
body between the enemy's forces, and would be in a position
to attack either one of them as soon as their presence should
be developed. But while keeping his main force in the
centre of the theatre of operations, MePherson was to be
thrown out somewhat in advance on his right flank, so that,
without getting out of reach of supports, he could reach
Jackson as quickly as possible, break up any force in that

THE CAMPAIGN IN REAR OF VICKSBURG. HI

vicinity, destroy the railroad, and rejoin the main body be-
tween Edwards' Station and Bolton. McPherson was there-
fore ordered to take the road from Hankinson's Ferry,
through Rocky Springs, TJtica, and Raymond, to Jackson.
McClemand was to follow the direct road to Edwards* Sta-
tion, through Rocky Springs, Cayuga, and Auburn ; one divi-
sion being thrown out on a parallel road to the left, nearer
the Big Black. Sherman was to follow McClemand, and, in
case the roads pei*mitted, to come up abreast of him. The
troops marched forward under these instructions, halting
for the nights as follows :

May 7th: 13th Corps (McClemand) at Rocky Springs;
15th Corps (Sherman) at Grand Gulf ; 17th Corps (McPher-
son) at Rocky Springs.

May 8th: 13th Corps at Big Sandy; 15th Corps at
Hankinson's Ferry ; 17th Corps at Rocky Springs.

May 9th : 13th Corps at Big Sandy ; 15th Corps at Han-
kinson's Ferry ; 17th Corps 7 miles west of Utica.

May 10th : 13th Corps at Big Sandy ; 15th Corps at Big
Sandy ; 17th Corps at Utica.

May 11th: 13th Corps at Five Mile Creek; 15th Corps
at Auburn ; 17th Corps 5 miles northeast of Utica.

May 12th: 13th Corps at Fourteen Mile Creek; 15th
Corps at Fourteen Mile Creek ; 17th Corps at Baymond.

On the night of the 11th Grant had his army well in hand,
and the orders for the next day were to move forward into
position on Fourteen Mile Creek, about seven miles south
of the railroad, McClemand on the Telegraph road from
Auburn to Edwards' Station, with one division thrown out
to the Big Black at Baldwin's Ferry, and Sherman on the
road from Auburn to Raymond ; McPherson was to push for-
ward rapidly into Raymond, in the hopes of capturing some
commissary stores there, the army being in need of rations.

142 THE MISSISSIPPL

MoPherson moved out accordingly before 4 a.m. on the.
12th, Logan's division in the lead, followed closely by
Crocker's. The enemy's videttes were soon seen falling back
before them, and about 9 a.m. stronger bodies of the enemy
were encountered. Logan thereupon formed one of his bri-
gades (Dennis') in line of battle across the road, the other
two brigades marching by the flank in rear of it. The only
cavalry regiment present with the army accompanied Mc-
Pherson's command, and it was now thrown out on the
flanks, with orders to explore every lateral road on which
the enemy might be posted. In this formation Logan con-
tinued his advance for about two hours. About 11 a.m., he
came to a small stream crossing the road, about two miles
from Baymond, and on the hills beyond it the enemy was
discovered in force, the infantry drawn up in support of two
batteries, which were posted in a position to enfilade the
road and the bridge over the stream. A halt was made, and
the ground was reconnoitred. It was evident that the en-
emy intended to dispute the passage. Logan was at once
ordered to attack him, and orders were sent back for Crocker
to hasten his march and come up as a reserve. The enemy's
force consisted of Gregg's brigade, which had come from
Port Hudson to Jackson, in pursuance of Pemberton's orders
of April 28th, and had moved out to Baymond to cover Jack-
son, and to fall upon Grant's flank should he attack Ed-
wards' Station. The brigade numbered, including some
State troops picked up at Jackson, something over 3,000
men.

Logan's division was at once formed by deploying J. E.
Smith's brigade on the right of Dennis', and placing De-
Golyer's (8th Michigan) battery on the road in the centre.
The infantry advanced, preceded by skirmishers, and a se-
vere engagement was soon in progi'ess. Stevenson's brigade

THE CAMPAIGN IN REAR OP VICKSBURG. 143

was then deployed on the right of Smith's, and the line con-
tinued to advance, passing over some open ground, and gain-
ing possession of a piece of woods across the creek, in close
proximity to the enemy's position on the hills. The fight
continued for two or three hours, the line gradually ad-
yancmg until, during the afternoon, the leading brigade of
Crocker's division came up and deployed in support of
Dennis' brigade. The enemy then abandoned the field
and retreated rapidly toward Jackson. Logan's division
followed in pursuit, passing through Raymond at 5 p.m.,
and pursuing the enemy for some distance beyond the town,
but being unable to overtake them the men were halted
and went into camp for the night. Crocker's division was
but slightly engaged in this affair, losing but two men.
Logan lost 65 killed, 335 wounded, and 32 missing; total
432. Gregg's loss, according to his own report, was 73
killed, 229 wounded, and 204 missing— total 505. Two dis-
abled guns were captured.

The defence made by the enemy at Raymond induced
Grant to believe that their force in the vicinity of Jackson
might be stronger than he had supposed ; reports reached
him moreover that reinforcements were arriving at Jackson,
and that Johnston was daily expected at that point to take
command in person. He therefore decided, before moving
up against Edwards' station, to make sure of Jackson, which
would be a dangerous point on his flank or i*ear if it re-
mained in the enemy's possession ; and as McPherson's
corps might not be strong enough to get possession of it at
once, single-handed — its fortifications being reported strong
— ^he determined to move his whole force in that direction.
On the evening of the 12th, therefore, orders were given
(countermanding previous orders of the same date, to move
up to the railroad) for McPherson to push forward at day-

lU THB MISSISSIPPI

light toward Clinton and thence to Jackson ; Sherman td
move to Raymond and thence by Mississippi Springs toward
Jackson ; and McOlemand, with three divisions, to follow
Sherman by the road on the north side of Fourteen MOe
Creek, sending his other division back to Anbnm to meefe
and escort the trains which were coming np from the river
at Grand Golf. The sharp skirmishing which both Mc-
Clemand and Sherman had had dnring the day in getting
possession of the crossings of Fourteen Mile Creek on their
respective roads was a strong confirmation of the numerous
reports that Pemberton was concentrating his Yicksburg
troops at Edwards' Station, but before attacking them Grant
desired to first dispose of the troops at Jackson and destroy
the railroad at that point.

Before following the manner in which the movement on
Jackson was executed, it is necessary to notice the Confed-
erate movements during the past ten days. On May Ist.^
Pemberton telegraphed to Johnston, then with Bragg's army
at TuUahoma, Tenn., that Grant's army had crossed the river,
and that a furious battle had been raging all day at Port
Gibson. Johnston answered on the following day: "If
Grant crosses, unite all your trooj^s to beat him. Success
will give back what was abandoned to win it." Pemberton
however, was on the ground and his judgment of the situa-
tion was different from Johnston's. He coincided in the
opinion expressed by Jefferson Davis, that for lack of sup-
plies Grant's army could not live more than a few days
away from the river and that it would soon return toward
Warrenton. He thought it probable, however, that a raid
might be made on Jackson. Acting upon this judgment
he made the following dispositions. The troops arriv-
ing from Port Hudson and any reinforcements that might
come from South Carolina were to stop at Jackson and de-

THE CAMPAIGN IN RBAB OF VIGKSBURG. 145

fend that place. The three divisions, Bowen's, Loringfs,
and Stevenson's, that had moved out toward Grand Gulf
were to retire and take np a position as follows : Bowen's
at Bovina Station to defend the railroad bridge ; Loring's
on the Hall's and Baldwin's Ferry roads, to defend those
ferries ; and Stevenson's from the Hall's Ferry road to
Warrenton, to resist an attack along the river. These
positions were taken np by May 7th, and were reported to
Johnston and to Jefferson Davis. Grant's movements were
watched as carefally as possible, bnt both sides were so re-
markably deficient in cavalry that each was largely in the
dark as to the other's movements. On May 11th, the pres-
ence of a considerable Union force (one of McGlemand's
divisions) at Baldwin's Ferry convinced Pemberton that
Grant conld live away from the river, and led him to believe
that Edwards' Station was to be the point of attack. Pem>>
berton therefore ordered Bowen to advance to Edwards'
Station, and Loring and Stevenson to move np and join
him. Walker, who had jnst arrived at Jackson, from Sonth
Carolina, was ordered to advance toward Baymond in sap-
port of Gregg, who had moved there the previous day. If
the enemy attacked in heavy force they were to fall back
within the fortifications of Jackson; if he moved toward
Edwards' Station they were to attack his flank and rear.
Walker did not leave Jackson until the 12th, and on that
day Gregg was entirely overpowered by McPherson. On the
same day there was considerable skirmishing on Fourteen
Mile Greek, only five miles south of Edwards' Station, be-
tween the heads of column of McClemand's and Sherman's
corps, and a brigade sent forward in observation by Bowen.
This convinced Pemberton that he was to be attacked in
force the next morning between Fourteen Mile Creek and
Pd^nrds' Depot, and Loring and Stevenson were urged on

vin.-7

146 THE MISSIS8IPPL

and came np with Bowen, forming line of battle sontli of
Edwards* Station on the morning of the 13th. Instead of
attacking, however, Grant's whole force moved off toward
Bajmond and Jackson.

While these events were in progress Johnston had received
orders from Richmond on May 9th to " proceed at once to
Mississippi and take chief command of the forces there.**
He arrived at Jackson on the evening of the 13th and f onnd
the two brigades of Gregg and Walker jnst returning from
Raymond. Gist's Sonth Carolina brigade and Maxey's Port
Hndson brigade were expected to arrive the next day. The
total strength of these four brigades was abont 12,000 men^
He also learned that Pemberton was at Edwards* Station bnt
that a large Union force was at Clinton, cutting off any
communication with him. He hastened to telegraph a few
words to Richmond conveying this information, and adding,
"I am too late.'* He seemed to foresee disaster, and
desired to clear himself in advance of any responsibility for
it, rather than to bend his whole energy to avert it.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of Grant's orders of the night of
May 12th, already referi'ed to, McPherson had moved from
Raymond to Clinton on the 13th, and from there toward
Jackson on the 14th. Sherman had moved through Ray-
mond to Mississippi Springs on the 13th, and thence toward
Jackson on the 14th, communicating with McPherson on the
other road, so as to approach Jackson about the same hour.
McClemand had moved to Raymond on the 13th, and sent
one division forward as far as Clinton on the 14th. Sher-
man and McPherson approached Jackson in a pouring rain,
about 10 A.M. on the 14th. Hearing of their approach from
his vedettes, Johnston posted one brigade on each road
— Walker toward Clinton, and Gregg toward Raymond — in
intrenchments which had previously been constructed on

THE CAMPAIGN IN REAR OP VICKSBURG. 147

high grotind commianding the approaches over open fields.
He instructed them to make enough of a defence to gain
time for him to remove stores and valuable property by the
railroad leading northward toward Canton.

Gregg made but a feeble resistance. After some prelimi-
nary artillery firing, Sherman moved a portion of his men
around the enemy's flank, an^j at 1 p.m., they reached the
enemy's intrenchments to find them deserted. About 250
prisoners were taken, together with all their artillery (18
guns), and much ammunition and stores. Sherman lost less
than 30 men.

W&lker made more of a fight. He occupied a fine posi-
tion on the crest of a semi-circular ridge, his flanks pro-
tected by woods, and in front of him a gently sloping open
field terminating, about one-third of a mile distant, in ia
boggy creek lined with thick willows. His artillery coml-
manded the bridge over this creek. McPherson arrived in
front of this position about 9.80 a.m., but the rain fell in
such torrents that his attack was delayed for an hour and a
half by the fear of spoiling their ammunition if the men
opened their cartridge-boxes (this was before the days of
metallic cartridges). Crocker's division had the advance
this day, and, during this hour and a half, his men wei^e
moved into place, the three brigades being deployed in line,
with one brigade of Logan's division in reserve. At 11 a.m.,
the rain having partially ceased, skirmishers were sent for-
ward, and advanced as far as the creek, but were unable to
move through the open field beyond it. They were then
recalled, and a charge Was ordered. The whole division
moved forward in a superb line, driving the enemy's skir-
mishers out of the creek, and advancing under fire across
the field. When they were about half way across it, the en-
emy broke from their intrenchments and made a hasty re-

148 THE lUSSISSIPPI.

treat. They were ponmed abont a mile and a half, during
which Crocker's men fell somewhat into disorder, and were
finally brought to a halt by some artillery posted in an innec
line of works close to the town. While they were re-form-
ing, the Confederates made their escape over to the Canton
road. In this engagement McFherson lost 265 men, and he
gives the enemy's loss at 845, a large portion of whom were
prisoners, and 17 guns. The Confederate reports make their
losses a little less than 400. McPherson's and Sherman's
troops entered Jackson abont the same time, between 3 and
4 F.iL Pemberton's attempt to defend Jackson against a
''raid" by a detachment ont of supporting distance had led
to complete disaster, viz. : the defeat of two brigades with
heavy loss, the loss of 85 guns, the captnre of Jackson, and
the destruction of the railroads and all public property at
that place.

Grant entered Jackson with Sherman's troops, and there
learned that Johnston had ordered Pemberton to move out
to attack his rear. He immediately determined to attack
Pemberton before Johnston, circling around to the north,
could come to his assistance. His troops were in compact
shape, well in hand for such a movement. McClemand had
two divisions at or near Baymond, one at Clinton, and one
on the road between Auburn and Raymond, bringing up the
trains. Blair's division of Shetman's corps and one bri-
gade of McArthur*8 division, of Mcl^herson's corps, had
come up with these trains from Grand Gulf. This gave five
and a half divisions, all within ten miles of the railroad be-
tween Bolton and Edwards' Station. They were all ordered
to move on converging roads toward the latter point
McPherson was to leave Jackson, at daylight on the 15th, for
Bolton, and Sherman was to complete the work of destruc-
tion at Jackson, and follow McPherson in the afternoon.

THE CAMPAIGN IN RBAR OP VICKSBURG. 149

On the same day that Johnston's troops were driven out
of Jackson (May 14th) most important events had transpired
in Pemberton's camp. On his arrival the previous evening
Johnston had sent a somewhat vag^e despatch to Pemberton,
referring to the presence of Sherman's [McPherson's] corps
at Clinton, stating the necessity of establishing communica-
tion between their forces, and saying : '* If practicable, come
np in his rear at once ; to beat snch a detachment would be
of immense value. The troops here could co-operate."
This despatch was carried by an officer around McPherson's
flank, and delivered to Pemberton at Bovina about 7 a.il on
the 14th. Pemberton immediately ireplied: "In directing
this move I do not think you fully comprehend the position
that Yicksburg will be left in ; but I comply at once with
your order." The troops were ordered forward from Ed-
wards' Station. Pemberton, however, continued to meditate
on the order, and a fatal divergence of views between him-
self and Johnston was soon developed. Johnston's idea was
that every man between Jackson and Yicksburg should be
united, to fight a battle on which the fate of Yicksburg
would depend, believing that any attempt to cover Yicks-
burg by a detachment would result in the loss of Yicksburg
and detachment both« Pemberton^s whole idea was to de-
fend Yicksburg to the last, and to make no move which
would uncover that place. About noon, therefore, before
his troops had got in motion, under his orders of the morn-
ing, he suspended these orders, and called a council of
war ; read Johnston's letter to his generals and asked their
views. The numerical majority of them were in favor of
Johnston's proposition, but the two senior generals (Loring
Imd Stevenson) preferred a movement against Grant's com-
munications in rear of Baymond, in the hope of cutting off
his supplies and compelling his retreat. Pemberton per-

350 THB MISSISSIPPI.

Bonally was in favor of making no movement at aU, but of
awaiting an attack on choBen ground ; bnt as his officers
were '* all eager for an advance," he waived bis judgment.
But the movement toward Clinton he would not make, for
ho considered that "suicidal,'* He therefore determined to
move against Grant's communications. As Johnston says in
his " Narrative," " Although averse to both opinions, Gen-
eral Pemberton adopted that of the minority of his council,
and determined to execute a movement which he disap*
proved, which his council of war opposed, and which was in
violation of the orders d his commander." It was an awk-
ward see-saw — Johnstgn moving out of Jackson toward the
north and west in the hope of joining Pemberton, and Pem-
.berton moving from Edwards' Station toward the south and
east, against the communications of an army that was living
on the country. Conflicting plans and lack of leadership had
•brought things to a bad pass for the Confederates, on this
night of May 14th. Pemberton had 23,000 men (his report
says 17,600, but his last previous returns give ^3,701) — ^to wit,
Loring's, Stevenson's, and Bowen's divisions — at Edwards'
Station ; he had left 9,000— Forney's and Smith's divisions —
at Yicksburg, defending the batteries from Snyder's Bluff to
Warrenton, which batteries were now not threatened, nor was
this force strong enough to defend them if they had been
seriously attacked ; in the vicinity of Jackson were 12,000
men under Johnston, part of them just defeated in two en-
gagements and part of them just arriving in railroad cars.
Beinforcements to the extent of 5,000 additional men had
just been ordered from the East, and double that number
were promised at an early day. Here, then« were 44,000 men
(and more to come) scattered over a territory 50 miles long
by 20 broad, and divided into three detachments, no two of
which were in supporting distance. Moreover, the enemy.

THE CAMPAIGN IN REAR OF VICKSBURG. 151

witli an equal force of 44,000 men, all within a few hours'
march of each other, was between the two principal detach-
ments, greatly outnumbering each of them, though not more
numerous than all the detachments combined. There never
was a more striking instance of the wisdom of keeping an
army united and the folly of dividing it into detachments to
defend several points at once.

At 5.40 P.M. on May 14th Femberton sent a despatch to
Johnston by an officer, stating his intention to move against
Grant's communications. The orders for this movement
were immediately issued. Loring's division was to form the
right, Bowen's the centre and Stevenson's the left. The
troops were to move with the right in front, preceded by a
detachment of cavalry ; they were to follow the roads lead-
ing from Edwards' Station toward Raymond as far as Ellis-
ton's plantation and then turn south so as to strike the Au-
burn and Raymond road at Dillon's. Grant's wagon train
was in fact in the vicinity of Dillon's on this day, but it was
well guarded by McClemand's and Blair's troops. Pember-
ton's order prescribed that the movement should take place
in the morning of the 15th, but the troops were not in mo-
tion before 1 p.m. A considerable delay then followed in
consequence of the heavy rain of the day previous. The
roads were muddy and the ford at Baker's Creek on the di-
rect road to Raymond was not passable. The troops were
therefore moved up the creek to the Clinton road, which
crossed the creek on a bridge. Crossing this bridge and
moving forward about two miles to the forks of the road
south of Champion's Hill, the head of column turned to the
right through a cross road which brought them to the di-
rect Raymond road near Elliston's. Along this cross-road
Pemberton's army passed the night. At 6.30 a.m., on the
16th, a courier arrived from Johnston, bringing an answer to

152 THE MISSISSIPPI

Pemberton's despatch sent after the coanoil of war on the
14th. Johnston's reply was dated on the Canton road, ten
miles from Jackson, 8.30 a.m., May 15th. It was as follows :
"Onr being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan
impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by
your moving directly to Clinton, and informing me that we
may move to that point with abont six thonsand." This was
a reiteration of the previous order to effect a junction on the
north of the railroad, which Pemberton had submitted to a
council and had decided not to follow, because he consid-
ered it ** suicidal" Having moved in an opposite direction
for the purpose of attacking the enemy's rear, and having
come into such proximity to the enemy that his advance
was already skirmishing, Pemberton now determined to
obey the order I Directions were given to get his trains out
of the road, countermarch his columns to Edwards' Station,
and there take the road to Brownsville in order to join John-
ston. The movement was, however, impossible, for the
enemy was already upon him.

On the 15th McClemand's divisions had moved as fol-
lows : Hovey's from Clinton to Bolton, Osterhaus' from Ray-
mond to the cross roads half way to Bolton, Carr's from
Baymond to the first cross roads northwest of that town, A.
J. Smith's (followed by Blair's of Sherman's corps) from Au-
burn to Baymond. On the same day McPherson's corps
had marched from Jackson to within a few miles of Hovey's
bivouac at Bolton. On the night of May 15th, therefore.
Grant had seven divisions, about 32,000 men, in close sup-
porting distance between Bolton and Baymond, occupying
all the roads which converged from these points on Edwards'
Station. Grant in person reached Clinton from Jackson at
4.45 P.M. on the 15th, and immediately sent orders to Mc-
Clemand to move forward cautiously, feeling the enemy if

I

I

s

154 THE MISSISSIPPI.

he encountered him, but not to bring on an engagement nn^
less he felt entirely able to contend with him ; also to order
Blair to move forward with him.

Grant passed the night at Clinton, and at daylight the
next morning two men, employees on the railroad, who had
passed throngh Pemberton's camp the day before, were
brought to his headquarters. They stated that Pemberton
had 80 regiments, estimated at 25,000 men in all, and that
he was moving to attack Grant's rear. Grant thereupon sent
a courier with an order to Sherman to bring one of his
divisions with the utmost {)oesible speed to Bolton, aud to
follow with the other as soon as possible. He also ordered
Mcpherson to move on rapidly beyond Bolton in support of
Hovey, and McCIemand to establish communication between
the divisions of Blair and Osterhans, and keep it up, moving
forward cautiously. He then rode to the front.

It will be seen by looking at the map that from the direct
road from Baymond to Bolton (about 8 miles long), there
are three roads leading to Edwards' Station. They were
^known as the direct Baymond road, the middle Baymond
road, and the Clinton road. The first diverges about one
mile out from Bajmond, and leads direct to Edwards' Sta-
tion, crossing Baker's Creek at a ford ; the second diverges
about two miles farther, and joins the third on the southern
side of Champion's Hill ; the third passes half a mile south of
Bolton, and is the direct road from Clinton to Edwards' Sta-
tion. Champion's Hill — then a portion of the plantation
of a Mr. Champion — is not more than 70 or 80 feet in
height, but it is quite a prominent feature in an other-
wise flat landscape. Its northern side is abrupt, cut up
with steep ravines, and heavily wooded. The eastern and
southern slopes are more gentle and are partly open. The
Clinton road, coming in a westerly direction, strikes the

THE CAMPAIGN IN BEAR OF VICKSBURG. 155

northeast slope of the hill near the point where Champion's
house then stood, then tarns sharply to the south, passing
around the eastern slope of the hill till it meets the middle
road, then turns sharply to the west again and goes on to
the bridge over Baker's Creek, at the foot of the western
slope. On the morning of the 16th the position was as fol-
lows: Hovey's division was on the Clinton road, moving
west from Bolton to Champion's Hill, with McPherson's
corps a lew miles behind them; Osterhaus, followed by
Carr, was on the middle road, moving northwest to the same
point ; and A. J. Smith, followed by Blair, was on the direct
Baymond road, near Elliston's. moving forward toward Ed-
wards' Station. On the Confederate side Loring was on the
Baymond road near Elliston's, skirmishing with A. J. Smith,
Bowen was in the centre, on a small cross-road leading to
Champion's Hill, and Stevenson was on the left, at the junc-
tion of the Clinton and middle roads. All three were under
orders to countermarch to Edwards' Station. It was soon
found, however, that the Union troops (McClemand's) were
pressing their rear so closely that the order to countermarch
could not be carried out. It was necessary to stop and fight.
Orders were therefore given to form line of battle behind a
creek running in front of the cross road above mentioned.
This position was assumed between 9 and 10 a.m. As the
skirmishing and artillery firing increased in amount on the
Baymond road as soon as the enemy made a stand, Mc-
Clemand sent word to Grant at 9.45 a.h. to ask if he should
bring on a general engagement. Grant had ridden forward
from Clinton early in the morning, and near Bolton had
found McPherson's corps repairing a bridge, and the road in
front of them blocked with Hovey's wagons. These were
quickly moved out of the way and McPherson's corps re-
sumed its advance; Grant came up with Hovey's divisio^

156 THB MISSIBSIFFL

not fiur from Champion's honse abont 10 A.11. Hovey's
skirmishers were ahready in contact with the enemy, and he
was forming his men in readiness to bring on an action at
any moment, but Qiant directed him not to attack until he
beard from MoGlemand.

Abont noon McGlemand's 9.45 A.11. despatch was received,
asking if he shonld bring on an engagement From the
bearer Grant learned that McGlemand was between two and
three miles distant. Grant sent a written reply at 12.35 p.m.,
directing McClemand to attack the enemy in force, if oppor-
tunity occurred. Subsequently verbal messages were sent,
directing him to push forward with all rapidity. These
orders did not reach McGlemand until after 2 f.m. He im«
mediately ordered Smith and Osterhaus to ** attack the en-
emy vigorously, and press for victory." But the attack was
by no means vigorous.

On the other flank, McPhexson's corps had reached the
field about 11 A.11., Logan's division in the lead, with
Crocker a short distance in the rear. As soon as Logan ar*
rived, Hovey's two brigades were deployed on the left
(southeast) of the Clinton road, and two brigades of Lo-
gan's division formed on the right of the road, the third bri«
gade being held in reserve. Hovey's men immediately
advanced, and, swinging their left flank forward, they
began climbing the eastern front of the hill under a heavy
fire. The troops opposed to them were two brigades of Ste-
venson's division. While Hovey had been forming his men
and waiting for the arrival of McPherson, Stevenson had no-
ticed the concentration on his left flank, and had taken the
brigade (Barton's) on his extreme right and sent it in rear
of his line to the extreme left to take position in the woods
on Champion's Hill facing north; the other two brigades
(Lee's and Cumming's) had been marched by the left flank

THB CAMPAIGN IN BBAB OF VICKSBURG. 157

along the road, and had taken position around the northeast
point of the hill, where the Clinton road ascends it, and
from there to the left ; his f onrth brigade (Beynolds') had
gone back with the trains toward Edwards' Station. Ho-
yey's attack led against the right flank of Stevenson's new
^xwition, and the men gradually fonght their way np the
hill, driving back Cmnming's brigade folly 600 yards, and
capturing 11 guns, the horses of which had nearly all
been killed by the well-directed fire of Hovey's batteries
posted near Champion's house. While Hovey was making
this attack, two brigades (J. E. Smith's and Leggett's) of
Logan's division had advanced against the northern slope of
the hill on Hovey's right. They gradually and steadily
drove the enemy before them as they climbed the wooded
slope ; and, when their attack was well advanced, the third
brigade (Stevenson's) of this division, which had been kept
in reserve for about an hour, was brought up on their right
and sent across a ravine, penetrating between Lee's and
Barton's brigades, cutting off the latter from all communi-
cation with the rest of his division, and capturing 7 guns.

Hovey maintained his position until about 2 f.h., when
the enemy was heavily reinforced, and he was driven back.
In moving over to the left during the morning, Stevenson
had notified Pemberton that the main attack was evidently
to be on his left flank, and, if successful, it would cut off
the line of retreat to Edwards' Station. He therefore in-
tended to move as rapidly as possible to meet it, but, in so
doing, he would necessarily leave a gap between his division
and Bowen's. On receipt of this, Pemberton ordered Bowen
to follow Stevenson, and keep this gap closed. Shortly
after 2 f.m. Bowen closed up with Stevenson, and found
Hovey's men in possession of the crest of the hill and of the
captured guns. The leading brigade (Cockrell's) was imme-

158 THB MISSISSIPPI.

diately sent into action against Hovey, followed quickly by
the other brigade (Green's). Overpowered by snperior num-
bers, Hovey*8 men were forced to give way ; they fell back
slowly, fighting desperately for eyery foot, bat were gradu-
ally driven down the hill, and back through the open fields
around Ghampion^s house, losing all but two of the eleven
guns which they had captured. But by this time Crocker's
division had come up, and, on an appeal from Hovey to
Grant for reinforcements, this division was ordered to sup-
port Hovey. These two divisions now moved forward again,
driving the Confederates before them, and for the third
time contesting the possession of the slope of the hilL In
sight of this advance, Cumming's brigade, of Stev^ison*s
division, broke and fled; Bowen's Missouri troops made a
desperate fight, but were finally forced to give way, losing
five of the guns which had previously been lost and recai>-
tured. They made their retreat through a cross-road near
that where they had first formed in the morning, and, reach-
ing the direct Raymond road, they retreated to the ford over
Baker's Creek. Stevenson's division was completely routed
and broken up; Barton's brigade retreated across Baker's
Creek by the bridge on the Clinton road, hotly pursued by
Logan's men, and Cumming's and Lee's brigades fled in
confusion to the Raymond road, and thence to the ford.

When the attack became so decided on the left flank,
Loring was at first ordered to send one, and then a second,
brigade to the assistance of Stevenson and Bowen. Buford's
brigade moved first, followed by Featherston's with Loring
in person; the third brigade (Tilghman's) was left on the
lower road to confront Smith's and Blair's divisions. The
two brigades did not reach the forks of the Clinton and
middle roads before the entire left fiank was routed. Loring
was then notified to form his men between the Clinton and

THE CAMPAIGN VS BMAB, OP VICKSBURG. 159

Baymond roads, to cover the retreat of Bowen's division and
pick up some of Stevenson's fugitives. In this position he
was attacked by Osterhans' division and soon gave way.
He fell back again to the Baymond road, and there met
Tilghman's brigade, which had made a gallant attack against
Smith's division, in the course of which Tilghman had been
kiUed ; the brigade had been repulsed and was now falling
back. Iioring then retreated along the Baymond road
toward the ford on Baker's Greek, having received word from
Stevenson and Bowen that they would hold the ford until
he arrived. But they were unable to keep their word, for
about sunset, a portion of Carr's division, which had moved
rapidly forward and Crossed at the bridge on the Clinton road,
began taking a xK)sitiQn which would command the Baymond
road. Stevenson and Bowen moved off hastily while there
was yet time, and when Loring reached the ford he found the
Union troops on the opposite bank. He then turned back
in search of another ford lower down the creek, and wan-
dered about on unknown roads during several hours of the
night, abandoning all his artillery — only to learn when he did
find a ford that the Union troops were already in Edwards'
Station, thus completely cutting him off from the rest of the
army. He therefore moved off to the south, and on the fol-
lowing day reported to Johnston his arrival, ** without bag-
gage, wagons, or cooking utensils," at Crystal Springs, on
the New Orleans Bailroad^ 25 miles south of Jackson.
Bowen's division, and the remnants of Stevenson's, made
their way back to the Big Black Biver.

The rout of Pemberton's army was complete. But if Mc-
demand had acted with the energy shown by McPherson,
and the three division commanders with him, XiOgan, Hovey,
and Crocker, every man in Pemberton's army would prob-
ably have been captured. Hovey's and Logan's divisions

160

THB MISSIS8IPPL

brought on the battle by an energetic attack, and when
Femberton threw his whole force npon them, the three
together bore the bnint of the battle. McClemand had
four diyicdons — ^more than half of the army — on the middle
and Raymond roads. Had he thrown his men in with the
▼igor displayed by Hovey and Logan, he would haye broshed
aside the small force in front of him, and cnt off the retreat
by the Raymond road to the ford, in the same manner that
Logan cat off the Clinton road to the bridge. Femberton
would then have been confronted with superior forces on
three sides, and an impassable stream on the fourth, and in
the demoralized condition of his men that evening, he
wotdd have had no option but to surrender. That these four
divisions under Mcdemand's command were not energet-
ically employed is abundantly shown by the following table
of losses.

Killed.

Wounded.

mming.

ToteL

Hovev^s division

211

48

123

14

1

872

826

539

76

24

119

29

20

a

4

1,202
403

Loffan's **

Crocker's "

662

Osterhftns* *«

Carr's "

110
3

A- J. SmHh*> division . . . . . ^ ^ . -

28

Rlair^ft diviirion

897

1,887

174

2,408

The Confederate losses were reported as follows:

1

KUled.

Wounded.

Missing.

TotsL

Stevenson's division

288

131

16

527

480

61

2,001

807

48

2,851

Bowen's **

868

Loring's **

120

880

1,018

2,441

8,889

THB CAMPAIGN IN REAR OF VICKSBURO. 161

Bat if Pemberfcon's army was not captured it was very
thoroughly routed, with the loss of 24 pieces of artilleiy ;
its wagons were saved, owing to their early departure during
the morning nnder the orders for a retrograde movement to
join Johnston.

Daring the night of the 16th the demoralized troops kept
arriving at the railroad bridge over the Big Black. Bey-
nolds' and Barton's brigades went through Edwards* Station,
closely pursaed by Garr's division of McGlemand's corps,
which reached that point at 8 f.h., and passed the night
there. The rest of Pemberton's men avoided that place and
moved straight from Baker's Creek Ford to the railroad
bridge. Pemberton was already there when they arrived,
and directed the disordered regiments of Steyenson's divi-
sion to move on as far as Mt. Alban's Station ; but the men
gave out from exhaustion when they had gone as far as Bo-
vina, and they were halted at that point between 1 and 2
o'clock in the morning. Bowen's division was ordered into
the trenches covering the bridge, and it was intended that
Loring's division shotdd form on the west bank. But Lor-
ing never appeared.

When Pemberton first moved out ^m Vicksburg after
the battle of Port Gibson, it was his intention to defend the
line of the Big Black, and for this purpose he ordered tetes-
de-pont to be constructed, covering the principal ferries and
the railroad bridge. Grant's troops arrived at the ferries so
quickly that it was impossible to defend them, but a tete-de^
poni had been constructed in front of the railroad bridga
At this point the river makes a wide bend in the form of a
horseshoe, the distance in a straight line across the loop be-
ing about a mile. The gp*ound on the concave side of the
bend was perfectly fiat and entirely open, excepting some
bunches of timber here and there ; a narrow but deep ditch

162 THB msaisaiPPL

or bayoii ran across this ground in a nearly straight line.
On the other side of the river the bln£B9 were 40 or 50 fe^
high, and the ground veiy broken. The line selected for
the trenches ran straight across the open ground behind this
ditch. Work was begun upon it on the 12th of May and
finished on the 15th. This line would have served its pur-
pose as a tete-de-poni, had it been occupied by a small ad-
vanced guard, supported by the main body in strong force,
properly posted in its rear on the west bank. Unf ortunat^y
for Pemberton, the troops (Loring's division) which he had
intended to post on the west bank, as they had been the
least engaged at Champion's Hill, were cut off in that battle
and never rejoined him. He was thus caught defending a
bridge with yearly all his reliable troops in the Ute-de-poni^
and nothing in support. A complete stampede was the re-
sult.

In moving forward to Edwards' Station on the Idth and
14th with his field army, Pemberton had called up two bri-
gades from those left in the defences of Yicksburg, and had
stationed them at the Big Black bridge to secure that point
in his rear against surprise. These were Vaughn's andl
Baldwin's brigades of Smith's division, the former of which
was posted in the trenches on the east bank, and the latter
at Bovina, a few miles in rear, in support. During the night
of the 16th Bowen's division was halted and placed in the
same trenches, CockrelFs brigade on the right and Green's
brigade on the left of Yaughn. The object was to defend
the position long enough to cover the crossing of Loring's
division as soon as it should arrive. In order to facilitate
the crossing, the ties of the railroad bridge were planked,
and a second bridge was improvised by taking a steamer
which happened to be there and mooring it athwart the
stream. It was nearly as long as the stream was wide, and

THE CAMPAIGN" IS RBAB OF VICKSBURG. 163

the vacant qpaoes at stem and stern vere bridged over with
plank.

Grant's army passed the night of the 16th between the
battlefield and Edwards' Station, with the exception of Sher-
man's corps, which bivouacked at Bolton. At daylight the
next morning the pnrsiiit was resumed, McClemand's corps
in the lead, moving toward Big Black bridge, followed by
McPherson. Sherman's corps moved from Bolton direct to
Bridgeport, in order to turn the position at the bridge. Carr's
divisian» which was in the advance, came in sight of the
trenches at the bridge about 8 a.m., and he immediately de-
ployed his two brigades on the right of the road. Osterhaus
was but a short distance behind him, and as soon as he came
up his division was deployed on the left of the road. A few
batteries were brought into position and some skirmishers
sent forward, but the ground to the left of the road was com-
pletely open, and it was not deemed advisable to assault the
works across such ground until more troops should come
up. On the right of the road, however, there was a clump
of woods extending nearly to the river, and Oarr moved his
men to these woods in order to gain an advantageous posi-
tion for assault.

On the Confederate side everything was at odds and ends.
There seemed to be no one in command, and the horses
of the field g^uns that had been placed in the trenches
had been removed across the river ; if a retreat became
necessary the guns must bo abandoned. The distance
from the point where the trenches crossed the road to the
bridge was fully three-quarters of a mile ; it was peiiectly
open ground, and there was no supporting force on the other
bank of the river. Under auoh circumstances, in case of a
retreat the men would be slaughtered. There were not more
than 5,000 men in the trenches, and fully double that num-

164 TEQB lOSSISSIPFL

ber now confronted them, with the prospect of more to ar-
rive yeiy soon. The "MiBsonri division" (Bowen's), was
renowned for hard fighting, both before and after this affidr,
bnt this was a case to tiy the nerves of the steadiest veterans,
for every man felt instinctively that he was in a position
where he onght never to have been placed. As they ob-
served the movement toward the woods on their left flank,
many of them slipped off one by one to the bridge in rear.

Meanwhile brisk firing was carried on opposite the centre
for abont half an hour, dnring which Garr's division was
moving into the piece of woods on the right, and A. J.
Smith's division was coming np and forming on Osterhans'
left. Jnst as Smith's division was coming into line Garr's
men emerged from the woods with a lond cheer, and rushed
forward npon the intrenchments. Vanghn's brigade in the
centre saw that they were cnt off from the bridge and im-
mediately tamed and ran at fall speed. Bowen's division
at first attempted to make a defence, bat in a few minntes
saw that it was hopeless, and it then joined in the attempt
to reach the bridge. All the reports, Union and Confeder-
ate, speak of this as a precipitate flight, every man for him-
self. The 18 pieces of artillery were all abandoned, over
1,400 small arms were thrown away, and one-third of the
command (1,751 men) were cat off and made prisoners. The
rest reached the bridges in time, and immediately after
crossing set flre to them. As they had been previoasly pre-
pared for this parpose by scattering loose cotton and tar-
pentine on them, they were qaickly consomed. The losses
on the Federal side in this engagement were 273 in killed
and woanded, all bat dO of which were in Carres division.
The whole afbir was over soon after 9 o'clock in the morn-
ing.

The rest of the day and the night were oonsamed in

THE CAMPAIGN IN BEAR OF VICKSBURO. 165

building bridges. One was constmcied near the site of the
railroad bridge for McClemand's corps. McFherson's coips
reached the river abont three miles to his right abont 2 F.H.y
and immediately began the construction of two bridges, one
of solid timber, and the other of timber cribs filled with
cotton bales and floored with planks obtained by tearing
down a cotton- gin in the yicinity. Sherman's corps (re-
joined on this day by Blair's diyision) reached the river at
Bridgeport at noon. The only pontoon bridge train ac-
companying the army was with Sherman, and his bridge
was ready by nightfall. The others were not completed
nntil after midnight.

When the engagement opened in the morning, Pember-
ton, who was at Bovina, telegraphed to Vicksbnrg for a train
of cars; as soon as it arrived, after sending a note by a
scont to Johnston to inform him of the disasters of the pre-
ceding and present day, and to state that Haines' Bluff was
now untenable, he hastened to Yicksburg, turning over the
command to Stevenson with orders to bring the army back,
and take post behind the fortifications. The delay neces*
saiy to construQt bridges gave the Confederates the whole of
the 17th in which to effect their retreat to Yicksburg (12
miles) unmolested. On his arrival at the latter place, Pern*
berton telegraphed to Haines' Bluff, directing Hubert's
brigade of Smith's division, which formed the garrison at
that point to return forthwith to Yicksburg, leaving two
companies to spike the guns and blow up the magazines on
the approach of the enemy. He then made arrangements
to dispose the troops, as they came in, for the defence of
Yicksburg. Stevenson's division (four brigadjas) was placed
on the right, holding the line from Warrenton to the rail-
road, about five miles ; Forney's division (two brigades) was
in the centre, from the railroad to the graveyard road, a

1G6 THB laSSISSIPPL

distance of about two miles ; M. L. Smith's division (three
brigades) was on the left, twm the graYeyard road to the
river, about two miles; Bowen's division, and some small
detachments that had been called in fr<Hn Fort Pemberton
and other points, were placed in reserve.* During the two
weeks since he left Vicksbnrg Pemberton had lost the whole
of Loring's division, 8,700 men, in addition to the killed,
wounded, and miasing in Stevenson's and Bowen's divisions
at Champion's Hill and Big Black, amounting to about
5,300 ; so that instead of 35,000, he now had about 21,000
effective men to guard his trenches, although doubtless his
rolls of men drawing rations at this time numbered ov^
33,000. His troops all returned from the Big Black during
the afternoon of the 17th and were in their places early on
the 18th. They had the whole of that day to recover their
composure before their pursueis could arrive.

Sherman crossed two divisaons at Bridgeport during the
night of the 17th, followed by the other division the next
morning. At break of da^his leading divisions were on
the road to Vicksbnrg. McClemand's corps, with the eSLCep-
tion of Hovey's division, which was left at f<dwards' Station
and Big Black, began crossing in the morning of the 18th
and was on the march by noon. He foUowed the direct road
to Vicksbnrg until after passing Mt. Alban's Station, where
he turned into the Baldwin's Ferry road so as to give room
for McPheison between himself and Sherman. McPherson's
corps, which had been joined on the evening of the 16th by
one brigade of McArthur's division, crossed in the morning
and moved up to the Bridgeport road, following in rear of
Sherman's corps. By 10 a.h., Sherman had reached the
Benton road, thus interposing between Vicksbnrg and

> See map, Siege of VidEsbniiK.

THE CAMPAIGN IN BEAR OF VICKSBURG. 167

HaineB' Bluff. A regiment of cavalrj was immediately sent
to take the batteries at the latter place from the rear, ^ler-
man halted a couple of honrs to allow his men to close up
and rest, and to receive instructions from Grant, who soon
came up. Sherman was directed to form the right of the
line, and at noon he resumed his march. About two miles
outside the intrenchments the road forked, the right hand
known as the Graveyard, and the left hand as the Jackson,
road; both leading into Yicksburg. Sherman took the
right hand and on approaching the defences moved two di-
visions toward the right along the ridge extending to the
Mississippi. Only one brigade of McPherson's corps came
up that night, Logan's and Qninby*s^ divisions being halted
a few miles back on the road at nightfall. About half of
Grant's army was in sight of the fortifications on the night
of the 18th. The cavalry regiment sent to Haines' Bluff by
Sherman arrived in rear of the batteries at that point during
the afternoon. The two Confederate companies left behind
to destroy the guns had fled without accomplishing their
purpose, and the cavalrymen rode in without opposition.
Signal was made to a gunboat lying in the Yazoo and it
came up and took possession. The magazine was full of
ammunition and the guns were all in good order. There
were 14 of them, of the heaviest calibre of that period.

The note which Pemberton had sent from Bovina on the
morning of the 17th was delivered to Johnston during the
oncoeeding night at a point on the road between Livingston
and Brownsville, whither he had moved in the hope of join-
ing Pemberton. Johnston immediately answered in these
words : " U Haines' Bluff is untenable, Yicksburg is of no

1 Qninby had been on leave of absence ainoe May lat« in oonsequence of severe
illnesB, bat rejoined his command on the morning of the 17th. During his ab-
senoe his division was oommanded by Crocker.

168 THB HIS8IS8IPPL

value and cannot be held. If, therefore, yon are inyested
in Yicksbnrg, jon must nltimatelj surrender. Under such
circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we
must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late,
evacuate Yicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the
northeast.** This was received bj Pemberton at noon of the
ISth. On reading it he was foirly aghast. He says in his
report : ** The evacuation of Yicksburg ! It meant the loss
of the valuable stores and munitions of war collected for its
defence, the fall of Fort Hudson, the surrender of the Mis-
sissippi Biver, and the severance of the Confederacy. These
were mighty interests, which, had I deemed the evacuation
practicable, in the sense in which I interpreted General
Johnston's instructions, might well have made me hesitate
to ei^ecute them.*'

Much might be said on both sides of Johnston's proposi-
tion, but the question of the moment was, could the order
be obeyed? Pemberton called a council of war, read John-
ston's note, and asked the opinion of his generals if it were
practicable to comply with it. Their opinion was unani-
mous, " that it was impossible to withdraw the army from
this position with such morale and material as to be of fur-
ther service to the Confederacy." While the council was
deliberating, guns were heard booming outside the works.
Sherman already held the road leading "to the northeast."
Pemberton wrote a note to Johnston, stating the action of
the council, and announcing his intention to hold Yicksburg
to the last, as he " conceived it to be the most important
point in the Confederacy." Having sent this by a scout, he
resumed his occupation of giving orders for the defence.

A portion of Smith's division had occupied the ridge be-
yond Fort Hill, looking down into the Tazoo bottom on the
north of the city. Pemberton thought that this gave too

THE CAMPAIGN IS BEAR OP VICKSBURG. 169

great a development to his line for the number of troops on
hand, and he therefore ordered Smith to withdraw to the
Fort Hill ridge in rear of it. This was accomplished quietly
during the night. Steele's division, of Sherman's corps,
was working its way along this ridge at nightfall on the
18th, and in the morning he took possession of these de-
serted batteries, and extended his right to the Mississippi
Biver. At 8 a.h. on the 19th Sherman's corps was in posi-
tion about 400 yards from the enemy's works, on the same
ground it occupied throughout the siege — i.e., on the ridge
beyond Fort Hill, from the Mississippi Biver to the Grave-
yard road ; Steele's division was on the right, Bkdi^s on the
left, and Tuttle's in reserve. McClernand's corps came into
position about 2,500 yards from the enemy's works near
the Baldwin's Feny road ; Osterhaus's division on the left
of that road, A. J. Smith's on the right, and Garros in re-
serve. McPherson's corps arrived only a short time before
noon, and took position on the Jackson road, between Sher-
man and McGlemand ; Logan's division on the right, and
Quinby's on the left, each with a brigade in reserve. Sher-
man was so close to the enemy's works that skirmishing
had been going on during the whole morning. The other
corps were hardly yet in position to attack, but Grant relied
upon the demoralization of the enemy, due to his constant
defeats in recent battles, and he therefore ordered a general
assatdt at 2 f.m. Sherman's corps made a vigorous effort
against the works near the Graveyard road, and his men
succeeded in reaching the ditch, but, being unsupported
by the other corps, they were repulsed. McGlemand and
McPherson wore so iai from the works, that they had suc-
ceeded in accomplishing nothing more than an advance
lor several hundred yards under a heavy fire, when dark-
ness closed in upon them. The troops on the defence
VIIL— 8

170 THE MISSI8SIPPL

were intelligent veteians. They had been marched, and
conntermarchedy and fonght, with very little plan and sys-
tem for the last two weeks, culminating in the affiur at
Black River bridge, where they had mn like sheep. But
now they were in intrenchments which had been prepared
long before, and they felt at home. Their demoralization
was all gone, and they stood up in their works, and ponred
out snch a fire as beat back Sherman's troops with compara-
tive ease. It was evident that Yicksborg was not to be
taken by a mere ooup-^-main.

It was now eighteen days since Grant had secnred a foot-
ing on the east bank of the Mississippi by the battle of Port
Gibson. In that time he had marched abont 200 miles, and
by keeping his army together had defeated the enemy's scat-
tered detachments in four engagements, at Raymond, Jack-
son, Champion's Hill, and Big Black, all fought within six
days ; he had inflicted a loss upon them of 8,000 ^ in killed,
wonnded, and missing, had captured 88 pieces of their artil-
lery, and, finally, had driven them into the narrow defences
of Vicksburg, causing their outworks at Haines' Bluff, War-
renton, and Grand Gulf to be abandoned, and establishing
his own base on the Yazoo River in easy and safe reach of
his gunboats and transports. He had not only prevented
the junction of the enemy's detachments, but had still fur-
ther scattered their forces, so that they had fully 14^000 less
men available in Vicksburg at the close of this period than
at the beginning. During these eighteen days Grant's men
had had but five days' rations, having lived for the rest on
the countiy; their own losses had been a little less than
3,500. We must go back to the campaigns of Napoleon to

1 At Raymond, 800; JackHon, 1,100; Champion's Hill, 4,100; Big Black, 2,000.
The number of prisonerB which reached Memphifi, May 29th, on their way North,
was reported by flnrlbat at 4,600.

THE CAMPAIGN IN RBAB OF VICKSBURG. 171

find equally brilliant results accomplished in the same space
of time with such small loss.

His success was aided — ^as was Napoleon's in 1796— by the
incapacity of his opponents. There can be little question
that when Grant crossed the river, the proper movement for
Femberton was to abandon Jackson, and concentrate his
whole force for a decisive battle. Yet such a movement
involved a great sacrifice, for Jackson was the meeting-point
of railroads by which reinforcements were arriving and were
to arrive, and this sacrifice Femberton was not prepared to
make.

When Johnston reached Jackson on the night of the 13th,
he was, peiliaps, as he said, '* too late." The situation was
certainly full of danger, which he clearly foresaw. Yet a
man of a more aggressive nature wotdd hardly have con*
tented himself with accepting the situation, and sending a
vaguely worded order by a messenger, but would rather, at
any risk of health, have joined Femberton at once — leaving
his detachments to follow — ^in order to fully understand the
condition of affairs, and issue his orders advisedly. He
would then, at least, have secured compliance with his
orders, and there would have been no divided responsibility.
For an emergency, such as then existed, a man of Johnston's
temperament was x>eculiarly unsuited.

Femberton's vacillation in first declining to obey John-
ston's order to move from Edwards' Station to Clinton, and
then attempting to execute it when in the presence of the
enemy, cannot be defended. But it is quite possible that
the effect of obeying the order would have been, as he says,
" to abandon Yicksburg without striking a blow for its de-
fence ; " for it may be safely said, without detracting in any
way from Johnston's skill in defensive campaigns, that no
decisive battle would have been fought under his command

172 THE MISSISSIPPI

after the junction. It would haye been *'a skilful retreat"
to Meridian, "owing to the insufficiency of his forces."
Later,' when Johnston ordered Pemberton to evacuate Yicks-
burg, if Haines' Bluff was untenable, and march to the
northeast, there is much to justify Pemberton's idea of re-
maining, even had the eyacuation been possible. For more
than a year the Confederates had been defending Yicksburg,
with uniform success ; it was less than a month since* Grant
was still cooped up in the swamps, well-nigh dismayed at
his lack of success in the various bayous. The Confed-
erate President and Secretary of War had congratulated
Pemberton on his success, and jepeatedly urged him to
stand firm, the possessioD of the Itfissiflsippi being vital to
the success of the Confederacy. The Union gunboats had,
indeed, run past the batteries, but the river was still closed
as a line of commerce and communications, so long as the
batteries at Yicksburg were intact. As Pemberton says,
'Hhese were mighty interests;" and to secure them, provi-
sions and ammunition had been forwarded to stand a siege,
and promises had been held out that every available man
would be sent to raise it. Pemberton knew that Johnston
had already a considerable force on the outside, and that it
would rapidly bd augmented ; he had every reason to believe
that Johnston, appreciating the vital importance of prompt
and energetic action, would quickly strike a vigorous blow
for his relief. The whole theory of the Confederacy was not
to conquer the North, but to prove that the South could not
be conquered ; to remain on the defensive, beat back the
Northern armies, and prolong the war until the North, in
despair, should agree to a compromise. To hold Yicksburg
and the Mississippi Biver to the last was probably more in
accord with the general line of Confederate policy than to
fibandon it in the vain hope of regaining it after a battle.

THE CAMPAIGN IN REAR OF YIGKSBURG. 173

Finallj, the anomalous character of the command on the
Confederate side was in itself a direct invitation to disaster,
for which Jefferson Davis was personally responsible. Pem-
berton commanded the Department of Mississippi and East
Louisiana, reporting directly to the anthorities in Rich-
mond and receiving orders from them. Yet Johnston com-
manded both Pemberton's and Bragg's armies, without the
possibility of being really in charge of either. Hence Pem-
berton regarded himself as chiefly responsible for Ticks-
burg, and looked upon Johnston's instructions in the nature
of advice rather than of positive orders.

Opposed to such divided responsibility and confusion of
authority there was a united army with a single general in
command, who had clearly defined plans and was in the
midst of his troops to carry them out. Fortunately, he was
at this time cut off from all communication with Washing-
ton, for on May 11th Halleck telegraphed him to unite his
forces with those of Banks between Yicksburg and Port
Hudson. Had this telegram been received and obeyed the
whole campaign would have been wrecked. Of this no one
was more convinced than Halleck and the President, both
of whom were enthusiastic in their praises of the campaign
when it was concluded.

CHAPTER VL

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VIGKSBUBO.

YiOKBBUBa lies upon the riyer slope of a lange of blnfEs
which extend for hundreds of miles along the eastern side
of the allnvial valley of the Mississippi, and which are here
washed by the river itself, thongh at other points of its
winding coarse it is often from 50 to 100 miles distant from
them. These bluffs are about 250 feet in height and are
composed of a peculiarly tenacious, semi-induzated clay,
which when cut vertically for roads or other purposes resists
the action of the weather and retains its vertical sides for
generations. In such a soil the action of running water in
small streams has, in the course of centuries, resulted in out-
ting the bluff or plateau into deep ravines with remarkably
steep sides, separated by very narrow ridges. The topog^
raphy is thus extremely broken and complicated, and is of
such a character that no manoeuvres of troops are possible
over it. On the other hand it lends itself admirably to the
purposes of fortification, the narrow ridges having a com-
plete command over the deep ravines in front of them, and
their sinuous course enabling each point to bring a cross
fire in front of adjacent points.

A careful study of the map is necessary to form even an
approximate idea of the main features of this topography.
It will be noticed that from the northeast comer of the
town a ridge runs out to the eastward, on which is the Jack-

i

THE SDBGB AND SURKENDER OF VICKSBURG. 175

son road ; about two miles from the ontskirts of the town,
this ridge meets another ridge, which trends off to the south-
west for several miles, following an irregular course, bat hav-
ing an unbroken crest nearly on the same level all the way.
Between the Jackson ridge and this second ridge there is a
collection of minor valleys, the drainage of which is finally
united into Stout's bayou, which empties into the Missis-
sippi a few miles lower down, but is here separated from it
by another ridge, on which is the Warrenton road. The
Confederate line began on the Warrenton ridge about three
miles south of town, crossed Stout's Bayou, and then fol-
lowed the ridge without a break for five miles to the Jack-
son road. Here the ridge turns to the east and subse-
quently to the north and west, reaching the Mississippi at
the point of the bend ; but this ridge was considered as
giving too long a development to the line of defence, and
from the Jackson road the line ran due north, to a ravine
called Glass' Bayou, fully 150 feet deep, with precipitous
sides, and filled with a dense growth of vines and cane ;
crossing this it continued along a lateral spur to the Grave-
yard road, where it intersected another narrow, level ridge,
running due west about two miles to the river at Fort HillJ
This line had been selected for fortification in the autumn
of 1862, and during the winter and spring it had been most
thoroughly fortified. At the salient and commanding points
of the ridge, at an average distance of perhaps two hundred
yards from one another, batteries were constructed for artil-
lery in the form of redans, lunettes, or, in some places,

1 The reparts of the Engineer and other officers of the Seventeenth Corps, which
held the line at the Jackson road, speak of the crest of the ridge on that road as
**Fort HilL*^ This is a mistake ; Fort Hill overlooks the river aboat two miles
north of the <Aty landing, as shown on the accompanying map. It was so named
because the Spaniards erected a fort upon it as a defence against the Indiana,
when they ascended the Mississippi, and it has retained the name to this day.

176 THB MIS8ISSIPPL

closed redoubts; the parapets of these batteries were 25
feet thick and 10 feet high, and the ditch was 7 feet deep,
making the top of the parapet 17 feet aboye the bottom of
the ditch. Between the salient points there ran a line of
intrenchments, which in the whole eight miles of line was
broken only at two points, i.0., at Stont's Bayou and Glass'
Bayoa ; this intrenchment was 10 feet thick and 5 feet high,
and the ditch in front of it was 4 feet deep. In a few places,
where cross spnrs jntted out from the main ridge, advanced
batteries were constmoted, making a doable or triple line,
bnt in general there was only a single line of works.

They were defended when the siege began by 128 pieces
of artilleiy, 36 of which were siege gnns and the rest field
pieces. In addition to these land defences, the circuit was
made complete by a series of water batteries, extending from
Fort Hill on the north, through the town, and along the
Warrenton ridge till they met the land batteries on the
south. They mounted 31 pieces of siege artilleiy of the
heaviest calibre, and 13 pieces of field artillery.

The troops for the defence numbered about 20,000 effec-
tive men, divided into four divisions, under Generals Ste-
venson, Forney, Smith, and Bowen, and Waul's ** legion."
Stevenson's division held the right, beginning at the Warren-
ton road and ending at the railroad ; his four brigades wsre
posted in the following order from right to left, viz. : Bar-
ton, from the Warrenton road about one mile north ; Bey-
nolds, from Barton's right to the Hall's Feny road ; Oum-
mings, from the Hall's Ferry road to the square fort, about
three-quarters of a mile south of the railroad ; Lee, from
the square fort to the railroad.

Forney's division came next, with two brigades posted as
follows : Moore, on both sides of the Baldwin's Ferry road,
his right extending to the railroad, and his left nearly to the

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VIGKSBURG. 177

Jackson road ; Hubert from the Jackson to the Graveyard
road, his troops occupying the main salients on both roads.

Smith held the left, with three brigades ; Shonpe, from
the Graveyard road about a mile westward ; Baldwin on the
left of Shonpe ; and Vaughn on the extreme left, extending
to Fort Hill.

Bowen's division and Waul*s legion were in reserve.

Having failed to carry the works by a coup-de-main on the
19th, Grant devoted the next two days to perfecting his com-
munications with the Yazoo. His depot was established be-
tween Johnson's and Lake's plantations near Chickasaw
Bayou, on the identical ground where Sherman had landed
and made his assault in the previous month of December.
From this point roads were constructed to facilitate the
hauling of supplies, and the army was firmly established
within six miles of a base of supplies entirely secure from the
enemy's attacks. On the 21st, the troops being now all in
position. Grant determined to make a vigorous assault on the
following day. Several reasons, the force of which cannot be
denied, impelled him to this course. First of all he felt con-
fident of success. Secondly, the troops desired the assault ;
they were fiushed with an unbroken series of victories, and
felt in the spirit of finishing the thing then and there ; they
were in no mood for the drudgery of pick and spade, until
they had tried what they could do with their rifles. A third
reason was found in Johnston's presence on the outside
with a constantly increasing army, the sole object of which
would now be to raise the siege. A successful assault before
Johnston could be strong enough to attack, would enable
Grant to at once turn on Johnston and disperse his forces,
and then send a detachment against Port Hudson ; and this
without drawing any more troox>s from Memphis or other
points. If a siege was begun reinforcements must be
8* 8

178 THE MISSISSIPPI.

brought^ to make enure both of holding Pemberton in Vicks-
burg and driving off Johnston on the outside. The orders
were consequently issued to make an assault at 10 a.m. on
the 22d, artillery fire and sharp-shooting to be kept up
from daylight. Admiral Porter was requested to bombard
the water batteries with his gunboats.

The investment was at that time by no means complete,
there being a gap of nearly four miles between McCler-
nand's left, which was nearly opx>osite the square fort, and
the river. In this gap there were no troops, although one
brigade of McArthur's division of the 17th Corps, which had
been at Grand Gulf throughout the campaign, had reached
Warrenton on the night of the 21st, and was to move for-
ward on the Warrenton road the next day. Grant had not
at that time enough troops to make a close investment of the
whole line, and he ran no risk in leaving this gap on the
south, because had Pemberton left his works and attempted
to escape in this direction he would have been caught in the
pocket between the Big Black and the Mississippi, and his
destruction would have been almost certain. The bulk of
Grant's troops were opposite that portion of the line be-
tween the square fort and the Graveyard road, and the three
roads — Baldwin^s Ferry, Jackson, and Graveyard — which ran
along ridges, were the only practicable lines of approach ;
the intermediate country being filled with steep, wooded
ravines, through which troops could not advance in any sort
of order. It was along these roads that the main efforts
were made, the troops moving in narrow columns. Watches
had been compared so as to insure a simultaneous move-
ment, and at precisely ten o'clock the three columns sprang
forwaid.

On the right, Sherman had placed Blair's division near
the Graveyard road, supported by Tuttle's, leaving Steele's

THE SIBGE AND SURRENDER OF VIOKSBURG. 179

division to make an assault nearer to the river. A storming
party of 150 volunteers had been formed, provided with
boards and poles to cross the ditoh ; Swing's brigade was
immediately behind these, followed by Giles Smith's and
Eilby Smith's brigades. All these troops were sheltered in
a ravine which led up to the road about 200 yards in front
of the bastion. Four batteries had been placed in a posi-
tion from which their fire could be concentrated on the bas-
tion. At ten o'clock the signal was given; the storming
party jumped up on the road, and ran forward at full speed,
with Swing's brigade just behind them. Until this time
not a man had been seen on the Confederate parapet, but as
these troops came forward in full view, the regiments of
Hubert's brigade and a portion of the Missourians, which
garrisoned this part of the lines, stood up, and the parapet
fairly blazed. Some of the storming party reached the
ditch, followed it a short distance, climbed the parapet and
firmly planted their flag ; it waved there till nightfall, all
efforts of the Confederates to step forward and seize it being
frustrated by the fire of the assailants. The greater part of
the storming party were killed, and their bodies, together
with those of the troops immediately following, soon ob-
structed the narrow road so as to make it almost impas-
sable. In passing over them under the terrible fire, Swing's
brigade wavered, halted, and sought shelter on the slope of
a ravine about seventy yards from the works. Giles Smith's
brigade, which came next, turned down this ravine to the
left, and deployed opposite a point of the works about three
hundred yards south of the road ; Eilby Smith's brigade fol-
lowed it in the same direction but deployed close to Ewing.
The troops were thus partly sheltered, and opened a wither-
ing fire upon any object which showed itself above the
parapet, not a stone's throw distant; but they could not

180 THE inHSTfWTPPL

adwioe an inch. Afiaiis remained in this condition ontdl
2f.x.

In MoPherson*8 corps, Bansom's brigade of McArtbnr's
diTision was on the right, in the ravines south of the Grave-
yard road ; Logan's division in the centre, on the Jackson
road ; and Qninby's division on the left, between the Jackson
and Baldwin's Ferry roads. Neither Qninby nor Bansom
was in a position to do more than make a strong demonstra-
tion, as each was opposite a re-entrant portion of the line
where, in an advance, they would be mowed down under a
cross fire from the salients. Logan's division, however, was
opposite the salient, J. E. Smith's brigade on the Jackson
road, Stevenson a little to his left, and Leggett in reserve.
At the appointed hour two brigades rushed forward. Smith's
by the road, and Stevenson's up the slope south of it, both
being directed against the main fort just north of the road.
Smith's troops were brought to a halt by the severe fire
across the road, but Stevenson's pressed on, and two regi-
ments reached the ditch of the work, where the colors of
the 7th Missouri were planted, and six standard-bearers
killed in as many minutes. These regiments were unable
to maintain themselves in this position, and soon withdrew
to find shelter about 200 yards from the works, where they
remained until ordered to withdraw at nightfall.

In McGlemand's corps, Carr's division was on the right
with one brigade, Benton's, on the Baldwin's Ferry road, and
one, Lawler's, just south of the railroad ; A. J. Smith's divi-
sion was in his rear, one brigade in support of each of Carr's
brigades ; Osterhaus' division was on the left, opposite a
salient about half-way between the railroad and the square
fort ; and Hovey, with one brigade of his division, the other
being at Big Black Bridge, was on the left of Osterhaus.
At the same hour, 10 a.ii., Benton's and Lawler's brigades

THE SIBGE AND SURRENDER OF VIOKSBURG. 181

moyed forward. Lawler's attack was directed against a fort
on a very prominent hill a few yards south of the railroad.
Two regiments of Lawler's brigade, the 22d and 21st Iowa,
charged up this hill and reached the ditch of the fort, where
the principal part of them were brought to a halt. A small
body, however, led by Sergeant Joseph Griffith, entered the
work and engaged in a hand to hand fight with the de-
fenders, in which nearly all but the sergeant were killed.
This work was for a short time deserted by the Confed-
erates, bnt it was commanded by a second work on higher
ground, 100 yards in rear, which prevented the Iowa troops
from retaining possession of its interior. The colors of the
22d Iowa were, however, planted on its parapet, and re-
mained there for nine hours. Landram's brigade, of A. J.
Smith's division, followed close behind Lawler's brigade, and
the 77th Illinois came up and planted its colors alongside
those of the 22d Iowa. The main body of these two bri-
gades was not able to penetrate the work, but remained in
the ditch, where hand-grenades were thrown upon them by
the defenders, causing considerable loss.

On the Baldwin's Ferry road, Benton's brigade, followed
by Burbridge's, made the attack in the same gallant style
and met the same experience. They reached the ditch,
planted their colors on the parapet, but could not enter the
work. The enemy used hand-grenades against them also.

On the left, Osterhaus' and Hovey's men moved forward
and came within a short distance of the works, but they were
subjected to a heavy cross-fire from the square fort on their
left and were unable to make any farther advance.

Within half an hour after the assault began the condition
of affairs was substantially the same at all three of the prin-
cipal points of assault ; at each of these points the Union
flags were flying on the works, and the men were in the

182 THB MISSISSIPPI.

diioh, bat tmable to go any farther. A most nnfortnnate
misunderstanding now oocnrred, which resulted in a large
and unnecessary increase of the loss of Ufa Chnmt had
taken a position in the morning on a high point on the
Jackson road, from which he had a clear view of the princi-
pal points of assault ; McPherson was a few hundred yards
in his front, Sherman less than a mile on his right, and Mc-
Clemand about a mile and a half to his left. From this
point he had observed the assaults, had witnessed the flags
planted on the parapets, and had seen the men halt at the
ditches under the terrible fire. By half-past eleven, an hour
after the troops had first reached the works, it became ap-
parent to him that the assault could not succeed. He was
just starting over to Sherman's position to confer with him
as to the prospects of success by further efforts, when he re-
ceived a not& from McClernand, dated 11.15 a.m., saying that
he (McOlemand) was hotly engaged with the enemy, who
was massing on his right and left, and that a vigorous blow
by McPherson would create a diversion in his favor. Grant
answered at 11.50 a.m., directing him to strengthen his ad-
vance by drawing from his reserves or from other parts of
the line. He then rode over to Sherman. Just as he arrived
there, he received a second despatch from McOlemand, dated
12 M., which was in these words : ** We are hotly engaged
with the enemy. We have part possession of two forts, and
the stars and stripes are floating over them. A vigorous
push ought to be made all along the line." Grant answered :
*' McArthur advanced from Warrenton last night ; he is on
your left. Concentrate with him and use his forces to the
best advantage." He also showed the despatch to Sherman,
who immediately ordered a renewal of the attack. Grant
then started back to see McPherson and order him to make
the diversion which McOlemand desired. While on his way

THE SIEGE AND SUBRENDEB OP VICKSBURG. 183

he met a messenger with a third despatch, written aboat 1
P.M., although the exact honr was not given. It was as fol-
lows : ** We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at sev-
eral points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to
McArthur to reinforce me if he can. Would it not be best
to concentrate the whole or a part of his command at this
point ? P. S. — I have received jour despatch. Mj troops are
all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to reinforce them."

Grant was somewhat doubtful as to the extent of these
successes of McGlemand, as he had seen nothing of the
kind up to the time he left his point of observation on the
Jackson road. But there was not time to ride over to con-
sult with McGlemand, it being already after two o'clock, and
he therefore ordered Quinby's division to move immediately
to McGlemand's support ; he also showed the despatches to
McPherson, and directed him to renew the assault.

In consequence of these orders, Sherman sent Tuttle's
division forward to the assistance of Blair's division, which
still renuuned in the position it had gained in the morning,
and directed both of them to attack with vigor. At the
same time Giles Smithes brigade united with Bansom's bri-
gade of McPherson's corps to make an assault between the
salient on the Graveyard road and Glass' Bayou ; Steele's
division on the right, which had been working its way for-
ward since morning, was now near the enemy's works, and
assaulted them at about the same hour as Tuttle and Ban-
som. The result was simply a repetition of the morning's
experience; everywhere the troops reached the enemy's
works, but could not enter them. Logan's division on the
Jackson road also moved forward again; it did not reach
the works, but suffered heavy loss. McArthur did not
arrive from Warrenton until the next morning. Quinby's
division did not reach McGlemand's position until a short

184 THE HISSISSIPPL

time before dark. The men were nearly exhausted with
fighting and marching through difficult ground all day, but
they were at once ordered by McGlemand to attack the cur-
tain of trench lying between the two salients (Baldwin's
Ferry road and railroad), where his men had been since
morning. The attack was made, was entirely unsuccessful,
and resulted in heavy loss, Colonel Boomer, one of the bri-
gade commanders, being among the killed. Just at dark the
Confederate troops occupying the redoubt on the Baldwin's
Ferry road, having been reinforced by a portion of Bowen's
division, made a sortie from their work and drove off the
men in the ditch. About the same time McClemand's
troops near the railroad also retired from the ditch of the
work where they had been since morning.

The result of the assault was therefore unsuccessful at aU
points. Of the 40,000 infantry present for duty in Grant's
army that day all but about 5,000 had been brought into
action. The length of line assaulted was about two and a
half miles, and it was held in the morning by two Confed-
erate brigades (Moore's and Hubert's), and by parts of two
others. As soon as the attack was begun, Bowen's division
and a part of Smith's division were sent to the threatened
points, Green's brigade going to the Baldwin's Ferry road
and the railroad, Cockrell's to the Jackson road, and
Vaughn's on the Graveyard road. The entire force of de-
fenders actually engaged did not number more than 13,000,
but the nature of the ground was such that the works could
. only be approached at three principal points ; these points
were salients which covered the line between them with
cross-fires, and by holding them the entire line was secure.
A force of 4,000 men at each of these points was all that the
works would hold, and any more men would have been
superfluous. The Confederate loss is not known ; it prob-

THB aiBGfi AND 8UHRBNDBR OF VICKSBUBG. 186

ably did not much exceed 500. In Fomej's divisioii, which
bore the brunt of the assanlts of Sherman's and McPherson's
corps, the loss was only 42 killed and 95 wounded. Grant's
loss in the two assaults of May 19th and 22d were over 4,000,
as follows, more than three-fourths of them being on the 22d :

Thirteenth Oorpt :

Garr^B division

A. J. 8mitii*8 division
Osterhaiu* ''

Hovey'B

Seventeenth Corps :

Logan's division.

Qninby's "

Baiisom*8 brigade ....

Fifteenth Corps :

Blair's division

Tattle's •'

8teele*s "

Klllfld.

Wounded.

Miadng.

109

559

57

09

400

bO

35

. . . •

233

• • • •

1

• • • •

33

378

6

52

295

2

70

875

81

173

708

9

22

185

43

• • • *

• • • •

• • ■ •

• • • •

• • • •

• • • •

TotsL

725

499

269

50

417
349
476

890
250
150

4,075

In his official report Grant blamed McOlemand very
severely for the misleading character of his despatches,
which induced him to renew the assault, '' and resulted in
the increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent., without
advancing our position or giving us other advantages." Mc-
demand wrote a long reply, dated Springfield, Illinois, Sep-
tember 25, 1863, which is on the files of the War Department,
and will be published with the records. In this McCler-
nand endeavored to show, among other things, that his des-
patches were less glowing as to his success than those he
received from his subordinates, that he was in a position to
see clearly what took place in his front, that if he had been
reinforced early in the afternoon he would have broken

186 THE MI8SIS8IPPL

oompleiely thiongh the enern/s line, and that he never
wrote that ''he was in pofiseesion o^ and still held, two of
the enemy's forts," as stated in Grant's report. It is hardly
necessary to follow ont the details of this oontroyersy.
MoClemand's despatches did undoubtedly mislead his com-
manding general, and did cause the latter to renew the as-
sault at heavy sacrifice and without success, which he would
not have done had he been distinctly advised as to the actual
state of afiEairs. McClemand's despatch (previously given)
reads: "We have part possession of two forts." Had he
said plainly that his men were in the ditch but could not
carry the works, he would have stated the exact fact, and
there would have been no second assault.

It was now apparent to every one that the Confederate
troops had recovered from the demoralization of Champion's
Hill and the Big Black, and that their works were too strong
to be carried in open assault. A regular siege was unavoid-
able, and every one was willing to perform the necessazy
labor to carry it on. The orders for beginning the siege
were issued on May 25th, Captains F. E. Prime and C. B.
Comstock, of the Engineers, being in succession the Chief
Engineers in charge.

It was, however, important to guard at once against any
attack from the rear by Johnston. Osterhaus' division of
the 13th Corps had been sent back to guard the Big Black
Bridge immediately after the assault of May 22d; and on the
26th, an expedition was formed, to consist of six brigades,
three each from the 15th and 17th Corps, the whole under
command of Blair. This expedition was to march to the
northeast, between the Tazoo and Big Black Bivers, dis-
cover what force Johnston had in that region, and, if possi-
ble, break it up. Blair reached Mechanicsburg, in the
vicinity of Liverpool, on the 28th, where he had a slight

THE SIEGE AND SURRBNDSB OF VIGKSBURG. 1S7

skirmish with a small party of the enemy, bnt he reported
that he was satisfied there was no large body between the
Yazoo and the Big Black. Johnston was said to be organ-
izing his army in the vicinity of Canton, and it was mmored
that A. P. Hill had joined him from the east, and that their
united forces nnmbered 45,000 men, bnt this Blair did not
credit Blair then retnmed to Haines' Blnflf, by way of
the Tazoo Valley, destroying all supplies that conld be of
nse to the enemy. A gnnboat exx>edition was also sent np
the Yazoo abont this time, as far as Yazoo City, destroying
all boats in the river.

The certainty that Johnston was organizing as large a
force as possible in his rear, induced Grant to order Hurl-
bnt, at Memphis, to ** strip his district to the lowest possible
standard,** and send him all available men. Just after he
crossed the river. Grant had ordered Hnrlbnt to send him
one division to take the place of the troops that had been
left to guard the road from Milliken's Bend to Perkins's.
Lauman's division had accordingly been sent; it had
reached MiUiken's Bend, 6,000 strong, about May 18th, and
had been moved across to Grand Gulf, and thence up to
Warrenton. On the 28th, it took position on the Hall's Ferry
road, partially filling up the gap between McClemand's left
and the river. On receipt of the further call from Grant for
reinforcements, Hurlbut made up another division of twelve
regiments, under Brig. -Gen. N. Kimball, and sent them be-
low ; and later still, a third division, under Brig.-Gen. W. S.
Smith. On May 29th, Grant also sent a telegram, via Mem-
phis, to Halleck, stating that if Banks did not come to his
assistance, he must be reinforced from elsewhere. Halleck
was in daily communication with Hurlbut, and knew exactly
what troops he had sent. On receiving Grant's telegram on
June 2d, Halleck immediately telegraphed to Schofield, at

188 THB MI8SISS1PPL

St. Lonifl, and to Bnmside, at Ginciimati, stating Grant's
situation, and asking if they conld send toy troops to his
assistance; also to Bosecrans in Tennessee, saying that
Johnston was reinforced from Bragg's army, and if he (Bose-
crans) conld do nothing himself, a portion of his troops
must be sent to Qrant. Bosecrans replied with a long des-
patch, expressing the opinion that none of his troops should
be taken, and that he was abont to execute a movement.
Bumside and Schofield replied that they conld spare troops
for temporary service, and two divisions of the 9th Corps,
under Maj.-€bn. J. G. Parke, were at once sent from Ohio,
and one division, under Maj.-Gen. F. J. Herron, from Mis-
souri.

The result of these prompt measures was that Grant was
reinforced almost as rapidly as Johnston, and in as large
numbers, and the opportunity when Johnston could have
attacked was soon lost. At the close of the siege, there

m _

were 17,000 men from Hurlbut's corps present at Yicks-
burg, and these, with Parke's corps and Herron's division,
carried the total strength of Grant's army to 71,141 men, and
248 guns, on June dOth.

Kimball's division of the 16th Corps arrived on June
dd and was sent up the Yazoo to Haines' Bluff, and
thence along the Benton road, with orders to destroy the
railroad bridge over the Big Black near Canton. Kimball
found, however, on arriving at Mechanicsburg that a large
force was in front of him at Yazoo City and Liverpool, and
as the Yazoo Biver on which he depended for his supplies
was rapidly falling he returned to Haines' Bluff, where he
received orders to fortify a position and hold it against any
force coming from the northeast.

Herron's division arrived on June 8th and was imme-
diately marched across the peninsula and ferried over the

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 189

river below Warrenton. He came up on the south side of
Yicksburg and took post on the Warrenton road, enabling
Lanman to close np on McClemand's left. The investment
on the south side was thus perfected. Hitherto it had been
imperfect on account of the insufficiency of Lauman's force
to close the entire gap between McClemand and the river.

W. S. Smith's division of the 16th Corps began arriving
on June 11th, and was at once sent to Haines' Bluff, this
and EimbaH's division being united under command of Maj.-
Qen. C. C. Washbume.

Parke's 9th Corps arrived on the 14th. It was at first in-
tended to move it to the south of the city as a reserve behind
Tiauman and Herron, but in view of the threatening aspect of
affairs along the Yazoo, it was moved to Haines' Bluff.

Meanwhile Johnston was slowly organizing an army at
Canton. The difficulties were very great, for Loring's
troops had joined him without guns, wagons, or camp equi-
page, the troops arriving by rail were also without wagons,
and though the country was full of food, there were no sup-
pHes available, Pemberton having moved his own suppHes
to Yicksburg; the railroads were still out of repair from
Grierson's raid, and were fuUy occupied at present in bring-
ing up troops. These difficulties could only have been sur-
mounted, if at all, by a man of extraordinary energy, bold-
ness, and resource. In spite of his undoubted abilities in
command of an army on the defensive, Johnston was hardly
the man for such an emergency as that in which he was now
placed. After sending the order to Pemberton to march to
the northeast he remained in the vicinity of the Big Black
until he received, on May 19th, Pemberton's answer saying
that he could not make the movement ordered; he then
marched back to Canton in order to assemble and organize
his army. While he was doing this. Grant organized a still

190

THB

IK': K-:

[PPL

larger force to use against him, and so it oame about that
Pemberton laj for 47 days in his trenches, before he finally
gave np in despair, daring which time Johnston organized
an army of over 31,000 men, bnt never came within mnsket-
shot of his enemy.

Johnston arrived at Canton on May 20th, and the next day
was joined by Gist's brigade from South Carolina and
Ector's and McNair's from Chattanooga. Loring's division
reached Jackson on the 20th, and was joined by Maxey's
brigade from Port Hudson on the 23d. Between that date
and June 3d there arrived in addition, Evans' brigade from
South Carolina, Breckenridge's division from Chattanooga,
and a cavaby division from Bragg's army, commanded by
W. H. Jackson, one of the most energetic cavalry leaders in
the South. Johnston organized his command into four
divisions, commanded by Loring, Breckenridge, W. H. T.
Walker, and French. There was subsequently much contro-
versy between himself and the authorities in Bichmond as
to the strength of his command, and therefore the following
statement is given in full, taken from the return signed by
himself on June 25th, and now among the archives of the
War Department. There were no reinforcements received
between June 3d and 25th.

Field Bbtobn.

Present
and absent

Loring^B division

Bred^nrid^e's diviaion

WaUJEer^s di vision

French's **

Jackson's cavalry

Misoellanooas

Total....

Present
for duty.

Aggregate
present.

0,451
6,107
8,049
6,498
8,606
515

7,427
6,884
9,571
7,466
4,873
594

81,226

86,315

18,875

9,688

18,452

10,559

6,797

881

54,747

THE SI£6E AND SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 191

Constant correspondenoe was maintained between John-
ston and the Richmond anthorities during the months of
Maj and Jnne, the latter urging him to attack at almost anj
risk, as the disparity in numbers would probably increase
rather than diminish with time. Johnston at first replied
(May 28th) that, although he would have only 23,000 men
when all his reinforcements arrived, he must try to beat
Grant with that number if no more could be sent. But on
June 7th, he telegraphed that when he thought of trying to
accomplish anything in aid of Pemberton the case seemed
''desperate." On the 8th the Secretary of War asked if
more reinforcements should be drawn from Bragg's army.
Johnston replied that to draw more troops from Bragg
would ** involve yielding Tennessee ; the Government must
decide between this State and Tennessee." On the 15th he
telegraphed that he considered ''saving Yicksburg hope-
less"; and on the 16th received a reply that "Yicksburg
must not be lost without a desperate struggle. ... If
better resources do not offer, you must hazard attack. It
may be made in concert with the garrison, if practicable,
but otherwise without, by day or night as you think best."
Johnston answered that he could not attack Grant because
Grant was covered by the Big Black, which would cut off
his retreat if defeated. The Secretary of War then tele-
graphed (June 21st), reiterating, in the most urgent language,
his orders for active movements, of which he assumed all the
responsibility, and suggesting that if a movement against
Grant's army was not feasible it might be possible to raise
the siege of Port Hudson. Johnston replied that this
would involve abandoning Jackson and with it the State of
Mississippi. Johnston saw nothing but difficulties which-
ever way he turned ; to save Mississippi was to lose Tennes-
see, and to save Port Hudson was to lose Mississippi ; while

192 THB MIS8I8SIPPL

he was still meditating on the dilemma Yioksbnrg snrren-
dered, followed immediately by Port Hudson and Jackson ;
and thns eveiything was lost.

While this correspondence was in progress Johnston had
observed the movements of Osterhans near Big Black
Bridge, and of Blair toward Mechanicsbnrg, in the last
week of May, and he had sent Walker's division to Yazoo
City, and Loring's to Benton. These troops simply re-
mained in observation, and were confronted by a larger
number of Union troops, extending from Mechanicsburg to
the Big Black Bridge. On June 14th Johnston sent a cou-
rier to Pemberton, who penetrated the lines and delivered
his letter on June 20th. In this Johnston said to Pember-
ton that the utmost that both armies could accomplish was
to save the troops at Yicksburg ; to raise the siege was im-
possible. He therefore asked Pemberton to indicate what
point should be attacked. Pemberton replied, under date
of the 21st, proposing that Johnston should attack on the
north of the railroad, while he (Pemberton) cut his way out
to Hankinson's Ferry on the south; he added, ''I await
your orders." On the 22d Johnston wrote (in answer to a
despatch of the 15th just received), saying that he feared
he would be unable to accomplish anything with his small
force, and suggesting to Pemberton that, in the last ex-
tremity, he might try to cross the river and join the Con-
federate forces operating in that quarter. This was the lasi
letter received by Pemberton from Johnston prior to the
surrender ; no definite instructions were ever received in an-
swer to the former's despatch of June 21st. Johnston, how-
ever, received one further letter from Pemberton, dated
June 23d, suggesting that Johnston should propose to Grant
the surrender of Yicksburg, but not of the troops. John-
ston's reply did not reach Pemberton. It was to the effect

THB SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VIGKSBURG. I93

that any sach propositions must be made by Pemberton
himself.

On June 28th, Johnston finally considered his army ready
to advance ; and orders to that effect were issued. Walker's
division had already been withdrawn from Yazoo City to
Yemon; and Loring's from Benton to Canton. Walker
was- now ordered to move down the Big Black, while Loring
advanced from Canton, and Prench and Breckenridge from
Jackson. On July 1st, Walker's, Loring's, and Prench^s
divisions were at Birdsong's Peny, and Breckenridge^s near
Edwards* Station. Johnston states that this movement ''was
not undertaken in the wild spirit that dictated the des-
patches from the War Department of June 16th and 21st.'*
He intended simply to examine the enemy's lines, and see if
there was any prospect of breaking them in order to save
the garrison ; there was no hope of saving the place. Con-
sequently he devoted July 2d, 3d, and 4th to reconnois-
scmces, which convinced him that no attack was practicable
north of the railroad. Such was unquestionably the fact,
for at that time Sherman had been detached from the block-
ading force, and placed in command of a large force on the
outside. These consisted of Parke's 9th Corps, Washbume's
two divisions of the 16th Corps, Tuttle's division of the 15th,
McArthur's of the 17th, and Osterhaus' of the 13th. This
force numbered nearly 30,000 men, and another division of
McPherson's corps was in readiness to move at once on
Sherman's order. These troops were posted from Haines'
Bluff on the left to Black Biver Bridge on the right ; they
had fortified and barricaded every road in the interval be-
tween these points, and were ready to hold them against
double their numbers.

Having found no opening on the north of the railroad,
Johnston intended to move on the 5th by Edwards' Station
VIII. -4>

194 THE MISSIS8IFPL

to the Bonth of the railroad, and examine the prospect in
that yicinitj. But on the night of the 4th he received the
news of the surrender. He countermarched his columns
forthwith toward Jackson. He was none too quick, for
Sherman was on his heels in pursuit with nearly 50,000 men,
before sunset of the day on which the garrison laid down
its arms.

While the negotiations for the surrender were in progress
on July 3d, Grant was in constant telegraphic communica-
tion with Sherman, and it was arranged that the moment
the surrender took place, Sherman should move out to at-
tack Johnston, pursue him to Jackson, and efifectually de-
stroy the railroads north and south of that point. In
addition to the troops already mentioned, the remaining
divisions of the 13th and 15th Corps were ordered to join
Sherman, so that his force consisted of the 9th, 13th, and
15th Corps, with one division of the 16th attached to ihe
9th, and one of the 17th attached to the 15th« The other
division of the 16th was left with Washburne at Haines'
Bluff. The entire force under Sherman's orders consisted
of 12 divisions, and numbered about 48,000 men, over two-
thirds of the whole army at Yicksburg.

Sherman was in motion on the afternoon of the 4th, and
the additional troops from Yicksburg started during the
night. On the 5th they all approached the Big Black, Ord
with the 13th Corps at the railroad bridge, Steele with the
15th Corps at Messenger's Ferry, a few miles above Bridge-
port, and Parke with the 9th Corps, at Birdsong's Ferry, on
the Brownsville road. Bridges were constructed at each of
these points, and the crossing was completed on the 6th.
On the 7th the advance was continued, the 13th and 15th
Corps reaching Bolton that day, and the 9th Corps being
slightly in rear.

THE SIEGE AND SUBBBNDEB OF VICKSBURG. 195

On the 8ih, the 15th Corps reached Clinton, and on the
9th, passed through that place on the direct Jackson road,
while the 13th Corps went through Baymond, and the 9th
on a road north of the railroad. On the night of the 9th,
the troops approached Jackson, skirmishing with the en-
emy's outposts, and on the morning of the 10th, they
closed in around that city. Johnston, as we have seen, hi^
retreated from the Big Black on the 5th and reached
Jackson on the 7th. The fortifications of that place ex-
tended in a semicircle on the west of the town, from the
Pearl Biver on the north to the same river on the south.
Loring's division w«s placed on the right, on the Canton
road ; Walker's and French's in the centre ; and Brecken-
ridge's on the left, across the New Orleans Bailroad. Jack-
son's divisicHi of cavalry was directed to observe the f ord i on
the river north and south of the fortifications.

As Sherman closed in on the 10th he placed Parke's corps
on the left, Steele's corps in the centre, and Ord's on the
right, both flanks extending to the river. The heat and
dust had been intense during the march, and the troops
were fatigued ; the fortifications were strong, and Sheiiuan
determined not to assault them, but to invest the place, and
throw up a few batteries to guard against any sortie. It
was not jHTobable that Johnston had enough stores to stand
a siege, and he would soon be obliged to abandon the place,
and it was hoped to fall upon him $ks soon as he left his
works. Artillery fire was opened on the 11th, and during
the following day one of the divisions of the 13th Corps,
which had been ordered to make a reconnoissance, pressed
closer to the works than had been intended, and it was
driven back with a loss of nearly 600 men. After this the
siege was confined to artillery firing. Expeditions were sent
out on either flank to destroy the railroad for several miles.

196 THE MISSISSIPPL

Johnston sent a detachment of cavalry to break Sherman's
Gommnnications near Clinton, but it was intercepted and
driven off by McArthur*8 division.

Johnston had hoped and expected that Sherman would
make an assault. When he saw that preparations were mak-
ing for a siege, he telegraphed to Bichmond (July 15th),
that he had no provisions for a siege, and that it would be
madness for him to make an attack. He therefore issued
orders on the 16th to withdraw across the bridges over Pearl
Biver within his own lines, and during the night this move-
ment was skilfully executed. It was not detected until 6
A.M. of the 17th, by which time he was well on his way.
Sherman sent a detachment in pursuit, but his instructions
did not contemplate an advance beyond Jackson in any force.
He telegraphed to Grant for further instructions, and re-
ceived orders to discontinue the pursuit, complete the
thorough destruction of the railways, and then return to
Vicksburg.

Johnston was therefore pursued no farther than Brandon
Station, a dozen miles from Jackson. He halted at Morton,
on the railroad, about half way between Jackson and Me-
ridian, and there went into camp. Sherman returned leis-
urely to Vicksburg, arriving there between the 25th and
27th of July. His losses during the expedition were a little
over 1,100 men. Johnston reported his losses as 71 killed,
504 wounded, and only 25 missing — but Sherman captured
and sent to Vicksburg, by actual count, 765 prisoners.

Johnston's efforts for the relief of Vicksburg thus came to
an end. He had been forestalled by his enemy in every
move. The railroads at Jackson, the point he considered
essential for the defence of the State of Mississippi, were so
thoroughly destroyed that that point lost all its strategic
importance for the rest of the war.

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OP VICKSBURG. 197

While Grant had been thus active in guarding against any
attack in his rear, he had prosecuted the siege in his front
with equal vigor. Just after the assault of May 22d, it was
thought that by bringing gunboats to enfilade the batteries
on Fort HiU, that position might be carried. At Sherman's
request Porter gave the necessary orders, and on the morn-
ing of May 27th the Cincinnati came down to engage
these batteries ; at the same time four vessels which were
below the town engaged the batteries near the Marine Hos-
pital. The Cincinnati was shot through and through by the
plunging fire from Fort Hill, and in less than half an hour
five of her guns were disabled, and she was in a sinking con-
dition. She was run toward the shore about a mile north
of Fort Hill, and sank in three fathoms of water ; 36 of her
crew were killed, wounded, or drowned. After this the
efforts of the navy during the siege were confined to bom-
bardment, which was kept up almost incessantly from the
gunboats and from mortar-boats. Several large guns were
landed from the vessels, and took their place in the besiegers'
lines, where they were worked by naval crews.

As soon as the siege was ordered lines of sap were begun
at various points. There was great lack of engineer officers
to direct these technical works, and hence they did not pro-
gress as rapidly as would otherwise have been possible.
The labor was furnished by pioneer companies, by the troops,
and by negroes hired in the vicinity. Materials for fascines,
gabions, and sap rollers were found in abundance in the
cane and underbrush of the ravines. Twelve miles of
trenches, and 89 batteries were constructed, armed at the
close of the siege with 220 guns, all but 12 of which were
field pieces.

There were ten lines of approach, the four most important
being on the Graveyard, Jackson, Baldwin's Ferry, and

196 THE MISSISSIPPI.

Warrenton roads. These approaches were all within a few
yards of the enemy's works when the place felL Mining
was employed on the Jackson and Graveyard roads, and was
met by countermining on the part of the besieged. On the
Jackson road a mine was exploded on Jnne 25th, nnder the
enemy's parapet, just north of the road. It was loaded with
a ton of powder, and fired with complete success. The troops
mshed into the crater and held it for twenty-four hours, but
were then driven out by hand-grenades and returned to their
own trenches. A second gallery was then run, and another
mine exploded on July 1st, blowing about 25 of the defenders
into the air ; but no attempt was made to occupy the crater,
owing to the failure of the preceding attempt. Small mor-
tars were improvised by shrinking iron bands on logs of
tough wood and boring out the core. With these, shells
were constantly thrown across the small space separating
the two lines. When the lines were so close the casualties
on each side were from 10 to 100 each day.

On July 1, the approaches were all within from 5 to 100
yards of the defenders' works. Any farther advance by dig-
ging resulted in hand-to-hand fighting. The time had come
for the final assault, and orders were issued for this to take
place on July 6th. The approaches were to be widened so
that troops could easily move in columns of fours, and ar-
tillery could pass ; planks, and sand-bags stuffed with cot-
ton, were to be prepared for crossing the ditches. The
troops were to be assembled in the approaches during the
night, and at daylight were to rush forward across the few
yards separating them from the enemy^s works, and endeavor
to carry the place at every point of approach. The assault,
however, was unnecessary, for the place surrendered on
July 4.

On June 7th an attack was made upon a detachment of

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 199

wliite and black troops, gaarding Milliken's Bend, by J. G.
Walker's division numbering 4,000 men. These troops bad
been ordered from Arkansas by Gren. £. K. Smith, who com-
manded the Trans-Mississippi Department, in response to
urgent requests from Johnston that he would come to the
assistance of Yicksbnrg. It is stated that the object of this
movement was to throw supplies and possibly troops into
the place ; or, falling in that, to cover Pemberton's escape
across the river. Of this Pemberton was not informed, so
that the scheme fell through. It would have been doomed
to almost certain failure in the presence of Porter's fleet of
gunboats. Walker's division was marched down to Alexan-
dria, where it reported to Maj.-Gen. B. Taylor, commanding
the district of West Louisiana. It was then placed on trans-
ports and carried up the Washita and Tensas Bivers until
abreast of Yicksburg, where it was disembarked and marched
across to Richmond, La., which was unoccupied except by
an outpost. From Bichmond the attack was made upon
Milliken's Bend. The troops of this garrison were at first
driven out of their works by the Confederates, and forced
back to the levee on the river bank. But here two gunboats
came to their assistance, and the Confederates were in turn
driven back and retreated to Bichmond. Mower's brigade
of the 15th Corps was sent across the river the next day, and
was soon reinforced by the Marine brigade under Ellet.
These troops advanced against Walker's division, and he
then retreated along the Shreveport Bailroad to Monroe.
This exx>edition had no effect whatever upon the course of
the siege.

On June 18th, Gen. McClemand was relieved from the
command of the 13th Corps, and succeeded by Maj.-Gen.
E. O. C. Ord. He had published to his troops a vainglori-
ous order, filled with insinuations against the troops of the

200 THB MISSISSIPPI

other corpB, and with indirect reflections upon the Com-
manding CteneraL A copy of the order was published in
the Memphis papers, and thus came to the notice of Sher-
man and McPherson, who vigoronsly protested against it.
Grant asked McClemand if the newspaper slip was a correct
copy, and why the order had not been forwarded to his
headquarters as required by the regulations. McClemand
replied that the newspaper slip was a correct copy, and that
he was "prepared to maintain its statements;" it was
owing to the carelessness of his adjutant that a copy had
not been forwarded. On receiving this reply. Grant issued
an order directing McClemand to repair to his home in Illi-
nois, and assigning Ord to the command of the 13th Corps,
subject to the President's approval. McClemand complied
with the order under protest, and appealed the case to
Washington, but without success ; although in the following
year he was assigned to a command in Texas, where he
served a few months and then resigned.

This was the termination of a long-standing controversy,
in which the majority of his officers thought that Grant had
shown more patience than was necessary or proper. What-
ever McClemand's talents may have been, he was certainly
lacking in subordination, and his relief caused no dissatis-
&ction, to say the least, in his own corps or in other parts
of the army.

As the month of June wore on, Pemberton's hopes of re-
lief began gradually to diminish, and then to disapi>ear.
His men were on reduced rations, but were not at starva-
tion point ; his ammunition was deficient, but it had been
carefully husbanded during the siege, and he had enou^
for a battle. Every man capable of doing duty was in the
trenches, and many of those previously wounded had recov-

HE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 201

ered, so that their numbers now amounted to nearly 22,000,
as shown bj their returns — a little more than when the siege
began; about 7,000 were in the hospitals. In his report
Pemberton vehemently denies that either lack of food or of
ammunition induced his surrender. He says he surrendered
because his men were enfeebled by long exposure in a
cramped position in trenches, and because there was no
prospect of relief. It is probable that the most potent
cause of surrender was the temper of the men. They were
physically exhausted and mentally discouraged, and they
saw no object in a continuation of the present state of af-
fairs, and no issue from it except in surrender.

It has already been stated that on June 20th Pemberton
received a note from Johnston, asking for suggestions of a
plan of attack by which he might be enabled to cut his way
out, and that Pemberton answered on the next day, giving a
plan for such an attack. It is a singular coincidence that
in a conversation between the Union and Confederate
pickets, on the night of the 20th, the Confederate said that
they had expected an assault, and were prepared for it, but
as it had not been made, the feelings of the troops had been
canvassed to see if they could be induced to make an attack
for the purpose of cutting their way out. The troops all de-
clined, and some of them threatened to mutiny if their offi-
cers did not surrender. They were only persuaded to con-
tinue on duty by the assurance that there were enough
supplies to last a week, and, by that time, 2,000 boats would
be made by which they could cross the river. Houses were
being torn down — so said the Confederate — ^to make the
boats. Three days after this canvassing, i.e., on June 2dd,
without having received any further letters from Johnston,
Pemberton wrote to him suggesting that he propose to
Grant a surrender of Yicksburg.
9*

g02 THB mssissippi.

On the 28th Pemberfeon received the following veiy cori-
OXI8 docoment :

Afpkal fob Help.

Ik TBJtROKW KS4B VlCKSBDBG,

June 28, 1863.

GkNL. J. C. PSMBSBTOM

Sir/ In aooordaaee with my own fedings and that of my fellow
■olcUers with whom I have conferred I aabmit to your consideraticMi the
following note :

We as an army have as mnch confidence in yon as a GomM^g. Gen*L
as we perhaps ought to have ; we believe yon have displayed as much
generalship as any other man could have done under similar circum-
stances ; we give you great credit for the stern patriotism you have
evinced in the defence of Vidcsburg during a pcotracted siege —

I also feel proud of the gallant conduct of the soldiers under your
command in repulsing the enemy at every assault, and bearing with
patient endurance all ihe privations and hardships incident to a si^e
of forty odd days* duration.

Everybody admits that we have all covered ourselves With glory,
but alas ! alas ! Genl. a crisis has arrived in the midst of our aege.

Our rations have been cut down to 1 biscuit, and a small bit of h»-
con per day, not enough scarcdy to keep soal and body together, much
less to stand the hardships we are caUed upon to stand We are actu-
ally on sufferance, and the consequence is, as far as I can hear, there is
complaining and general dissatisfaction throughout our lines. We are
and have been kept close in the trenches day and night, not allowed to
forage any at all, and even if pehnitted there is nothing to be had
among the citizens.

Men don^t want to starve and don^t intend to, but thej^ call upon
you for justice, if the Commissary Department can give it, if it can't
yon must adopt some means to relieve us very soon. The emergency
of the case demands prompt and decided action on your part.

If you can't feed us, you had better surreiider us, horrible as the
idea is, than suffer this nobl6 atmy to di/^grace thenoelveB by desertion.
I tell you plainly men are not going to lie here and petish ; if they do
love their country, self-preservadon is tiie first Iaw of nature, and

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OP VICKSBURG. 203

hunger will compel a man to do almost anything. Ton had better
heed a warning voice, though it is the voice of a private soldier.

This army is now ripe for mutiny unless it can be fed.

Just think of one small biscuit and one or two mouthfols of bacon
per day. GenL please direct your inquiries in the proper channel, and
see if I have not stated stubborn facts, which had better be heeded be-
fore we are disgraced.

From

Many Soldiers.

This docnment was preserved by Pemberfcon, and its ex-
istence was probably not publicly known until it was found
among the "Pemberton papers" received by the War De-
partment a few months since. How much or how little im-
portance he attributed to it no one can say.

The above facts are not cited for the purpose of reflecting
in any way on Pemberton, but to show what was probably
the temper of his men. They, as well as himself, knew that
the case was hopeless, and that he had but two alternatives,
vie.: to surrender or to make a vain eflFort to cut his way
out ; in other words, surrender or suicide. He chose the
former, his own statement of the case being as follows :
" When forty-seven days and nights had passed, with the
knowledge I then possessed that no adequate relief was to be
expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy
the brave men whose lives had been entrusted to my care."
Hoping that on the great national holiday he might obtain
the most favorable terms, he opened negotiations on the eve
of the Fourth of July.

Before taking the final step, however, Pemberton asked
his division commanders, by circular letter dated July 1st,
their opinion as to the ability of their troops " to make the
marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a
successful evacuation." Three of them — Forney, Smith,
and Bowen — ^reported unequivocally, on the following day^

204 THE MISSiaSIPPL

that their troops were unable to undergo snoh fatigues : and
two of these advised an immediate capitulation. The fourth
— Stevenson — said that his men were much enfeebled, but
he believed that the most of them, rather than be captured,
would exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish an
evacuation. Smith stated that an evacuation was almost
impossible, on account of the temper of his troops. The
opinion of the brigade and regimental commanders was al-
most unanimous against the idea of cutting their way out.
After receiving these answers, Femberton assembled his four
division commanders for consultation. The minutes of the
meeting show that they unanimously advised a capitula-
tion.

On the morning of the 3d, therefore, Femberton sent a flag
of truce by Bowen, with a letter to Grant, proposing that
three commissioners be appointed on each side to arrange
terms for capitulation. Grant replied that he did not favor
the proposition of appointing commissioners ; that his only
terms were an unconditional surrender of the city and gar-
rison, and that Femberton might feel assured that men who
had shown so much endurance and courage as those now in
Yicksburg would be treated with all the respect due to
prisoners of war. Bowen expressed a desire to converse
with Grant, which was refused ; but Grant sent word that if
Femberton desired to see him he would meet him in front
of the lines at 3 p.m. At that hour Grant, with his two corps
commanders then present, Ord and McFherson, and the
division commanders nearest that part of the line, Logan
and A. J. Smith, besides several members of his staff, went
forward to a point just south of the Confederate works on
the Jackson road. Here he was met by Femberton, Bowen,
and some of the former's staff. Femberton asked what
terms he would be allowed, and Grant answered those indi-

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VIGKSBURG. 205

caied in bis letter that morning. Femberton replied that
then the conference might terminate, and hostilities be
resnmed. Grant said *' Very well.*' Some farther conver-
sation ensaed, when the proposition was made — by whom is
a matter of dispute — ^that Bowen and A. J. Smith should re-
tire for consultation. Grant made no objection to this,
except that he would not consider himself bound by any-
thing they might agree upon. These officers then stepped
to one side, but came to no conclusion. Finally the con-
ference broke up with the understanding that Grant would
formulate his terms in detaU, and' send them to Femberton
at 10 P.M.

The letter which Grant sent that evening conveyed the
same idea of unconditional surrender, although those words
were not used. He proposed to take possession of the city
the next morning, have rolls made out as soon as possible,
and individual paroles signed by eveiy officer and man, after
which the Confederate troops were to march out ; the rank
and file taking no property but their clothing, and officers
retaining their side arms and one horse for each mounted
officer. Thirty wagons and any desired amount of rations
could be taken from their own stores.

These terms would not only insure a complete surrender,
but they would save the trouble of transporting and feeding
the prisoners until exchanged.

Femberton accepted these terms in the main but pro-
posed that he should first march out with his colors and
arms, before Grant took possession ; also that officers should
retain their personal property and ** the rights and property
of citizens to be respected." This proposition was received
after midnight, and Grant at once answered, declining to
make any stipulations about citizens, and agreeing to the
officers retaining their private baggage and side arms,

206 THE MISSrasIPPL

which was already included in his first letter. As to the
proposition to march ont with colors and arms, he had no
objection, provided that, as soon as the arms were stacked,
the troops marched back again and remained within the
lines nntil diilj paroled. Pemberton was notified that
unless his acceptance of these terms was signified by 9 a.h.
they would be regarded as rejected, and measures taken ac-
cordingly. He immediately replied accepting them.

In these negotiations Grant had waived the technical
point of not offering any terms further than the words " un-
conditional surrender," as in his position of conqueror it was
very easy for him to do. But he had kept the negotiations in
his own hands, instead of delegating them to commissioners,
and he had yielded nothing of the principle for which he
contended, i.e., the suiTender of the whole force, with their
arms and munitions, as prisoners of war, not to take arms
again until properly exchanged.

At 10 A.M. on July 4th, the Confederate troops marched
out, each division in front of its works, stacked arms, laid
their colors upon them, and then returned toward the town.
Logan's division was marched in to take possession. Paroles
were made out and signed as quickly as possible, and the
prisoners were meanwhile fed from the Union stores. On
July 11th, they marched out without arms, and proceeded
to the vicinity of Enterprise, Miss., and Demopolis, Ala.,
where they remained until they were declared exchanged in
the following month of September.*

1 On July 10th, Jeffenon Davis telegraphed to Pemberton that all the general
ctAcen bad been exchanged, and were released from their parole ; and that th^
shoald retom to duty at once. He also desired to know what portion of the troope
were really effective, and was informed that Stevenson's, and'Bowen^s, and a part
ci Fomey^s division were fit for servica, <.«., about two-thirds of the whole force.
On September 11th, the Confederate Agent of Exchange notified the United
States Agent that on the following day the divisionB above named would be de*

THE SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 207

The number actually paroled, as certified by the U. S.
Commissioner of Exchange, to whom the rolls were for^
warded, was 29,391 — ^viz., 2,166 officers, and 27,225 men.
In addition, 790 refused to be paroled, and were sent- North
as prisoners of war, and several hundreds escaped, or died
in the hospitals before they could be paroled, so that the
total force surrendered was, in round numbers, 31,000. The
artillery found in the place numberied 172 pieces, 67 of
which were siege guns, and the rest £eld pieces.

Grant's losses in the entire campaign, including the expe-
dition against' Jackson, were a little less than 10,000, some
of which, being men slightly wounded, were only temporary.
Of the army which, on Pemberton's return for March, num-
bered 61,495 actually present, all had now been lost except
about 6,000 who escaped with Loring from Champion's
Hill, 4,000 who were operating in the northern and eastern

Glared exchanged, and on the 12th the order was isRued. It was notorious that
at this time— just prior to the battle of Chickamaoga — ^the Confederates were
sorely in need of troops. The Confederate agent gave no statement of numbers,
nor any description of the Union prisoners against whom they were exchanged;
but merely stated " I have in my possession more valid paroles nf your officers
and men than would be an equivalent for the officers and men herein enumerated.*^
It was, however, an unquestioned fact, which had been the subject of correspon-
dence among the Confederate authorities at this very time, that the capture of
the troops at Vicksburg placed the balance of prisoners largely In favor of the
United States. Against this extraordinary proceeding the United States agent
at once protested, but without avail, and some of the paroled Vicksbnxg prisoners
were taken in arms at the battle of Chattanooga in November following. Both
sides then declared all paroled prisoners exchanged, which threw the subject of
exchanges into hopeless confusion. A voluminous correspondence was carried on
for months with reference to the subject, during which the Confederates advanced
the proposition that the iwroles at Yicksburgand Fort Hudson were all Invalid on
technical grounds. This was submitted to General Grant, then In command of
all the armies, in April, 1864, and he directed that no further exchanges be made
of any character unless the paroles at Vicksbnrg and Port Hudson were fully
recognized. In consequence, no more exchanges were made during the war,
except in special cases of sickness. It was not, as has been represented, from a
desire to cripple the South that the exchange of prisoners was stopped, but from
« belief that the Confederate authorities had deUberately acted in bad faith.

208 THE MISSISSIPPI

part of the State, and 7,000 from Port Hndson, who had
joined Johnston at Jackson. The losses in the battle of
Baymond and the two battles at Jackson, among Johnston's
troops, were abont 2,000. The net total of losses to the
Confederates was therefore over 46,000 men, 60,000 small
arms, and 260 cannon, which they had but poor means of
replacing ; add to this the loss of the Mississippi Biver and
the resources of the fertile region beyond it.

The events of Jnly 4, 1863, at Yicksbnrg and Gettys-
burg, sounded the death-knell of the Confederacy. There
was desperate fighting thereafter, but it was without hope ;
it was the fighting of men who saw defeat and ruin staring
them in the face, but were determined to fight until nothing
should be left, and in their downfall to create as much havoc
as possible.

CHAPTER YIL

PORT HUDSON.

In the month of November, 1862, Maj.-Gren. N. P. Banks
sailed from New York with a force of between 15,000 and
20,000 men.* His instructions, conveyed in a letter from
Halleck, dated November 9, 1862, were to proceed to New
Orleans, relieve General Butler in command of the Depart-
ment of the Gnlf and, uniting the forces brought with him
with those already serving on the Gulf, advance up the Mis-
sissippi in co-operation with General Grant, in order to gain
complete possession of that river ; after the river was cleared
he was to advance sufficiently far into the interior to hold
an unbroken line of communication by land from New Or-
leans to Yicksburg, and then, turning to the west of the Mis-
sissippi, he was to occupy the Red River country as a pro-
tection for Louisiana and Arkansas and a basis of future
operations against Texas.

Banks arrived at New Orleans about the middle of De-
cember, 1862, and assumed command on the 16th of that
month. A portion of his command, numbering 10,000
men, under Brig. -Gen. C. Grover, was not disembarked
at New Orleans, but proceeded directly up the river to
Baton Rouge. Grover reached this point at daylight on

> The War Department Becords contain no data aa to the exact strength of
tiiia force.

210 THE MISSISSIPPI.

the 17th, and immediately landed and took possession,
driving off a small force of Confederates which was stationed
there as an outpost. Baton Bouge is bnt twenty-five miles
by land sonth of Fort Hndson, and was a convenient base of
operations against that stronghold. Bnt Grover did not con-
sider his division sufficiently strong to make any ad:vance at
that time ; it was not thoroughly organized and equipped for
the field, the troops were new — this being their first ser-
vice — ^and they were deficient in transportation and other
essentials for active service.

The entire force under Banks' command consisted of 56
regiments, nearly one-half of which were enlisted for nine
months only, numbering in all 31,253 officers and men for
duty, out of a total of 36,508 present, as shown on his re-
turn of December 31st. They occupied positions along the
Gulf, stretching from Florida to Western Texas, and up the
Mississippi from the forts below New Orleans to the vicinity
of Port Hudson. It was necessary to hold all these x>oints,
as those on the Gulf were of material assistance in main-
taining the blockade, and those in the vicinity of New Or-
leans were necessary to protect that city from capture, either
from the direction of Texas, or from Mobile, or other points
in Alabama. Banks' troops were designated as the 19th
Army Corps, and were divided into four divisions, com-
manded by Maj.-Gen. Augur and Brig.-Gens. T. W. Sher-
man, Emory, and Grover.

Almost immediately after Banks' arrival, his attention
was directed to the condition of Gralveston, which had been
captured in the previous month of October, and was now
held by the navy. It was reported to be threatened by a
considerable force moving against it from the north, and,
although his instructions did not include the defence of
that place, yet Banks considered it of such importance that,

PORT HUDSON. 211

at the request of Admiral Farragut and of Brig. -Gen. Hamil-
ton, who had come with Banks to assnme the duties of Mili-
tary Governor of Texas, he sent a regiment of infantry to as-
sist in the defence of the place. A portion of this regiment
reached Galveston on December 28th, jnst in time to bo
captured. The place was attacked on Jannary 1st by a
force of Confederates, numbering over 2,000 men, under
Magruder, and it was captured with its little garrison and
the giinbonit Harriet Lane, whose commander (Wainwright)
was kiUedw The gunboat WestfiekL was blown up to escape
capture.

Galveston remained in the possession of the Confederates
from this time until the close of the war, and Banks had no
further opportunity for efforts in this direction.

The most important duty entrusted to Banks by his in-
structions Wias an advance up the Mississippi Biver against
Fort Hudson, in co-operation with Grant's operations against
Yicksburg. But after deducting the garrisons of all the
positions before referred to, he found that he could not take
the field with more than 15,000 men. The garrison of Port
Hudson, according to the information which Banks received,
numbered 18,000 men^ and the position was one of consider-
able strength, thoroughly fortified by a continuous line of
works, each flank of which rested on the river. Burners
ev^n reached Banks that the garrison numbered over 30,000
men, but without crediting this exaggerated report it was
evideAii that his force was entirely insufficient to assault
the works at Port Hudson. He therefore turned his atten-
tion to the project of passing it or reducing it by other
means.

This post, as well as Vicksburg, drew its supplies mainly
from Western Louisiana and Texas, by way of the Bed Biver.
If this river could be reached and held, these supplies could

THE JIIi:)t(U<8U'PL

PORT HUDSON. 213

be cut off and commtuiication opened wifch the troops nnder
Grant near Yicksbnrg. At this time the Confederate forces
in Louisiana consisted of about 4,000 men under Maj.-
Gen. B. Taylor. Their principal point of defence was at
Alexandria, but their outposts extended down as far as
the railroad from New Orleans to Brashear City. Just
below Alexandria they had an earthwork called Fort de
Bussy, intended to block the passage up Bed Biver. On
the Bayou Teche, at Fattersonville, a few miles west of
Brashear City, they had another work, called Fort Bis-
land, extending from Grand Lake to the impassable swamps
south of the Teche. On the Atchafalaya there was a third
work at Butte-tt-la-Bose, about twenty miles north of Grand
Lake.

The whole country, for 50 miles west of the Mississippi, in
this region is alluvial land filled with countless bayous, lakes,
rivers, and swamps, crossing and connecting with each other
in such manner that the country is almost impassable ; but
there is a road along the Teche from Brashear City through
Opelousas to Alexandria; and in high water the Teche is
navigable to Opelousas, and the Atchafalaya to Bed Biver.
Along these two streams, therefore, lay the routes of any ad-
vance to the Bed Biver. The Confederate forts were in-
tended to defend these lines of approach, and Fort Bisland
was, in addition, to be used as a base of operations against
the La Fourche and New Orleans.

Li the latter part of January, Banks organized two expedi-
tions, one of which, consisting of 4,000 men under Brig.-
Qen, Weitzel, was to move up Bayou Teche from Ber-
wick, and the other, of 3,000 men under Brig. -Gen. Emory,
was to leave the Mississippi at Flaquemine, and pass
through a bayou into the Atchafalaya. The two columns
were then to unite and advance upon the fort at Butte-Ma-

2U THB MISSISSU>PI

Rose, alter taking which they were to move iip to the Bed
Biver. This expedition came to nothing — ^beyond a sioaU
skirmish on the Teche — ^because it was found impossible to
penetrate through Bayou Flaquemine. Before it had been
ODmpletely abandoned, information was received of the cap-
tare by the Confederates, on the Bed Biver, of the ram
Queen of the West, and the gunboat De Soto, which had
run post the batteries at Yicksburg and descended the
river early in February. On hearing of this. Admiral Fana-
gut determined that it was necessary to patrol the river at
once above Fort Hudson with his vessels, ^e requested
Banks to make a demonstration with his troops against
Fort Hudson, while he ran past the batteries for this
purpose.

Banks gave his assent, and immediately withdrew Emory
from the west banjk of the river, and taking all the force avail-
able from New Orleans — excepting Weitzel's command on the
Teche, which was essential for the defence of the city from
that direction — he moved to Baton Bouge emrly in March.
His force numbered about 17,000 men. A delay of ten days
then occurred, owing to the necessity for repairs to the ma-
chinery of some of the vessels, but on Mc^ch l^h Fanagut
arrived at Baton Bouge with his fleet. On the same day
Grover's division moved out from Baton Bouge for Fort
Hudson, followed, on the morning of the 14th, by Emory's
and Augur's divisions. These troops, whose effeetive strength
was reported by Banks as cmly 12,000 — a considerable force
having been detached to guard the points in his rear — took
position on the roads east of the Fort Hudson works, intend-
ing to make a demonstration against them, and to advance
close enough to use their artillery in order to create i^ diver-
sion during the passage of the fleet. The time for this
latter had been fixed at a little before dawn on the 15th, but

POET HUDSON. 215

late in the afternoon of the 14th Banks received a despatch
£rom Farragat saying that he found it more favorable to pass
during the evening, and he intended to start soon after dark.
Banks' advance was delayed by erroneous maps and by the
necessity of constructing some bridges, and it was impossi-
ble for him to approach near enough to the works to use
his artillery with any effect. Beyond exchanging a few
shots with the enemy's pickets, his troops accomplished
nothing on this expedition. He was still engaged in
building bridges when, at 11.30 p.m., on the 14th, the noise
of Farragut's guns was heard from the direction of the
river.

Farragut brought with him from New Orleans, for the puiv
pose of passing Port Hudson, the following vessels :

Hartford, Capt. J. S. Pahner 38 gima.

Richmond, Comdr. James Alden 35

Monongahela, Capt. J. P. McKinBtry 11

Mississippi, Capt. Melancton Smith 19

Essex, Comdr. C. H. B. Caldwell 7

Albatross, Lt.-Com. J. E. Hart 7

Grenesee, Comdr. W. H Macomb >i^ S

Kineo, Lt.-Com. John Waters 6

Sachem, Lt. Amos Johnston 5

5 mortar-schooners 5

Total 131 guns.

The first four were sloops of war, the Essex a river iron-
clad, the other four were gunboats. The order of battle
prescribed that each of the large vessels — except the Missis-
sippi, which was a side-wheeler — ^should take a gunboat
firmly lashed on the port side, away from the batteries, and
that they should proceed up the river in the order named
above, the Hartford in the lead. The mortar-boats were

216 THE MISSISSIPPI.

anchored near the east bank, about a mile below the bat-
teries. The captains were reminded that the object of the
movement was to pass the batteries with the least possible
damage to their vessels, so as to secnre as efficient a force as
possible for patrolling the river above. The vessels were
trimmed bj the head, so that in case of grounding thej
would not swing around with the current.

At 9 o'clock, the signal was made for the ships to get into
line, and as soon as this was accomplished, the Hartford
slowly steamed ahead. At 11.20 p.m. two rockets were fired
on the east bank, and almost immediately the batteries
opened fire. The fleet and the mortar boats immediately
answered, and from this time till long after midnight, the
noise of 150 guns firing as rapidly as possible was inces-
sant.

The fleet moved forward steadily under the fire. As the
Hartford reached the upper batteries, the smoke was so
dense that the pilot could see nothing, and the firing was
ceased. It was immediately found that the strong current
had deflected the ship from her course, and she was head-
ing for the shore. While the Albatross backed, the Hart-
ford's engines drove forward, and thus the two ships were
turned into the current again, the Hartford grounding for a
moment only. Just as she was free, the Richmond came
upon her from the stem, and a collision was barely avoided.
Once in the right direction, the Hartford, and her consort,
the Albatross, went forward at full speed, and were soon out
of range above the bend, where they came to anchor, having
been under fire an hour and ten minutes.

None of the other ships were able to follow. Their vari-
ous mishaps will be described in turn.

The Bichmond reached the bend just after getting clear
of the Hartford, and then received a shot on the safety-

PORT HUDSON. 317

yalves, npaetting tliem, and allowing the steam to escape.
Her engines were thns useless, and all the efforts of the
Genesee, her consort, were insnfScient to carry both ships
forward against the strong current. They were therefore
forced to turn back, and came to anchor below the batteries.

The Monongahela ran too close to the west shore, and
grounded in turning the point at 11.20 p.m. Her consort^
the Kineo, broke adrift with the shock, and went ahead a
short distance, and also grounded. Her rudder had pre^
viously been destroyed. Just after grounding, the bridge
of the Monongahela was shot away, and her captain thrown
violently to the deck, injuring him so that he was unable to
take further part in the action. The Kineo having floated,
she backed to the Monongahela, and made fast again ; both
vessels then backed with all steam, and finally got off after
being aground under fire for twenty-five minutes. The
Monongahela then started up stream again, but in a few
minutes the engine stopped, and the engineer reported that
the crank pin of the forward engine was so heated that he
could not go ahead. The ship thus became unmanageable,
and drifted down below the batteries.

The Mississippi also grounded at 12.30 a.1£. on the west
bank just at the point of the bend. She grounded hard and
fast, and lay there for thirty-five minutes under fii-e, firing
her starboard gn^ms, and backing her engine with all the
steam the engineer deemed safe. But it was of no avail.
The captain then determined to abandon the ship ; her en-
gine was destroyed, small arms thrown overboard, the sick
and wounded landed on the shore, and fires kindled in sev-
eral parts of the ship. When these were well under way
the captain left the ship, and with his crew in open boats
went past the batteries to the fleet below. The Mississippi
floated at 3 a.m. and came down the river in full blaze. At
VIII.— 10

218 THE MI8SISSIPPL

5.90 the flames reached the magazine and she was blown to
atoms.

The Essex acted in connection with the mortar boats at
the lower batteries and did not come up to the bend. At
the close of the action she picked up the boats of the Mis-
sissippi and embarked the wonnded from the west shore.

Of the Mississippi's crew of 297 men, 64 were missing at
the close of the action and, it was supposed that 25 of these
were killed. The casualties on the other ships were 11
killed and 38 wounded ; the total loss was thus 113. One
ship had been destroyed, four had been disabled, and two
had succeeded in passing. It is doubtful if the Gonfeder«
ates lost a dozen men, and their works were practically un-
injured.

It was an extremely gallant fight, conducted against great
odds in spite of the naval superiority in number and weight
of guns ; for a successful shot from the ships merely threw
up a cloud of dirt, while a successful shot from the shore
destroyed an engine or a rudder and rendered a ship help-
less if it did not sink her. The object of the fight was to
pass the batteries and patrol the river above, especially at
the mouth of the Bed Biver, whence the Confederates drew
their supplies. Although five out of seven of Farragut's
ships met with disaster, yet he fully accomplished his pur-
pose, and the Bed Biver route was completely blockaded
from this time forward. This object may seem small as
compared with the capture of a great city like New Orleans,
yet it was a most important object in the operations then in
progress.

Banks received word from his signal officers on the 15th
that Farragut had passed the batteries with the Hartford
and Albatross, and that the other vessels were disabled. The
object of his expedition being merely to make a demonstia-

PORT HUDSON. 219

tioii while the vessels were passing, his men at once re-
turned to Baton Bonge.^ Leaving Augur's division there,
Banks returned in person to New Orleans, giving orders for
Emory and Grover to move down the river to Donaldson-
ville, and thence march across to Thibodeau, on the railroad,
in order to join Weitzel at Bi-ashear City, and resume the
movement up the Atchafalaya and Teche, which had been
suspended by the demonstration against Port Hudson. Liack
of transportation both on the river and on land delayed
these movements so that it was the 10th of April before the
troops were united and ready for action at Brashear City.
They numbered about 17,000 men.

Banks arrived in person from New Orleans on the 8th, and
on the morning of the 11th the movement began, Emory's
division and Weitzel's brigade crossing Berwick's Bay and
moving forward toward Pattersonville, and Grover's division
moving up Grand Lake in transports, and landing opposite
tiie bend in Bayou Teche, just above Franklin, so as to cut off
the enemy's retreat. On the 13th the Confederates were met
in front of Pattersonville and driven into their works at Fort
Bisland after a sharp contest. It was intended to make an
assault on the following morning, but during the night the
Confederates evacuated Fort Bisland, retreating toward
Opelousas. Grover reached Franklin on the following day
(14th), having been greatly delayed in disembarking in con-
sequence of shallow water extending out a mile from the
shore. He had succeeded in landing on the evening of the
13th, and the next morning was attacked by a detachment
which had been sent against him from Fort Bisland, in

1 In his annual report for 1863, Haileck says: ** Had oar land forces invested
Port Hadmn at this time, it ooold easily haye been redaoed, as its garrison was
weak.*^ In this Haileck was mistaken. The garrison of Port Hadaon wait at
its maximnm— 10,887 for duty oat of 30,888 present— at this time. See p. 287

220 THB MIS8ISSIPPL

order to keep open the line of retreat He beat off this de-
tachment» but was unable to head off the main body of the
Confederates, who nuMie good their retreat to Opelonsas.
Daring the aflBur at Fort Bialand the ram Qneen of the
West was finally destroyed by the gnnboats Estrella, Ari-
zona, Clifton, and Calhoon, under command of Iit.-Com.
A. P. Cooke, XT. S. Navy. Two other gnnboats were blown
np by the Confederates to preyent their capture.

Banks followed up the retreating force of the Confeder-
ates and occupied Opelousas on Ai»il 20th. On the same
day the gnnboats, under Iit.-Com. Cooke, after a short en-
gagement, captured the fort at Butte-^la-Bose on the Atcha-
fidaya, with its garrison of 60 men. Bemaining two weeks
at Opelousas, Banks moved forward on May 5th, and on the
9th occupied Alexandria, the Confederates retreating to-
ward ShreveixHrt. The Yeesels of Farragut's fleet above
Port Hudson, reinforced by four gunboats under Porter,
who had come down from Grand Ckdf on the Mississippi,
had all ascended the Bed Biver and appeared at Alexandria
simultaneously with the troops. In these operations from
Brashear City to Alexandria, Banks had captured a lai^
number of prisoners and 22 guns, and had destroyed three
Confederate gunboats and a considerable amount of prop*
erty. His own loss had been about 600.

It was, however, nearly five months since Banks had ar-
rived at New Orleans, and during that time nothing of any
importance had been done against Port Hudson or in co-op-
eration with Grant. For this Banks was sharply called to
account by Halleck as soon as the latter heard of the occu-
pation of Alexandria, but Banks seems to have been per-
fectly justified in his movements against the Bed Biver
forces prior to any action against Port Hudson, for had his
troops besieged Port Hudson before driving back Taylor's

. PORT HUDSON. 221

forces, the latter wotdd possibly have been able to capture
New Orleans, the safety of which exceeded in importance
all other considerations.

Dnring the months of March, April, and May, consider-
able correspondence took place between Grant and Banks
as to the co-operation of their forces, which, as it has been
mnch quoted and misinterpreted, is given in full, with dates
of receipt, in the Appendix. The first letter is from Banks
to Grant, dated March 13th, the day before the passage of
the batteries at Port Hudson. In this Banks announced his
arrival at Baton Bouge with 17,000 men, for the purpose of
making a demonstration, while Farragut passed the bat-
teries. After this he hoped to communicate with Grant as
to the best means of co-operation between the two armies
under their respective commands.

. Farragut carried this up the river, and delivered it to
Grant on March 20th. A few days later Farragut prepared
to go down the river again, and Grant took advantage of the
opportunity to send word to Banks. He wrote him a des-
patch, dated March 23d, explaining the condition of affairs
at Yicksburg, and his various attempts to reach dry land on
the east bank of the river. On the same day he wrote a let-
ter to Farragut, in the nature of a postscript to the letter to
Banks, and with a request that it might be sent to that of-
ficer, saying that the Lake Providence Canal promised suc-
cess, and that he had sent to the Ohio Biver for light-
draught steamers. If they arrived, he stated that he could
send 20,000 men to Banks on the Bed Biver by that route.

Farragut started down the river with these two letters on
March 28th, and arrived above Port Hudson on April 6th.
JEere his secretary, Mr. Gabaudan, volunteered to slip past
the batteries in a skifif, and convey the letters to Banks.
But for fear of accident or capture, it was thought best not

122 THB MISSISSIPPL

to take the letters with him bat, to commit them to mem-
017. He arriTed safelj at Baton Bouge on April 8th, and
thence took steamer down the river, and reached Banks'
headquarters at Brashear Citj on April 10th. From the
verbal message which he conveyed, Banks gathered the in-
formation that Grant positively intended to send 20,000
men by the Lake Providence ronte. The contingency of re-
ceiving suitable transports (which, in fact, never arrived)
was either not reported or not noticed. Banks immediately
wrote Grant in reply that he was advancing toward Opelou-
sas, but had no intention of remaining west of the Missis-
sippi ; that he wonld return to Port Hudson by May 10th,
and that his available force for field operations was 15,000
men. Mr. Gabaudan took this letter, returned to Baton
Bouge, and made his way across the wooded swamp oppo-
site Port Hudson, reaching the Hartford on April 15th.
Farragut had no opportunity to forward the despatch until
May 1st. On that day he sent the Switzerland up the river
with the letter, which reached Grant on May 2d, just after
he had crossed at Bruinsburg. It was this despatch which
has previously been referred to as convincing Grant that he
could receive no co-operation from Banks during his cam-
paign behind Yicksburg, and as causing him to retain all
his own troops for that campaign instead of sending a corps
to Port Hudson as he had intended before crossing the
river. Grant wrote Banks to that effect on May 10th, as
will be subsequently explained. It will be noticed that it
took 40 days, from March 23d to May 2d, for Grant to re-
ceive a direct answer from Banks, and in the course of that
time the whole condition of affairs had changed around
Yicksburg. It was hopeless to effect any co-operation be-
tween two armies with such delay in communicating intelli-
gence.

PORT HUDSON. 223

In this interval several other despatches had been sent on
both sides, crossing each other on the road ; they had but
little effect on the campaign, and what little they had was
in the direction of creating confosion rather than of assist-
ing in co-operation.

In the first place, the two letters of March 23d from Grant
to Banks, which Farragnt brought down the river with him,
were sent across the peninsula opposite Port Hudson, and
delivered to General Augur at Baton Bouge, who forwarded
them by an officer of his staff. They did not reach Banks
until April 21st, eleven days after Mr. Gabaudan had con-
veyed his verbal message. Banks was then at Opelousas.
The letters themselves, instead of conveying the positive in-
formation that 20,000 men were to be sent by Lake Provi-
dence, made the sending of them depend on the arrival of
light-draught steamers. The letters were a month old
when received, and nothing had meantime been heard of
any troops coming down the Tensas. Banks was therefore
uncertain as to Grant's intentions, and he wrote in reply,
asking for definite information as to the method and time of
co-operation, and as to Grant's facilities for supplying any
troops he might send. This letter was sent to Farragut,
who received it on the evening of May 1st, and forwarded it
a few days later. It reached Grant about May 10th.

Still another despatch was sent by Grant from Milliken's
Bend, April 14th. At that time, as we have seen. Grant had
just received a despatch from Halleck, urging his co-opera-
tion at Port Hudson, and Grant had made his plans for such
a movement as soon as he could cross the river. In the de-
spatch Grant communicated these plans, said he would send
a corps to Bayou Sara *' by the 25th,'' and asked if Banks
would send troops to Vicksburg after Port Hudson had
fallen. The despatch was delayed in transmission ; it did

224 THE MISSISSIPPI.

not reach Banks HU May 6ih, at Alexandria. It was for-
warded from New Orleans hj telegraph, in cipher and with-
out date. Banks supposed it was onlj a few days old, and
that *' the 25th " meant May 25. He replied May 6th in the
following words : " By the 25th, probably, by the 1st, cer-
tainly, I will be there." This referred to being at Port
Hudson, and said nothing about coming to Vicksburg.
The reply reached Grant on May 10th.

Finally, however. Banks received a despatch, only two
days old, giving him information which caused him no Ht-
tie disappointment, but at least enabled him to form defi-
nite plans. This was Grant's despatch of May 10th, dated
at Bocky Springs. In this. Grant explained to Banks the
circumstances under which the campaign had opened in
earnest behind Vicksburg, the necessity for prompt ac-
tion, and the impossibiliiy of detaching any troops to
go down the river. On the contrary. Grant asked Banks
to come to Grand Gulf with all his effective force, or to
send such portion of it as could be spared, to take part
in the operations at Vicksburg, on which everything on the
Mississippi depended. In order to insure safety in the de-
livery of this despatch, Grant sent it by one of his staff <m
a special steamer, and by chance this officer met one of
Banks* staff at Natchez, who immediately took charge of it,
and delivered it to Banks at Alexandria, on the 12th, two
days after it was written.

Banks was greatly disappointed at receiving information
that no reinforcements would come to him from Grant's
army. Under these circumstances, he deliberated whether
he should pursue the enemy in his front to Shreveport, or
go to Vicksburg, as requested by Grant, or invest Port Hud-
son with such troops as he already had. Nothing could be
gained by advancing beyond Alexandria, for the enemy was

PORT HUDSON. 225

reported to have already dispersed. To go to Yieksburg
would consume weeks of time, for lie had only enough
steamers to transport a few regiments at a trip ; moreover
such a movement left New Orleans comparatively defence-
less and open to attack from the forces at Port Hudson
should he be detained long at Yicksburg. To march to
Port Hudson was the only feasible plan, and orders were at
once issued to put it in operation. Two days later (May
14th), Grover^s division left Alexandria, for Simsport, on the
Atchafalaya, followed on the 16th by Emory's division, and a
few days later by Weitzel's brigade, which had been sent
forward on a reconnoissance, nearly seventy miles toward
Shreveport, but was now recalled. The whole force was
united at Simsport on the 19th, crossed the Atchafalaya at
that point by means of transports, thence marched down
the. west bank of the Mississippi to opposite Bayou Sara,
where it was ferried across the river by the same boats, and
marched to the vicinity of Port Hudson. It arrived there
on May 24th, and effected a junction with Augur's division,
which meanwhile had moved up from Baton Bouge, in pur-
suance of orders to that effect.

It has already been narrated in the first chapter how the
Confederates came to select Port Hudson for a fortified
point, after their unsuccessful attack upon Baton Bouge in
August, 1862. Slave labor was then abundant and time was
not pressing, as they were not molested for several months.
In that interval they constructed a series of works around
Port Hudson of remarkable strength, the parapets having
an average thickness of 20 feet, and the depth of the ditch
below the top of the parapet being not less than 15 feet.
They consisted of a series of batteries, in all mounting
20 siege guns, along the bluff at an elevation of about
80 feet above the river. The land defences consisted of a
10*

contimunu line of puapet of etroog profile, begiimmg at a
point known as Boea'e lAndii^, about one mile below Part
Bndoon, thence mnning eaatwardl j throagb ft slightly broken

oonntty for aboat a mile, giadn&lly coming into ft broad
plain, dotted here and there with clumps of trees ; Ihenca
the line tnmed to the northward, following a general direo-
tion pararel to the river, and finally turning westward

PORT HUDSON. 227

through a rough country much cut up by ravines, and meet-
ing the river bank at the mouth of Thompson's Creek, about
half a mile north of Port Hudson. Near Boss's landing on
the river bank the line began in an enclosed bastion work ;
at the southeast salient of the line was another work ; a
third was situated at the forks of the roads leading to Baton
Bouge and Bayou Sara, and there was a fourth facing
Thompson's Creek. The entire length of the line was be-
tween three and four miles ; it was of strong profile through-
out, was defended by about 30 pieces of field artillery, and
the ground in rear of it afforded admirable facilities for
prompt movement of troops from one point to another.

Brig. -Gen. Beall constructed the works, and commanded
the garrison, which gradually increased from 6,000 to 12,000
men during the autumn of 1862. Maj.-Gen. Frank Gard-
ner succeeded him in command on December 28, 1862, and
remained in command until the surrender of the place. In
the months of Januaiy and February, rumors of Banks^ ar-
rival with a large force at New Orleans and his advance to
Baton Bouge were communicated by Gardner to Femberton
with the request for reinforcements. In response to this, on
February 22d, Femberton sent Bust's brigade, which carried
the total strength of the garrison to 16,287 for duty and 20,-
388 present as shown by the returns of March 31st. Subse-
quently Femberton became alarmed for the safety of Yicks-
burg, and on April 5th, he ordered Gardner to send Bust's
and Buford's brigades back to him. On April 29th, when
Femberton heard that Grant was crossing the river, he or-
dered Gardner to send Gregg's and Maxe/s brigades to
Jackson, and the garrison was then reduced to 4,652 effec-
tive out of a total of 5,715 present, as shown on a return
dated May 19th. But this return is manifestly erroneous,
as the number actually paroled, the sick not paroled, and

!228 THB lOSSISSIPPL

the acknowledged losses during the siege, make np a total
of a little over 7,000; which was the force present when
Banks arrived in front of the place on May 24th. On May
19th, Johnston sent Gardner an order to eyacnate the place
and bring whatever force he had to Jackson. But just as
the courier arrived with this order the place had been in-
Vested.

Banks brought with him from the Bed Biver country the
divisions of Grover and Emory (the latter under command
of Brig. -Gen. Wm. Dwight, Emory being sick) and the bri-
gade of Weitzel. He was joined by Augur's division and a
paii of T. W. Sherman's from Baton Bouge. His returns for
April 30th and June 30th, show a force of 33,000 men for duty
out of over 40,000 present.' Of these 33,000 all but about
2,300 appear on the return as being at Port Hudson. The
rest were at New Orleans, Brashear City, or elsewhere in
small detachments.

The troops were all united on the road a few miles east of
Port Hudson on May 25th, and after some skirmishing with
the outposts, the place was invested. Prepaivtions were
immediately made for an assault. The troops of Grover,
Dwight, and Weitzel were on the right; Augur's division
was in the centre; and T. W. Sherman was on the left
Orders were issued for a simultaneous assault along the
whole line early in the morning. Between 5 and 6 o'clock
the artillery opened briskly, and at 10 o'clock the troops
on the right moved forward to the assault. The groimd
was very broken and progress was difficult; severe fight-
ing was kept up on this part of the line until 4 o'clock

> Banks' final report, dated April 6, 1866, states that his effectiYe fcvoe before
FortHadson was *'lem than 13,000, inclading An^nr^s command.*^ His official
returns, however, are as above given, without connting Grierson^s cavalry, which
was defending his rear from cavalry raids of the enemy.

PORT HUDSON. 229

in the afternoon. In the centre and on the left there
was some delaj in the assault, which did not take place
until 2 P.M. It was then made with great determina-
tion, and the troops reached the ditch, but were unable
to cross the parapet. At nightfall they were withdrawn.
The assault in general was entirely unsuccessful, and it
entailed a loss of 293 killed, 1,545 wounded, and 157 mis-
sing, total 1,995. Oeneral T. W. Sherman was severely
wounded, losing a leg in this assault. The defenders lost
probably less than 300. Some siege guns were then brought
up and constant skirmishing ensued for several days, during
which the Union troops slightly advanced their position,
and intrenched their line. This line was parallel to that of
the Confederates, and between seven and eight miles in
length. On June 13th, Banks summoned the garrison to sur-
render, and this being refused, another assault was ordered.
Dwight's division was now on the left, and it was ordered to
push forward at daylight under cover of a ravine, and attack
the large bastion, called the *' Citadel," while the main at-
tack was made on the right by Grover and Weitzel. Neither
columns were successful, although the lines were advanced
from 50 to 200 yards, the troops intrenching themselves on
the new ground and permanently holding it. On the left
an eminence was gained, from which an approach was sub-
sequently run to within ten yards of the citadel.^

In this assault the loss was 203 killed, 1,401 wounded,
and 201 missing — ^total 1,805. Nearly 4,000 men, therefore
were lost in the two assaults.

The usual siege operations were then resumed and the
approaches were carried forward within a short distance of

1 The War Department Beoords contain no reports of division commanders for
either of these assaults. The above account, which is necessarily very meagre, is
taken from Banks^ reports.

2d0 THE MIS8I8SIPPL

the defendei^s works. On July 7th a letter was received
from Grant commnnicating the intelligence of the surrender
of Yicksborg. Salutes were fired and lond and prolonged
cheers were given along the Federal lines. The news
quickly spread among the Ck)nfederates, and in the after-
noon of that day Gardner asked Banks to give him an official
assurance that the news was true. Banks replied during
the middle of the night, sending a copy of Grant's letter.
Gardner immediately announced his willingness to sur-
render, and proposed the appointment of three commission-
ers on each side to arrange the details. Banks acceded to
this, and the commissioners met at 9 a.m. and drew up the
articles of capitulation, by which the entire garrison was
surrendered as prisoners of war, together with all arms, muni-
tions, public funds, and material of war at the post. The
garrison laid down its arms on the morning of the 9th, and
was paroled a few days later. The number actually paroled
was 5,953, exclusive of about 600 sick and wounded in the
hospitals. The losses during the siege of 45 days were
about 800. The artillery numbered 51 pieces, and the small
arms over 5,000 ; there were also large quantities of ammu-
nition, but almost no commissary stores, the defenders hav-
ing lived on mules and rats for several days.

While the siege had been in progress a small body of
cavalry had been hovering in the rear between Clinton and
Gamp Moore, but they were easily beaten off by Grierson.

A very serious danger had, however, arisen in the return
of Taylor's forces from Alexandria to the lower Teche and
La Fourche Bayous, from which they now threatened the city
of New Orleans as well as Banks' communications on the
river. After Banks had left Alexandria for Port Hudson in
May, Taylor had been ordered, as we have seen, to accompany
Walker's division from Arkansas on its bootless expedition

PORT HUDSON. 231

against Milliken's Bend. After this expedition had retired
from the vicinity of Vicksbnrg to Monroe, Taylor had asked
to take this division to Alexandria and unite it with his
own troops, which would give him a force of between 7,000
and 8,000 men. With these he proposed to move down the
river and either raise the siege of Port Hudson or capture
the city of New Orleans — according to the disposition of
Banks' forces. In this plan Taylor was overruled by Kirby
Smith, who ordered Walker's division .to remain in the
vicinity of Vicksburg. Taylor then returned to Alexandria
alone and there recruited and reorganized his own forces,
which numbered about 3,000 men. He divided them into
two detachments, the first of which, consisting of the in-
fantiy brigades of Mouton and Thomas Green, was to move
down the Teche to its mouth and attack Brashear City in
front ; while the other detachment, consisting of three cav-
alry regiments under Col. Major, was to move from Opelou-
sas by way of Plaquemine and Thibodeau and attack Brashear
City in the rear. Small detachments of Union troops were
at this time posted at Plaquemine, Donaldsonville, and New
Orleans on the river, and at Brashear City and Thibodeau
on the Western Bailroad. All the rest of Banks' troops
were at Port Hudson.

The detachments moved as ordered, and Major's command
reached Plaquemine on June 18th, capturing its little garri-
son of 70 men and burning two steamers; thence Major
hurried on, avoiding Donaldsonville, to Thibodeau, where
he attacked and was defeated on the 20th and 21st ; thence
he moved westward on the railroad toward Brashear City.
Mouton and Qreen had meanwhile marched down the Teche,
and near its mouth had collected some small boats and rafts.
With these they crossed Grand Lake on the 22d, and at-
tacked Brashear City simultaneously with Major's command.

2^2 THB MISSISSIPPI.

The place was captured, wj% eveiything in it. Tajlor
states that his prisoners numbered 1,700 and the captured
Cprns 12 ; Banks gives the strength of the garrison as " abont
300,** and the gons lost as 8. Tajlor says that, with this
capture, he had supplies for the first time since he arrived
in Western Louisiana, which is not disputed.

Taylor collected his captured property as rapidly as pos-
sible, and on the 24th he sent Qreen with his own and
Major's men to Donaldsonville, while Mouton moved along
the railway to the La Fourche, whence he sent his pickets as
far as Bayou des Allemands, within 25 miles of New Or-
leans, creating no little excitement in that city, which was
practically without defenders. There can be little doubt
that, had Walker's division been sent to Taylor as he re-
quested, he would have captured New Orleans, though he
would have been unable to hold it for more than a short
time. In regaining it, however, Banks might have felt
obliged to raise the siege of Port Hudson. It was still two
weeks before Port Hudson surrendered.

Green arrived in front of Donaldsonville with a force of
about 1,400 men on the afternoon of the 27th. There was a
small earthwork at the place, garrisoned by 180 men of the
28th Maine, under command of Maj. J. D. Mullen. At
1.30 A.M. of June 28th the Confederates assaulted the work,
but in the darkness there was a good deal of confusion in
their movements, and they were completely defeated by the
combined action of the little garrison and of three gunboats
in the river. The afiEair lasted until daylight. There is
the usual discrepancy as to the losses, Taylor stating the
Confederate loss at 97 in all, whereas the Union reports
speak of burying 69 Confederate dead and taking 120 pris-
oners. Being repulsed in this assault, the Confederates
moved down the river a few miles, and there erected bat-

PORT HUDSON. 233

teries commanding its navigation. The situation was now
very serions, one force of Confederates in front of the La
Fonrche directly threatening New Orleans, and another on
the river cutting off all communication by transports with
Port Hudson. Gen. Xhnory, then in command at New Or-
leans, wrote to Banks, on July 4th, that he must come to
the assistance of New Orleans at once or it would be lost ;
that the choice lay between New Orleans and Port Hudson.
Banks, however, wisely determined to remain at Port Hud-
son, as he felt confident it must fall in a few days, when he
would have abundant force to drive Taylor off.

His confidence was justified. Port Hudson was surren-
dered on the morning of July 9th, and on the same after-
noon all the transports available were loaded with WeitzeFs
and one of Qrover's brigades and sent down to Donaldson-
ville, where they arrived the same afternoon. Other troops
followed, and on the 13th Grover attacked Green's force on
the La Fourche and a sharp engagement followed, which
was indecisive in its results. A day or two later, however,
Green withdrew to Brashear City, and Mouton was called in
to the same point from the Bayou des Allemands. Banks
overestimated Taylor's force, and did not pursue vigorously,
so that Taylor had a week longer in which to remove all the
stores for which he had means of ti*ansportation. On July
21st he ran all the captured cars and heavy guns into Ber-
wick's Bay, and on the following day began his retreat up
the Teche. Banks' troops arrived at Brashear City on the 22d
but did not continue the pursuit. Taylor retreated, without
molestation, to Opelousas, where he remained, skirmishing
occasionally on the Teche, until the opening of Banks' Bed
Biver campaign in the spring of 1864.

CHAPTER Vm.

OONCLUDmO OPERATIONa

As soon as the Bichmond aatborities learned that Pern-
berton had been inyested in Yicksbnrg, the Confederate
Secretary of War sent a despatch (May 25th) to Johnston
snggesting that the troops in the Trans-Mississippi DejMot-
ment should advance toward Yicksbnrg, in order to make a
diversion in favor of Pemberton. Johnston forwarded this
to E. K. Smith on May Slst, with a letter requesting compli-
ance with this suggestion. The first result was the fruitless
expedition of Taylor and Walker against Milliken's Bend,
which has already been narrated. After this had foiled
Lt.-Gten. T. H. Holmes, who commanded the District of
Arkansas in E. K. Smith's department, sent the following
telegram, dated Little Bock, June 16th, to Smith at Shreve-
port : ** I believe we can take Helena ; please let me do it*
To which Smith replied : " Most certainly do it." Holmes
then had in his entire district, according to his returns of
May Ist, 31,933 men, of whom 14,608 were " estimated" as fit
for duty. For his expedition to Helena he collected about
twenty regiments, consisting of Price's and Marmaduke's
divisions and Pagan's and Walker's brigades. In his report
Holmes states that these troops numbered 7,646 men. With
their officers the whole force was probably between 8,000
and 9,000 ; it was estimated by the Union officers at 15,000.

Holmes^ object in this expedition was to capture Helena,
by which he hoped to raise ^^he siege of Yicksburg, or if

CONCLUDING 0PEBATI0K8. 235

Vickaburg (ell to still keep the river eloaed and perhaps
make ft new Vioksbnrg on the west b&nk.

Helena bad been occupied by the Union troops ever since
Curtis arrived there from Western Arkansas, in Jnlj, 1862.
It had been considerably fortified hj a redonbt, called Fort
Cortis, jnst west of
the town, and by four
ontlying batteriea —
named Batteries A,
B, 0, and D— which
commanded the, roads
<m the west of the
town, as shown on
the accompanying
sketch.

The gameoD at this
time consisted of Boss"
division of the 13th
Corps (temporarily in
command of Brig.-
Oen. Salomon) and a
brigade of cavalry.
The entire force nnm-
bered il29
Prentiss.

Holmes arrived in front of the place on the evening of
July 3d. His orders were to assaolt at daylight, Pagan's
brigade on the right against Battery D, Price's division in
the centre against Battery C, Miannadnke's division on the
left against Batteries A and B, and Walker's cavalry brigade
covering the extreme left. Prentiss was expecting an attack,
and his troops were under arms all night in order to be pre-
pared for it.

TW;

'~»--H^%/l

If

w\^ ^J vH

N^o 1

1

(13

IJ, o

^ k-'

pBics^j^STT^

is.

"M

g j

u

and was commanded by Maj.-Gen. B. M.

286 THE 1II8BI88IPPL

At daylight Fagan and Marmaduke moved forward. The
hitter's attack was feebly made, and was not supported by
Walker's cavalry on his left as had been ordered. It ac-
complished nothing all day« Fagan, however, attacked with
gre&t determination and carried all the outer intrenchments
in front of Battery D, but was unable to enter that work.
His men were subjected to a severe cross-fire from the other
batteries, and were forced to fall back ; the four regiments
of this brigade lost over 400 men. Price also made a most
vigorous assault, although he did not come into action until
an hour later than Fagan. He carried all the intr^ichments
in his front and Battery C also. He then ordered one bri-
gade to move forward toward the town and the other to as-
sault Battery D in rear. But there was a great deal of con-
fusion among his men, and the orders were not obeyed. In
the midst of the delay he was energetically attacked by the
Union troops, and Battery C was recaptured. Seeing that
his attack had no chance of success. Holmes gave the order
to withdraw at 10.30 a.m. His troops returned to Little
Bock without molestation, Prentiss having too small a force
to attempt a pursuit.

The Confederate losses, as stated by Holmes, were 178
killed, 687 wounded, and 776 missing, making a total of
1,636. Prentiss certifies that he buried 400 dead, paroled
108 wounded, and sent North 993 prisoners, about one-fourth
of whom were wounded, making a total of 1,501 left in his
hands. The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and 36
missing ; total, 230.

This battle of Helena was the last expiring effort on the
part of the Confederates to retain control of the Mississippi
Biver ; and it was a hopeless, and to some extent a discredit-
able defeat, the mortification at which is not concealed in
their reports. It occurred on the same day that Vicksburg

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS. 237

fell, and was followed in a few days by the fall of Port Hud-
son ; the last hostilities at various points on the river being
thus almost simultaneous. The great river was finally free,
and free forever. On July 16th the steamer Imperial ar-
rived at New Orleans direct from St. Louis, thus showing
that the Mississippi was once more a highway of commerce.
Garrisons were retained until the end of the war at vari-
ous points between Cairo and New Orleans, and the banks
were infested by partisan and guerilla bands, supplemented
now and then by a cavalry raid of larger proportions. But
no serious effort was ever made to again bring the Mississippi
within Confederate control or to permanently blockade it
against commerce. These cavalry raids were of importance,
because they occupied the attention of a large force of Union
troops, but they accomplished no other purpose ; they would
have been long since forgotten but for the indelible stain
left by Forrest when he slaughtered the captive negro gar-
rison of Fort Pillow, in April, 1864.

The Union armies on the Mississippi turned their atten-
tion to other fields. Banks' troops assembled at New Or-
leans, and afterward operated on the Bed Biver and in the
direction of Texas. Grant's army was broken up, the 9th
Corps returning to Ohio and Herron's division to Missouri ;
the 13th Corps was sent to Texas, and the 15th, followed
eventually by the 17th and part of the 16th, to Chatta-
nooga. Grant remained at Yicksburg until October, 1863,
when he was assigned to the command of all the troops in
the West and ordered to Chattanooga to retrieve the defeat
at Chickamauga, and to prepare the way for the eventual
advance to Atlanta and thence through the heart of the
Confederacy.

APPENDIX A.

SUMMARY OF PRINOIPAL EVENTS.

1861.

ICay 10th. Captare of Gamp Jackson, near St. Loais, by V, S. Troops.

July iitSth. New Madrid, Mo., oconpied by 0. S. Troops.

Ang. Fort Henty, Tenn., occupied by C. S. Troops.

▲ng. Fort Donelson, Tenn., occupied by C. 8. Troops.

Sept. Ist. Cairo, 111., occupied by U. S. Troops.

SepL 4th. Columbus, Ky., occupied by C. S. Troops.

Sept 0th. Fadnoah, Ky., occupied by U. S. Troops.

SepL 18th. Bowling Green, Ky., occupied by C. S; Troops»

Not. 7th. Engagement at Belmont, Mo.

1869.

Feb. 6th. Fort Henry captured by U. S. Troops.

Feb. ISth. Bowling Oreen evacuated by 0. S. Troops.

Feb. 16th. Fort Donelaon surrendered by C. S. Troops.

Mar. 8d. Columbus, Ky., evacuated by C. S. Troops.

Mar. 8th. Chattanooga occupied by G. S. Troops.

April 6th, 7th. Battle of Pittsburg Landing.

April 24th. Battle of Forts St Philip and Jackson below New Orlaani.

April 25th. New Orleans captured by U. S. Navy.

May Ist New Orleans occupied by XT. S. Troops.

May 10th. Naval Engagement at Fort Pillow, Tenn.

May 12th. Yicksburg occupied by C. S. Troops.

May 18th. Farragut^s fleet arrives at Yicksburg.

May 29th. Farragnt^s fleet returns to Now Orleans.

May 80th. Corinth evacuated by C. S. Troops.

June 4th. Fort Pillow evacuated by C. S. Troops.

June 5th. Memphis evacuated by 0. S. Troops.

June 6th. Naval engagement near Memphis, Tenn.

June lOtii. BuelPs army moves from Corinth toward Chattanooga.

June 25th. FarcBgut^s fleet arrives at Yicksburg.

240 THE MISSISSIPPI

Jane SSlh. Fungnt'B fleet pmhb the tetteriea at yicksbarg and joinB DftTto*

flotUla above.
July S4th. Bnigg*t army moves from Topelo, Min , toward Chattanooga.
July Mth. Famgnt's fleet retams to New Orleans, and Davis* to Helena.
Aug. 6ttu Battle of Baton Booge, La.
Aug. 7th. Port Hodnon, La., ooonpied by C. S. Troops.
Aog. 9Ut, Baton Booge, La., evaonated by U. S. Troops.
Bept 19th. Battle of loka, ICias.
Oct 8d, 4th. Battle of Oorinth, Miss.
Oct. 6th. Engagement on Uatchie Biver, Miss.
Nov. 84th. Orant^s army moves southward into UlssisslppL
Dea 11th to Jan. 8d. Forrest^s raid into Western Tennessee.
Dec. 14th. Banks* expediticm arrives at New Orleans.
Dec 17th. Baton Booge reoocnpied by XT. S. Troops.
Dea SOth. Orant^s d6pdt at Holly Springs destrojred by Yan Dom.
Dec. SOth. Sherman^s river expedition leaves MemphiB.
Deo. 38th. Grant's army returns to Tennesse e .
Dec. 39th. Battle of Chiokaaaw Bluffs.

18ft3.

Jan. 1st Capture of Galveston by C. S. Troops.

Jan. 11th. Capture of Arkansas Post by U. S. Troops.

Jan. 11th to Feb. 38th. Expedition on Bayou Teche.

Jan. 16th. ICcClemand's river expedition rctumR to vicinity of VicksbnTg.

Jan. SOth to March 7th. Work on canal opiwsitc Yicksburg.

Jan. 39th. Grant takes command of river expedition.

Feb. Ist to April, 6th. Yasoo Pass expedition.

Feb. 6th to Mar. 18th. Work on Lake Providence projeot.

Mar. 14th. Farragut^s fleet pusses the batteries at Port Hndson.

Mar. 16th to Mar. 37th. Steele's Bayou expedition.

Mar. 36th to May 14th. Expedition on Bayou Teche.

Mar. 39th to April SOth. Movement from Milliken^ii Bend to Bruinsborg.

April 13th. Engagement at Furt Bisland, La.

April 14th. Engagement at Franklin, La.

April SOth. Capture of Butte ft la Rose, La.

April 39th. Engagement at Grand Gulf.

April SOth. Grant^s army crosses the Mississippi.

May Ist. Battle of Port Gibron.

May 3d. Evacuation of Grand Gulf.

May 7th. Occupation of Alexandria,

May 13th. Battle of Raymond.

May 14th. Battle of Jackson.

May 16th. Battle of Champion's HilL

May 17th. Battle of Big Black Bridge.

May 19th. * Assault at Vickeburg.

May 19th. Evacuation of Haines* Blnff.

APPENDIX A. 241

May 83d. Aflsanlt at Vicksburg.

May 83d to July 4th. Siege of Yicksburg.

May 84th to July 9th. Biege of Port Hndoon.

May 27th. Assanlt at Fort Hadaon.

Jnne 14th. Assault at Port Hudson.

June 88d. Gaptore of Brashear Oit^ by C. S. Troopa.

June 88th. Engagement at Donaldsonville, La.

July 4th. Battle of Helena.

July 4th. Surrender of Yicksburg.

July 9th. Surrender of Port Hudson.

July 9th to 16th. Investment of Jackson, Miss.

July 18th. Engagement at Donaldsonvllle, La.

July 16th. Evacuation of Jackson, Miss.

July 88d. Becapture of Brashear City by XT. S. Troopn.

DEPARTMENTS AND COMMANDERa

At the outbreak of the war, the territory between the Mississippi Biverand the
Bocky Mountains constituted the Military Department of the West. Brig.-Oen.
W. S. Harney was in command until May 81, 1861, when he was succeeded by
Brig.-Gton. N. Lyon. On July 8, 1861, the title was changed to Western Depart-
ment, the boundaries remaining substantially the same, with the addition of Illinois,
and Maj.-Gen. J. C. Fremont was assigned to the command. On November 9,
1861, this department was disoontinned, and a new department constituted, oon-
sisting of the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, lUinois, Arkansas,
and Western Kentucky. This was styled the Department of tiie Missouri, and
Maj.-Oen. H. W. Halleck was assigned to the command. On the same date the
Department of Kansas was formed, consistlh^ of that State and the neighboring
territories under Maj.-Gen. D. Hunter; and the Department of Ohio, consisting
of the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee, and Eastern Kentucky, under
Brig.-6en. D. G. Buell. On March 11, 1863, these three departments were consol-
idated into one, styled the Department of the Mlsnissippi, and General Halleck
was assigned to the command. The three field armies within the department
were the Army of the Tennessee, under Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant ; the Army of the
Ohio, under Maj.-Gen. D. G. Buell, and the Army of the Mississippi, under Maj.-
Gen. John Pope. These three armies were united at Corinth, and separated again
in June, 1863, into two armies, under Generals Grant and Buell, the Army of the
Mississippi being divided between them ; one army acting on the line of the Mis
siisippl, and the other on the line from Nashville to Chattanooga.

General Halleck was appointed General-in-Chief, July 11, 1863, but no successor
was appointed to the command of his department. In September and October,
1863, this department was gradually broken up, and four new departments
formed out of it, viz.. Department of the Missouri, under Maj.-Gen. S. B. Curtis,
succeeded in May, 1863, by Maj.-Gen. J. M. Schofield ; Department of the Ten-
nessee, under Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant; Department of the Cumberland, under
Maj.-Oen. W. S. Bosecrans ; and Department of the Ohio, under Maj.-Gen. H. G.

243 THB MISSISSIPPL

Wright, nooeeded in 1868 bj Maj.-Qeius. A. B. Bornaide and J. G. Fcwter, and in
1864 bj Maj.-Oen. J. M. Schofleld.

Theae foor departmenta remained independent antil October 16i, 186^1, when the
three which were east ot the MiariiBippi (Tennessee, Cnmberland, and Ohio) were
gro u ped into the Diyision of the Missiwippi, and General Grant was assigned to
the oommand. This divirion continued in existence nntil August, 1866, General
Sherman succeeding General Grant on ICarch 18^ 1861, when the latter was placed
in oommand of all the armies.

On the Confederate side, the Ifisdasippi Valley was divided at the outbreak of
war into two departments, known as Departments No. 1 and No. 2. The first
embraced the State of Louisiana and the lower part of MissisRippi, and was com-
manded by Mai.-Gen. D. B. Twiggs from May 27th to October 7, 1861, and then
by Haj.-Gen. Mansfield Lovell. The capture of New Orleans rirtnaUy abolished
the Department, and it was mei^ced into Department No. 8, on June 25, 18^
Department No. S; sometimes called the Western Department, comprised the Mis-
sisrippi Yall^ north of Louisiana. Maj.-Gen. L. Polk was assigned to the com-
mand <» June 25, 1861, and was succeeded by General A. 8. Johnston on Septem-
ber 10, 1861. At his death, April 6, 1862. the command devolved on General G. T.
BeanregBrd, who was sn<x;eeded on June 17, 1862, by General Braxton Bragg. In
May, 1868, that portion of this department which was west of the Mississippi was
formed into a new department, called the Trans-MlBslssippi Department, which
was commanded by Ma). -Gen. T. H. Holmes until February 9, 1863, when he was
succeeded by Lt.-Gen. K K. Smith, who retained the command nntil the clone of
the war. In October, 1862, still another deportment was formed from a portion
of the original No. 2. It was called the Department of Missi^ppl and East
Louisiana, and embraced the territory named in its title. Lt.-Gen. J. C. Pem>
berton was assigned to the command, and retained it until the surrender of Yicka-
burg.

The various armies and districts which were embrsoed in these d^artmenta
have been indicated in the text.

APPENDIX B.

Abairact from ReturnM of the Armies of the Aflsaissippi and of the Ten^
neeeee^ and of the District of the Ohio^ Majok-Genekal H. W.
Hallbck Commanding^ for May 31 and June 1, 1862.

Commands.

Army of the MUaieaippi (Pope) :

Biffht winsr (Roeecraos)

Left wing (Hamilton)

Cavaliy divigion (Granger). .

Engineers (Biasell)

Beeerves (Garlin)

Total.

4th
5th
6th
7th

Army qfthe Teimeaaee—'BAght wing (Thonuui):

adDiyision (Davies)

" (Hnrlbut)

" (W. T. Sherman)

** (McKean)

" (T. W. Sherman)!

Total

Beiterve Corp* (McCiemand) :

Ist Division ( Judah)

8d ^ (Wallace)

Total.

Total Anmes of the Tennessee and
Miairifwippi

DifitrUA qfthe Ohio (Bnell) :

adDivisioa(McCook)

Sd " (Mitchel)»

4th " (Nelson)

5th " (Crittenden)

eth " (Wood)

7th " (Monran)»

7th Brigade (NegTeY)«

23d ~- CLerteA

DnmoDt^s command

Cavalry (Jackson)

Artillery reserve (Bamett)

Unattached artillery

" cavalry

infantry

Total.

Present for Duty.

S8S

527

114

6

71

1.248

290
844
255
868

1,540

819
264

583

8,866

870

290

190

849

443

LS4

110

95

90

17

IS

119

22*7

2.808

Grand Total I 6,169

i^

10,856
10.817

2,408
105

1,736

21,922

5,246
5,629
6,060
5,401
7,066

29,402

5.537
5,540

Tl^Olf

65,401

7,785
6.072
6.212
8,460
6.220
8,240
2.i«7
2,411
1,663
1.798
453
815
2.419
6,157

55.152
120.523

13,060
1^544

3,158
762

2,063

81,542

6,745
7,094
7,867
6,989

8,305

86,960

7.159
7,029

14,188

82,680

9.225

8,612

7,641

4,298

7,458

10,154

8,820

2,858

2,019

2,379

490

864

2,841

6,067

67,781
150,461

16/)18
15,818

4.135
865

2,228

88,564

10,348
9,861
11,878
10,251
11,806

53,684

11,855
9,870

20,T25

112,923

11.908
11,687
10,696
6,556
10,455
12,780

8,867

2,447.

8,151

664

437
8,405

7,019

201.558

1 Formerly Ist Division (Thomas). Army of the Ohio. ^ ^ ^, ^ ^„

« In Nort£em Alabama. » At Cumberland Gap. 4 At Nashville.

An of Bnell's troops, except those commanded by Mitchel, Morgan, and Negl«y,
were at or near Corinth.

NOTR.— The above was cooipiled m the War Records Office, and will appear OQ
page 285 of VoL X., Part IL, oTthe Beoords of the War of the Rebellion.

I

t

^5

1

8 8§ fis S §§

QfBoera.

i ss

EnUsted
Men.

6

S tfs s. S iS

OfiloetB.

S SS'SS

8 8S

Enlisted
Men.

op

8 I «kM I M^

iss;!S8

OffloeiB.

ss

1* w

Snarted
Men.

H

u

•.s

Ofllom.

S :

M Mk*

»^ I

S8

Enlisted
Men.

8;§s

25i 138
5 Sg

EflBectiTe toteL

s s§ ~

TML

i

3

§§

•AjIgTQgBte.

»

00

MOk

1$ s§

Offloen.

g SIfe ' 88

8<

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men.

Offloeri^

wS eeto

men.

8<

«!-» • i-» IS mS

Offloers.

S8 oo8

Enliflted
men.

S iiS

-»-»

Offloers.

%\%W'tt '§ .§

EnUated
men.

^1

I

f
§

Sg'§§

"S¥g

s ss

Total.

AWTPegate.

3

s

I

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I

I

APPENDIX D.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH REFERENCE TO THE
DISPERSION OP HALLECK'S ARMY AFTER
THE CAPTURE OF CORINTH,

No. 1.
Lincoln to Halleck.

Washuvoton, Jnne 5, 1862—9.30 p.m.
I have received the following despatch from Qenend ICcClellan, which I traas*
mit for yonr coiisideration :

"McGleixan^s HEADQtriBTBBS, June 5, 1862—4 p.m.
** May I Bgain invite your Excellency's attention to the great importance of ooctf*
pying Chattanooga and Dalton by our Western forces ? The evacuation of Cor-
inth would appear to render this very easy. The importance of this move in force
cannot be exaggerated.^'

No. ».
Halleck to Lincoln.

CoBiNTH, Jnne 7, 186S.

Your telegram of yesterday jnst received. Preparations for Chattanooga made
five days ago, and troops moved in that direction. MitchePs foolish destmction
of bridges embarrassed me very much, but I am working night and day to ranedy
the error, and win very soon reinf <noe him,

[NoTS.— Mitcbd had written orleni from BneU to destroy tiie bridges r e to r e d
to.— F. V. O.]

No. 3.

Halleck to Stanton.

Corinth, Jnne 0, 1863.
. . . General BneU, with four divisions, has been directed to move East,
to form a junction with Mitchel. . . . It is absolutely necessary to reinforce
Oeneral Curtis. I hope the navy will assist me in supplying him by White Biver.
I am podiing forward troops and opening the road to Memphis.

946 THE MISSISSIPPI.

No. 4.
Stamton to Halleck.

Wasbihgtoh, Jane A, 1888.
Tour despatch of thia date has jiut been received, and yoar propomd plan of
operatlona ia cordially approved. I sappoatf yon contemplate the occnpation of
Vickiibnrg and clearing oat the MUwissippi to New Orleans. If it shoold in any
eoDtingeucy become nooeanuy, can yon lend a hand to Botlerf

No. 5.

Stajtton to Halleck.

Wab DBPABTmirr, Jnne 88, 1868.
The enemy hare concentr a ted in such force at Richmond as to render it abeo-
intely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for yon immediate to detach
86,000 of your force, and forward it by the nearest and quickest roate by way of
Baltimore and Washington to Bichmond. . • .

No. 6.
Halleck to Stanton.

CoBTHTB, June 80, 1868.
Your telegram of 88th Is just receiyed . . . and measures will be immediately
taken to carry it out. ... I think, under the circumstances, the Ohattanoc^Fa
expedition better be abandoned, or at least be diminished. If not I donbt our
ability to hold West Tennessee after detaching so large a foroe as that called
for. • • •

No. 7.
Stanton to Halleck.

Wab Dkpabtmbvt, Jnne 80, 1868.
Tour tAegnm of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition must
not on any account be given up. The President regards that and the movement
against East Tennessee as one of the most important events of the war, and its
occupation nearly as important as the capture of Richmond. . . . He directs
that no force be sent here if yon cannot do it without toeaUng up the operations
against Bast Tennessee. . . .

No. 8.
Lincoln to Halleck.

WASHiiroTOir, June 80, 1808.
Would be very glad of 86,000 infantry-~no artillery or cavalry ; but please do
not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it
forces you to give up, or weaken, or delay the expedition against Chattar
nooga. • • •

APPENDIX D. 247

No. 9.
Hallbgk to Stantok.

CoBiHTB, July 1, 1863.
Td^pram enspending oidecs for troops is reodvecL If order had been carried
out we should have been either defeated or forced to retreat. No forces can be
spared at present. . . .

No. 10.

Halleok to Linoolm.

CojaxTBL, Jnly 1, 186S.
Your tetegram jnst received saves Western Tennessee. ... If these troops
had been sent East we should have been defeated or forced to retreat.

At the time this correRpondence took place, McClellan was withdrawing hia
army to the James Biver, and his secret service agents were reporting that the
Confederate army in front of Bichmond ntimbored 180,000, its actual strength
being under 80,000. See YoL III. of this Series, page 183.

APPENDIX E.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ABMY OF THE TEN-
NESSEE,

CcnoiAiiDBD BT Majob-Gxnkbaii U. S. GBANT, as shown

ON THB RkTCBN DATED AfBIL 30, 1863.

THIRTEENTH ARMT CORPS.
MAJOS-GsiiaKAL J. A. McCLERNAND.
S$eort—Sd Illinois Gayalry, Go. L.
NINTH DIVISION (08TBRHAUS).
Jlrtf BrtgadB (Gabbabd). Second Brigade (Sheldoit).

49th Indiana. 16th Ohio.

09rh Indiana. 4ad Ohia

jaOth Ohioi 114th Ohia

118th Illinois. 54th Indiana.

7th Kentocky. 89d Kentucky.

ArUUertf. CaoaJry.

Ist Wisoonsin Battery. 8d nUnoii Gavaky, Go.'s A, B, and K.

7th Michigui Batteiy.

TENTH DIVISION (A. J. SUITE).

nm Brigade (Bubbbums). Second Brigade (Land&am >.

10th Indiana. 19th Kentacky.

60th Indiana. T«th DliuoiR.

67th Indiana. 97th Illinois.

83d Ohio. lUSth Illinois.

96th Ohia IdOth Illinois.

S8d 1¥i8oonBin. 48th Ohio.

Artillery. Camlry,

Chicago Mercantile Batteiy. 4th Indiana Cavalry, Company C.

17th Ohio Battery.

TWELFTH DIVISION (A. P. HOVBY).

FtrU Brigade (MoGnmiB). Second Brigade (Siagk). ArtUlery,

11th Indiana. 47th Indiana. 9d Illinois, Battery A.

84th Indiana. 34th Iowa. 2d Ohio Battery.

84th Indiana. 88th Iowa. 16th Ohio Battery.

46th Indiana. 66th Ohio. Ist Missoori, Batteiy A.

89th Wisconsin.

Ca/oalry,
1st Indiana Caralry, Oompaiqr GL

APPENDIS E. S49

THIBTBHNTH DIYISIOlf (BOSS).

nmBrtgam (8ialoiiqii> AKond BrtaaOB (Fbk).

48d Indiana. 89Ui Iowa.

aSth Minoari. 88d Iowa,

aeth Wifloonain. 86th Iowa.

AriUUrV'
8d Iowa Battery.

SSdMiasoiuL

FOUBTEBNTH DIVIfllON (CABB).

F%r9t BtHgad$ (Basneov), Second Brigaae (Lawlsb).
Irt United States. Uth Wiaooiuin.

8th Indiana. 2l8t luwa.

18th Indiana. 99d Iowa.

83d Illinois. S8d Iowa.

99th Illinoia.

Armierv, Camlrv.

Isfc Indiana Battery. 8d nUnols Cavalry, Ca Q.

let Iowa Battery.

SECOND DIVISION, OAVALBY (BUSSEY).

Firti Brigade (Wzlkt). Secottd Bngade {Cucnov). 3d Illinoia Oav. (6 Oo.*s).
6th Illinois Cavahry. Sd Arkansas Cavalry. Kentucky Infantry, Patter-

lit indiaiiA Cavahry. 8d Iowa Cavahry. *.f*?,f ^°- . « m « , x

6th Kansas Cavalry- ^^ Misspuil Car. (7 Ca's).

PIPTBBNTH ARMY CORPS.
Majob-Gbnbbal W. T. SHERMAN.

ELEVBNTH [FIBST] DIVISION (STESLE).

Fittt Brigadt Second Brigade Third Brigade

(Maitebb). (C. B. Woods). (ThatxbX

18th IlUnoia. 96th Iowa. 4th Iowa*

9f7tb MiasoozL Slst Iowa. 9th Iowa.

S9th MissonrL 8d Miasoari. 90th Iowa.

SOthHissoorL ISthlOssoari. 80th Iowa.

Slst Miaeunri. 17th Misuari.

89d Hiflsooxi. 76ch Ohia

AraOerv. Caoalry.

9d Misaoorl, Battery F. Kane Co. Illinois Cavalry.

4th Ohio Battery. 8d DUnois Cavalry, Co. D.

FIFTH [8BC(»n>] DIVISION (BLAIB).

rirUBrigade Seoond Brigade TMrdBrigade

(G. A. Smith). (T. K. Smith). (Ewimo).

Ath Missoori. 65th Dlinois. 80th Ohia

8th liissonri. 197th Illinoia 87Lh Ohio.

118th Dlinois. 64th Ohio. 47th Ohio.

110th niinois. 67th Ohio. 4th West Virginia.

18th United States. 83d Indiana.

JrMUsrr, CtaNilry.

BaUtty A, 1st Iffinoli AarMllery. Thielemann^s Cavslry.

Battery B, let Illinois Artillery. 10th Missoori Cavahy, Co. a

Battery H, 1st Dlinois Artillery.

tfO

THE MTfiSTaftTPPL

KIOUTU. frUIlKD] DIVISION (TUTTLB).
Bri09da(BiuoKLAXD), StoondBrU/ade (Mowxtt}. TUrdBm^iile(}U:

TSdOhio.
fiOthOhio.
114th Illinois
98d T"*^'^"*a

Sd lowm Batteiy.

47th lUinolB.
6th Minnesota,
nth Miasouri.
8th Wisconsin.

8th Iowa.
ISth Iowa.
86th Iowa.

ArWiery.

1st Illinois Artilleiy, Battery B.

SEVENTBENTH ARMY GOBPa

Hajob-Genbbal J. B. McPHEBSOK.
Aoorf— 4th Co. Ohio Cavalry. .

FlntBtiga^
(J. E. Smith).

90th Illinois.
81st Illinoifl.
46th IllinoiB.
184th UUnois.
88d Indiana.

THIBD DIVISION (LOGAN).

Second Brigade
(Dknhis).

80th Illinois.
SOth Ohio.
68th Ohio.
78th Ohio.

TMrdBrlgade
(J. D. Stkvkksoh).

6th Illinois.
8l8t Illinois.
7th Mi^ooii.
SSdOhio.

JrUUerw.

Ist Illinois Artillery, Co. D.
8d Illinois ArUllery, Co. G.

8d Illinois ArtHlery, Co. L.
8th Mlohigan Battoy.

8d Ohio Battery.

cavairif,

9d Illinois Cavalry, Company A.

SIXTH DIVISION (MoABTHUB).

Fim Briffade (Bbid). Second Brigade (Bassom). TMrd Brigade (Hau.).

ITth niinoiflL 11th UUnois. 11th Iowa.

86th lUlnois. 78d IlUnois. 18th Iowa.

1st Kansas. 14th Wisconsin. 16th Iowa.

10th Wisconsin. 17th Wifwonsin. 16th Iowa.

18th Wisconsin.

8d Illinois Artillery, Ca F.
Ist Minnesota Battery.

Artmery,

let Missouri Artillecy, Go. 0.
10th Ohio Battery.

CavaHry.
11th Illinois Cavalry, Company G.

SEVENTH DIVISION (QUINBY).

Second Brigade (HoucKS). JIUrd Brigade (Booacnt).

66th lUinois.
17th Iowa.
10th Miaaonri.
34th Mitwouri, Co. B.
80th Ohio.

ArtiUer»n
1st MlsHonri Artillery, Co. M. 6th Wisconsin Battery.

11th Ohio Battery. ISth Wisconsin Battery.

Gioalry, ■
9d Illinois Cavalry, Co. E. 6th Misaonri Cavalry, Co. 0.

FIrtd Brigade

(AltEXANDBB).

48th Indiana.
69th Indiana.
4th Minnesota.

SSdDlinois.
6th Iowa.
10th Iowa,
aeth Missouri.

APP&NDIX E. 261

SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS.
Hajos-Genebal S. a. HURLBUT.

FIBST DIVISION (W. 8. SMITH).

FIrtt Brigade (Looios). Stoond Brigade (HKZf >

96th Illinois. 40th BlinoLB.

90th niinoiB. lOSd lUinolo.

12th Indiana. 6th Iowa.

100th Indiana. 46th Ohio.

TMrd Brigade (CockkbsUi). Fourth Brigade (SAirroBD).

Vrth Indiana. 48th niinois.

90th Indiana. 49th lUinoiB.

63d Ohia 119th lUinois.

70th Ohio. 15th Michigan.

ArtaUry.

Irt Illinois Artillery, Go's. F, I, and M. 4feh Indiana Battery.

9d Illinois Artillery, Go. 1). Ist Missoori Artillery, Go. K.

CanairV'
7th Illinois Cavalry, Go. B. Sd West Tennessee Gavaliy.

DISTBIGT OF GOBINTH (DODOE).

FIrU Brigade (Swcsht). Second Brigade (Mbbst).

52d IlUnois. 9th Illinois.

8d Iowa. 12th liUnois.

66th Iowa. 123d Illinois.

81st Ohio.

TMrd Brigade (Bahb). Fourth Brigade (Fullbb).

7th Illinois. 37th Ohio.

60th Illinois. 89th Ohio.

67th Illinois. 63d Ohia

89th Iowa.
18th Missoori.

Artnury.

Ist Missoori Artilleiy, Go. B. 9d TT. S. Artillery, Go, F.

Siege Batteries.

Caoairy (Cobittn).

Ist Alabama Cavalry. 10th Mistoori Cavalry.

16th Illinois Gavahr. 6th Ohio Cavah7 (8d Battalion).

THIBD DIVISION (KIMBALL).

Fmt Brigade (^vjLTiUX\ Second Brigade {"Biobmovd). Third Brigade {Tbxje),

48d DUnois. 18th UUnois. 62d Illinois,

aiat Illinois. 64lh Illinois. S7th Indiana.

lU6th Illinois. 126th Illinois.. bOth Indiana.

12tli Michigan. 22d Ohio. Ist West TeonesBee.

Artmery.

8d Blinois Artillery, Co. A. 14th Ohio Battery.

14Ui Indiana Battery. 7th Wisconsin Battery.

Caoairy (Mizhxb).

llih Illinois Cavalry. 8d Michigan Cavalry.

^Ist West Tennessee Cavalry.

252

THE MISSISSIPPI.

FOURTH DmSION (LA.UMAN).
/Irrt Brioc^ (Pvob). Sacond Brigade (Oall). Tkird Brigade (Bbtaht).

41rt lUinoffl.
5%1 lUinoiB.
Sdlowa.
88d WiflOODsiii.

14th Ulinoia.
15th Ulinois.
46thIilinoi&
Ydth lUinoiB.

28th Illinois.
dSA lUinois.
63d Indiana.
12th Wisoonsin

ArtiUerv.

9d Illinoli Artillery, Co*s. E and K. 7th Ohio Battery.

Mh Ohio Battery. 15th Ohio Battery.

Cktvalry.

DetaohmeDt 15th Illinois Cavalry.

DISTSICT OF MEMPHIS (VEATCH).

68d niinois.
Mth IllinoiH.
<M>th Ulinois.
87th Illinois.
117th IllinoiB.

Ii\fantry.

laOtb lUinois.
i:^lst IUinoi&
S5th Indiana.
89th Indiana.

If^ United States.
15th United States.
S3d Wisconsin.
Convalescents.

Cavalrv.

1st Missonri Cavalry.
5th Ohio Cavalry.

9A U. 8. Cavalry.

9d Wisconsin Cavalry.

ArUOerv.
Hurllmt Battery.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBUS (ASBOTH).

OolvmlMiti Kf .

Detachment 16th U. S.
Slst Wisconoin.
S5th Wisconsin.
84th Wisconsin.
Det. 9d Illinois Cavalry.
DeL 15th Elentucky Car.
Det. 4th Missonri Gav.
Det 8d U. S. Cavalry.
Det 9th Indiana Battery.

Hickman, Ky.

Det 18th WisGcmsin.
Det 15th Illinois Cav.

Clinton, Ky.

83d MiBsonri.

Det. Sd Illinois Cav.

Det 4th Illinois Cav.

Oairo, HI.

128th Illinois.
85th Iowa.

Ftidncah, Ky.

40lh Iowa.

24th Wisconsin.

Det 15ch Kentucky Cav.

Island Na 10.
Det 15bh WiBoonain.

Fort Haiman, Ky.

111th Illinois.

dd Minnesota.

Det. 16th Kentucky Cav.

Det 9th Indiana Uatteiy.

Fort Pillow, Tenn.

Det. 52d Indiana.

Det 82d Iowa.

Det 2d Illinois Cavahy.

FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION (WASHBUHNE).

First Brigade (Gribbson). Second Brigade (McCbilusX
6th Illinois Cavalry. 8d Illinois Cavalry.

7th Illinois Cavalry. 4th Ulinois Cavalry.

Sd Iowa Cavalry. 7th Kansas Cavalry.

APPENDIX E.

253

Abstract from Return, shawifig strength of Trooptt in the Department
of the Tennessee^ commanded by Major-Genebal U. Sb Grant,
for the month of April, 1863.

-

Present for duty.

Aggregate
present.

Present and
absent.

OOKMAXDB.

1

•

1

Thibxkknth Asm Cobps— Major-Oen.

J. A. HcClernand

9th Div., Brig.-Gen. P. J. Osterbaas.
lOtli Div., BrifiT.-Gen. A. J. Smith . . .
12th Div., Brig.-Gen. A P. Hovey . . .
14th Div., I^ig.-Gen. E. A. Carr

11
195
2S6
293
209

• • • « ■ •

4,024
8,928
6,565
8,796

11
6,182
6.621
7,016
4,662

14
8.583
9,568
8,269
6,224

• •

12
12

26
12

Total Thirteenth Army Corps . . .

938

17,312

24,891

32,648

62

FlFTBXMTH Abmt OoBPfl^Xajof-Gton.

W. T. Sherman

11th Div., Major-Qen. Freil. Steele. ..
6th Div., Maj.-Gen. V. P. Bhiir, Jr...
etb Div., Brig.-Gen. J. M. Tuttle

6

889
S15
233

6,787
6,631
8,764

6
8,819
6,916
8,997

8

11,272

10,001

6,135

• •

10

18

8

Total Fifteenth Army Oorp.^

893

16,082

19,238

27,416

86

SSTXHTBBNTH ABMT GOBPS — HajOT-

Gen. J. B. MgPhebson

9
362
244
293

'6,186
8,959
4,846

9
7,076
4,582
5,815

11
9,160
5,829
8,164

3d Div., Major-Gen. J. A. Logan

6th Div., Brig.-Gen. J. McArthar. . . .
7th Div., Brig.-Gen. J. F. Qoinby , . .

24

16
20

Total Seventeenth Army Oorpe . .

908

14,940

17,482

23,164

60

Aggr^rate of troops near Y icksbnrg.

»,734:

47,334:

01,111

83,818

158

District of Easterk Arkansas— Ma-
jor-Gen. B. M. Pbbntiss

13th Div., Brig.-Gen. L. P. Ross

2d Cavalzy Div., Col. Cyrus Bussey..
Detachments , .

'"its

189
27

• • • ■ • •

8,602

8,094

310

• • • • • ■

4,731

4,721

400

•■••••

6,574

5,910

684

• •

6
12

Total District Eastern Arkansas .

394:

o,vOo

9,85a

1»,068

18

SiXTEXNTH Abmt Corps— Major-Gen.
S. A. Hytrlbft

9
483
679
866
320
297
892
153
62

29

7,530
12,168
6,466
6,824
4,939
6,990
2,827
1,186

88
9,427
16.484
8,227
7,002
7,614
9,026
3,873
1,288

88

11,312
17,970
9,8 7
8,850
8,691
10,200
4,628
1,543

Ist Div., Brig.-Gen. W. S. Smith ....
Dist.of Oorinth,Brig.-Gen. G.M.Dodge

8d Div., Bng.-Gen. N. Kimball

4th Div.. Brig.-Gten. J. G. Lanman ..
Dist. of Memphis, Bg.-Gen.J,C.Veatch
Dist. of ColumbniB, l^.-Gen. A. Asboth
1st Ca V. Div. , Bg. -Gen . C. C. Washbnm
Engineer Detachments

7

• •

18
22

• •

118

• •

Total Sixteenth Army Corpn—
(Tennessee and Kentucky) ....

S,700

47,939

61,9^9

79,369

254

THE MISSI3SIPPL

BECAFITULATION.

For duty.

PMflent

Pment
•ndabeent.

Neur 'VlckslniTg

60,068

7,800

60,669

9.ffi8
61.989

88,218

Diatrict of Eastern Arkuinw

18,068
78,669

In Tenne«ee and Kentucky

JlCgregsto in tlie Depeitment

108,097

13S,81Ki

167,855

KOTB.— The nbore ilgnres are taken from the monthly retam for the month of
April, 1868. The tri-monthly return for April 80, 1868, givee substantially the
■ame figures for totAls in the Department, hut different figures for the three corps
near VUduhurg, as follows :

ISth Corps 18,628

16th Corps 17,210

17th Corps 18,898

Total 54,886

In the War Beoords Oflloe the monthly return is generally adopted, in cases
of discrepancy, as being the more accurate. I have therefore used the figures of
that return in tlie test.

APPENDIX R

ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA,

CoMiiANDED BY Lieut.-Genebaii J. 0. PEMBERTON,

FOB THE MONTH OF ApHIL, 1863.

FIRST MHilTARY DISTRICT, Brig.-Gen. D. RUGGLES.

(Headquarters at Columbns, Miss.)

RIoe^K Tennessee Heavy Artillery. Gillelyn's Mimisaippi Cavalry.

Thrairs Arkansa^t Light Artillery. Martinis Cavalry Company.

Owen^B Arkansas Light Artillery. Johnson^s Cavalry Company.

ISth Alabama Rangers. 2d TenneHsee Cavalry.

8d Miasisxippi State Troops. Warren^s Partisan Bangers.
6th Mississippi State Troops.

SECOND MILITARY DISTRICT, Maj.-Gen. C. L. STEVENSON.

(Headquarters at Yicksborg, Miss.)

STEVENSON'S DIVISION (Majob-Gbn. C. L. STEVENSON).

Flt^8t Brigade (Babton). Sooond Brigade (Tbaoy). . T&ird Brigade (Tatlob).

40th Georgia. SOth Alabama. 84th Georgia.

4l8t Georgia. S3d Alabama. 86th Georgia.

42d Georgia. SOth Alabama. 8»th Georgia.

48d Georgia. 81st Alabama. 66th Gvorgia.

S2d Georgia. 46th Alabama. 67tb Ger.>rgia.

43cl Texmessee.

Fouf^ Brigade (Betnolds). Artillery.

8d Tcnnesfsee. Waddell^s Light Battery.

Slst Tenn?«see. Cherokee Light Battery.

69tb Tennessee. Botetourt Light Battery.

8d Maryland. Battery.
Vandyke^s Cavalry.

356

THB MTSftlSftTPPL

BMrrH*8 DIVISION (Maios-Gsm. H. L. SMITH).
Fkm Brigade (BkU>WT»), StoonA BrU/ode (Vaughh). Third Brigade (8. D. Lex).

nth LoateUma.

Slrt LoaisUuiA.

4th MimilMdppi.

46th ICiMQMippL

Co. B, MiuiiiiJppi Lt Art.

Smith's Plutinn Bftogen.

79th TeiuM

80th Teaneawe.

SlrtTennemee.

Co. A, Ward's Artillery.

Co. B, Ward^s Artillery.

Co. I, Wither's Artillery.

9Gth Loaidana.

STth Loaisiaua.

88th Lonisiaiia.

iRt £iOui»iana Heavy ArL

8th Loaiaiana U^vy Art.

S8d Louisiana Heavy Art.

lat Tennessee Heavy Art.

FORNEY'S DIVISION (Hajob-

Firai Brigade (HnnT).

2d Lonisiana.
86th Biiseissippi.
87th MiBsissippL
88th liiBfiiflRippL
43d liissLwippi.
Hork's Battery.
Bengstak'fl Battery.
McNally's Batteiy.
Adam*8 Cavalry.

Our. J. H. FOBNEY).

Second Brigade (Moobk).

dd Texas.
86th Mississippi.
40th MississippL
87th Alabama.
4ad Alabama.
Bledsoe's Battery.
Tobin*s Battery.

(Bmio.-Onr. J. S. BOWEN).

Second Brigade (Gbskk).

1st Missouri Cavalry, dismoonted.

8d Missouri Cavalry^ dismounted.

18th Arkansas.

16th Arkansas.

Ittth Arkansas.

aOth Arkansas.

1st Arkansas Oavaby.

Western Bangers.

I>>we*s Battoy.

Dawson's Battwy.

LOEING'S DIVISION (Majob-Gsx. W. W. LOBING).

Firet Brigade (Tilohman). Second Brigade (FRATHxaaxoN).

aOth MisslBsippL WanPs Legion.

83d Mississippi. Pioneer Company.

96th MiBsiflsippi. Point Couple Battery.

64th Alabama. lat Tennessee Cavalry.
8th Kentucky.
McLendon's Battery.

BOWEN'S DIVISION

F^et Brigade (Cocxbbzx).

1st Missouri. •
adMissourU
8d Missouri.
4th Missouri*
6th Missouri.
0th Missouri.
Wade's Battery.
Landis's Battny.
Guiber's Battery.

THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT, Haj.-6en.

FirH Brigade (Mazet).

42d Tennessee.
. 46th Tennessee.
48th Tennessee.
49ch Tennessee.
63d Tennessee.
66th Tennessee.
4th Louisiana.
80th Louisiana.
Texas Sharpshooters.
Fenner's Biittery.
Uobert's Battery.

Second Brigade (Bsall).

llth Arkansas.
12th Arkansaa.
14th Arkansas.
16th Arkansas.
16th Arkansas.
17th Arkansas.
18th Arkannas.
88d Arkansas.
Ist MississippL
89th BlississippL
8 Go's. 1st Miss. Art

FRANK GARDNER
Third Brigcude (Gubgo).

8d Tennessee.
10th Tennesaee.
aOth Tennessee.
41st Tennessee.
60th Tennessee.
61st Tennessee.
7th Texas.

1st Tennessee Battery.
1st Missouri Battery.
9th Louisiana Battray.
Brook Haven Batteiy.

APPENDIX F.

267

Fourth Brigade (Rust).

9th ArkRUBM.
12th Lonisiana.
15th MisRisBippl
6th MiasiBRippi.
%th Alabama,
let Gonf . Battery.
Hadaon^s Battery.
Point Goap6e Artillery.

Fifth Brigade (Buford).

8d Kentncky.
7th Kentucky.
10th Arkansas.
4th Alabama.
97th Alabama.
49th Alabama.
6th Alabama.
Watson Battery.

Unattached.

Ist Alabama Artillery.
12th Louisiana Battery.
9th Tennessee Cavalry.
9th Lonisiana Cavalry.
Gantt^B Cavalry.
G^land^B Cavalry.
Miller^B Cavalry.

FOURTH MILITARY DISTRICT, Briq.-Gbn. JOHN ADAMS.

8d BrifT. Hiss. State Troops.
14th Mississippi.
Ist Choctaw Indians.

Ist MissisBippi State Troops.
Bolen^R Cavalry Company.
Terry^B Cavalry Company.

FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT, Bkig.-Gen. J. R. CHALMERS.

1st Mississippi Bangers. 18th Mississippi Rangers.

Blythe^s Battalion. Martin's Battalion.

Six companies State Troops.

Abttraetfrom Return^ thawing strength of Troops above namedjfor the

month of March^ 1863.

OomcAMss.

first Military District (Baggies). .

Second Military District-
Stevenson's Division

Smith's Division

Forney's Division

Bowen's Division

Loring'4 DiviHion

Third Military District (Gardner).

Fourth Military District (AdMms).

Fifth Military District (Chalmers)

Total

Present

for Duty.

r

f

i

1

o

S

H

lea

1,809

2,262

681

9,795

18,268

402

4.666

7,112

843

8,660

6,264

8f«

4,160

6.499

405

4,788

6,241

1,966

14,931

80,888

53

878

5:i5

83

780

986
61,496

8,878

44,961

'I

as

I

8,081

16,708
9,166
8,409
6,964
8,880

26,': 28

980

1,472

82,818

APPENDIX G.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL GRANT
AND GENERAL BANKS RELATIVE TO THE CO-
OPERATION OF THEIR ARMIES.

No. 1.
Banks to Grakt.

Batov Rougk, March IS, 1888.
(Beodvod Maich 20th.)

Anticipating the racoMS of Admiral Farragnf a proposed attempt to run the
enemy^s batteries at Fort Hadson and to open oommnnication with yon, I will
avail myself of the oppartnnlty to give yon a statement of oar position, fOToes,
and intentions.

We have at Baton Bonge a force of about 17,000 effective infantry, and one
n^:ro rc^^ent ; one regiment of heavy artiilery with tdz light batteries, one 20-
ponnder battery, a dismounted c(mipany of artiUeiy, and ten companies of cav-
alry, of which eight are newly raised and hardly to be counted on. Of thiis three
regiments of infantry, the heavy artillery manning the mege train, the dismounted
artillery, and one company of cavalryf will remain at Baton Bouge. Leaving this
force to hold the position of Baton Bouge, we march to-day upon Port Hadson by
the Bayou Sara road to make a demonstration upon ttiat work for the purpose of
co-operating in the movement of the fleet. The best information we have of the
enemy's force places it at 25,000 or 80,000 ; this and his position precludes the
idea of an assault on our part, and accordingly the main object of the present
movement Is a diversion in favor of the navy, but we shall, of course, avail oar*
selves of any advantage which occasion may offer.

Should the Admiral succeed in his attempt, I shall try to open communication
with him on the other side of f^e river, and in that event trust I shall hear from
yon as to your pooltion and movements, and especially as to your views of the
most efficient mode of oo-operation upon the part of the forces we reepectively
command.

No. a

Gbant to Banes.

Bsroia: Vioksbubg, Miss., March 23, 1863.
(Beceived at Opelousas, April 2l8t.)
Tour oommnnication of the 13th instant, per Admiral Farragat, was duly re-
ceived. The continuous high water and the nature of the country, ahnoet pE»*

APPENDIX 6. 269

dudlnf? the possibiUty of landing a force on the east bank of the Miuissippl any-
where above Vicksburg haa induced the hope that yon woald be able to take Port
Hudson and move np to Black River. By the use of yonr transports I oonld send
you all the force yon would require. . . .

The best aid you can give, if you cannot pass Fort Hudson, will be to hold as
many of tho enemy there as ponsible. If they could be sent I could well spare one
army corps to enable you to get up the river. My effective force, including all
arms, will be between 60,000 and 70,000, if I bring all from Memphis that can be
spared in an emergency. An attack on Haines^ Bluff cannot possibly take place
under two weeks, if so soon. My forces are now scattered, and the difficulty of
getting transportation is very great.

No. 8.
Gbant to Farbaqut.

March 38, 1863.
(Beoeived by Banks April 81st.)

In the various notes I hare written. Including the despatch for General Banks,
I have not mentioned that soon after taking command there in person I collected
my surplus troops at Lake Providence, and directed the commanding officer to
effect a passage through from the Mississippi Biver to Bayou Macon. This will
give navigable water through by that route to the Bed Biver. This is now re-
ported practicable for ordinary Ohio Biver steamers. I sent several weeks ago
for this class of steamers, and expected them before this. Should they arrive,
and Admiral Porter gets his boats out of the Yazoo, so as to accompany the expe-
dition, I can send a force of say, 20,000 effective men, to co-operate with General
Banks on Port Hudson.

This force certainly would easily reduce Port Hudson and enable them to come
on up the river and maintain a position on high land near enough to Yicksburg,
until they could be reinforced from here sufficiently to operate against the city.

Please inform the General of the contents of this, and much oblige your obedient
servant.

Na4.
Banks to Gbant.

Camp at Brashbab CiTr, La., April 10, 1868.
(Becelved at Port Gibson, May S.)

The seoretary of Admiral Farragut, Mr. Gabaudan, called upon me at Broshear
City this morning and gave me the substance of your despatch. We have 16,000
men that can be moved with facility. The artillery is strong, the cavalry weak,
but we hope to strengthen the cavalry without delay, as one of the results of this
expedition.

We shall move upon the Bayou Teche to-morrow, probably encounter the en-
emy at Pattersonville, and hope to move without delay upon Iberia, to destroy the
salt- works, and then upon Opelonsas. This is the limit proposed. We do not in-
tend to hold any portions of this country, as it weakens our force, but will at once

aao THB MTaaiflflTFPL

ratarn to Baton Bonpo to oo-t^erato with yoo agniiMt Port Hadaon. I can bo
there Miaily by Hay 10th.

There an now 4,500 infh&trj at Baton Booga, with three reKimenta of colored
troopa and two oompanies of cavalry, three batterioe of artillery, with eeveral
heary gnna in poaition, and five gnnboata and aix mortars. The land forra is
under command of Major-Oeaeral Augnr ; the fleet nnder Captain Alden, of the
Richmond.

We ahall endeaTor to establish oommnaication with Admiral Farragut near
Bayon Sara, hot the opening of the levee opposite Port Hudson may make it im-
possible. If so, we will oommnnicate with yoa freely, by the way of New York,
as to our progress. I shall be very glad if yon will oommnnicate with ns in the
name manner. To avoid delays by mail, I will send my despatches by an officer.

Na6i
Banks to Grant.

QrsLOVBiB, La., April 88, 1868
(Beceived about May 10th.)

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches, dated at head-
quarters, before Vicksbnrg, March 23, 1863» on the 21st, by the hand of Lieuten-
ant Tenney, of General Augur's division at Baton Rouge. On April 10th, Mr. Ga-
bandan, private secretary of Admiral Farragut, commanding the Hartford at the
month of Bed River, reported at my headquarten^ at Brashear, and gave me ver-
bally the substance of your despatches, which he said he had read, but did not
bring with him in the dangerous paomge whidi he was compelled to make of the
batteries of Port Hudson.

The information received firom Mr. €kibandan diffars somewhat from yomr
despatches. I understand from him that it was your intention to send a force by
the way of Lake Providence and the Black River, passing through the interme-
diate bayous to the mouth of the Black River, <m the Bed Rtver, and that this
fcMtse would probably reach the Red River by May Ist^ proximo, to co-operate
with my command against Port Hudson. . . .

I was disappointed in learning, from the perusal of your despatches, that at
tiieir date it was undetermined whether you can send a force to the Red Biver or
not, on soconnt of the deficiency of your tran^ortation. It is a grief on my part
that I cannot aid you in this respect. Our transportation is lamentably deficient
I had but one steamer with which to pass two divisions of my corps over Ber-
wick''s Bay In this campaign. The route is open, but I can reach Red Biver only
by forced marches. It is sbc days* march to Alezandriai and four or five to Sims*
port, at the mouth of the Atchafalaya, but until we can hear from yon I shall
make Washington, on the Gonrtablean, my base of operations.

We can co-operate with you in any manner you suggest by a junction on ttie
Red River, or by an attack from Baton Boogeii joining your forces on the Bayou
Sara, in the rear of Port Hudson. K7 belief is that this is the best method, as
the passage of the Mississippi from the Red River is very difficult with our short
transportation, and will require a landing, and {daces us between the armies cl

APPENDIX G. 261

VIckAbttrg And Port Hudson : bnt we shall not hesitate. I wait anxiounly bo hear
fiom yon upon these point!), viz.:

First. — ^When can yon be at the mouth of the Black or Red River f

Senond. — In what manner shall my forces co-operate with yon ?

Ti.ird.—Ca,n yon fnmlsh transportation for your passage to Port Hudson; or
do you rely upon us ?

Fourth.— Caja you supply your troops ; or will you rely upon ust

Fifth. — Is it not practicable for your force to join us by the Atchafalaya ?

It is doubtful if we can supply your forces from New Orleans in operating above
Port Hudson, on account of our deficient transportation. My belief is that the
bfrit junction is by the Atchafalaya. We can reach Baton Rouge b^ the Grand
River and the Plaqnemiue without transshipment, and our forces united, make the
reduction of Port Hudson certain. My own command is insufficient.

Waiting anxiously your response, and with fall confidence in your judgment and
eameit co-operation, I am, very truly yours.

No. 7.

Grant to Banks.

MiLLiKEN^s Bekp, April 14, 1868.
(Received at Alexuidria May 5th.)
Am concentrating my forces at Grand Gulf. Will send an army corps to
Bayou Sara by the 35th to co-operate with yon on Port Hudson. Can you aid me
and send troops after the reduction of Port Hudson to assist me at Vicksburg ?

No. 8.
Banks to Gbant.

Alexirdria, May 6, 1868.
(Received about May 10th.)
By the 96th, probably ; by the Ist, certainly, I will be there.

No. 9.
Grant to Banks.

RocET Springs, Miss., May 10, 1868.
(Received at Alexandria May 12tb.)

My advance will occupy to-day Utica, Auburn, and a point equally advanced
toward the Mississippi Southern Railroad, between the latter place and the Big
Black. It was my intention, on gaining a foothold at Grand Gulf, to have sent a
sufficient force to Port Hudson to liave ensured the fall of that place with your co-
operation, or, rather, to have co-operated with you to secure that end.

Meeting the enemy, however, as I did, south of Port Gibson, I followed him to
the Big Black, and could not afford to retrace my steps. I also learned, and be-
lieve the Information to be reliable, that Port Hudson is almost entirely evac-
nated. This may not be true, but it is the concurrent testimony of deserters and
oontrabanda

263 THE MTSaiaSTPPL

Ifany days amnot elapM before the battle will begin which Ib to decide the flste
of Viokuboiv, but it ie impoasible to predict how long it maj last. I would ur-
gently request, therefore, that you join me, or aend all the force yon can spare to
co-operate in the great etmi^le for opening the Misfriseippi River.

My means of gaming information from Port Hndaon are not good, but I shall
hope, even before this reaches Baton Bouge, to hear of yonr forces being on the
way here.

Grierson^s cavalry wonld be of immense service to me now, and, if at all practi-
oable fnr him to join me. I wonld like to have him do it at once.

For fear of thin aooldentally falling into the hands of the enemy I will not com-
municate to yon my foroei

Ko. 10.
Banks to Grant.

Alkxaitdbia, La., Hay IS, 18fi8~8 a.ic.
(Beceived abont May 16th.)

Tour despatch of the 10th instant I received by the band of Captain Elfers, this
morning at 6.80. I r^ret to say that it is impossible for me to join yon at Yicks-
bnig in time, or with force to be of service to yon in any immediate attack. I
have neither water nor land transportation to make the movement by river or by
land. The utmost I can nccotnplish is to crou for the purpose of opemtiug with
yon against Port Hudson. I could cross my infantry and artillery without trans,
portation. receiving supplies from Baton Bonge, in the rear of Port Hudson.
That is the utmost I can accomplish on the other side of the Mississippi, above
Port Hudson. Were it within the range of human power I should join yon. for I
am dying with a kind of vanishing hope to see two armies acting together against
the strong places of the enemy. But I roust say, without qnalificatione, that the
means at my disposal do not leave me a shadow of a chance to accomplish it. I
have been making preparations to join your corps at Bayou Sara, and though
this wonld have laid all my trains and supplies open to the enemy^s cavalry, I
thould have risked it.

We believe that a force of about 7,000 of the enemy has left Arkansas River to
join Kirby Smith at Shreveport, leaving the Washita at Pine Bluff, near Monroe;
then to come down the Bed River to Grand Ecore, above Natchitoches, where
they are fortifying in strong position. There is undoubtedly a Texan column on
the road to join them. My advance is now sixty miles above Alexandria. The
only course for me, failing in co-operation with you, is to regain the Mississippi
and attack Port Hndson, or to move againi^t the enemy at Shreveport. Port Hud-
son is reduced in force, but not as yon are informed. It has now 10,000 men and
is very strongly fortified. This is the report of Admiral Farragut, whose fleet is
above and below the works.

I r^ret very much my inability to join you. I have written Colonel Grlerson
that you desire him to join yon, and have added my own request to yonrs. Cap-
tain Effers goes to Baton Rouge to communicate with him.

Wishing you all possible success, and feeling that you have all the prayers of our
people, I have the honor to be, with sincere respect, yonr obedient servant.

APPENDIX H.

UNION LOSSES IN THE VIOKSBUBG CAMPAIGN.

Th> statements of losses in the foregoing pages are invariably taken from the
official reports made at the time. Since these pages were sent to prev the
following statement of Union losses in the Vicksborg campaign has been com-
piled with great care in the Adjntant-General^s office. The numbers differ very
slightly from those given in the text, bat as they form the final official statement
in the matter they are here published.

Port Gibson, May Ist

Raymond, May 12th

Jackson, May 14th

Champion's Sill, May 16th

Big Black Bridge, May I7th

Skirmishes at Vicksburg, May 18th,

8Uth, and 21st

Assault of Vicksbnrg, May 19th . . . .

Assault of Vicksbnrg, May 29d

Siege of V ickxbnrg

Varions skirmishes

Total

Killed.

Wounded.

Missing.

181

719

26

66

889

87

42

851

7

410

1,844

187

89

887

8

46

194

2

157

777

8

601

2,651

147

100

419

7

SO

66

80

1.S11

7,896

468

Total.

875
449
8U0
2,441
279

241

942

8,199

626

116

9,S60

I]S'DEX.

KoTB. — Hegiments, IxUteries^ etc.^ are indexed under the names of
their States^ eiccepting batteries called by their captain's or by some
other special name. These are indexed under Battebies.

Abbeville, liiss., 58, 63
Adams, Brig. -Gen. D. W., brigade

of, 123
Albatross, the, 212, 215 et seq., 218
Alden, Comdr. James, 215
Alexandria, La., 199, 313, 220, 224,

230 et seq.
Allen, CoL Robert, 73
Antietam, 54
Appomattox, 2, 109
Arizona, the, 220
Arkansas Post, 83 et seq.
Arkansas, the, 23 et seq.
Armstrong, Brig. -Gen. F. C, 37,

45
Atlanta, Ga., 3, 31, 120
Anbnm, Miss., 141, 144, 148, 151,

152
Augnr, Maj.-Gen. C. C, 210, 214,

219, 223, 225, 228
Autry, C!oL J. L., 20

Bache, Lient. 6. M., 84
Baldwin, Brig.-Gren.W. E., brigade
of, 126 et seq., 133, 162, 177
VIIL— 13

Baldwin's Perry, 145, 166, 169,
176, 178, 180 et seq., 197

Baldwyn, Miss., 43 et seq.

Banks, Maj.-Gen. N. P., 82 ^t seq.,
96, 107, 119, ia5, 139, 140, 173,
187, 309 et seq., 218 et seq.;
Port Hudson surrenders to,
230 et seq.

Barton, Brig. -Gen. S. M., brigade
of, 132, 156 et seq., 161, 176

Baton Bonge, La., 19, 21, 23 etseq. ,
25 et seq., 36, 44, 83, 121, 139,
209et seq., 214, 219, 221 etseq.

Batteries : De Golyer's, 142 ; Phil-
lips', 48, 51; Powell's, 48 et
seq. ; Bobinett's, 48 et seq. ;
Williams', 48

Baxter Bayou, 97

BeaU, Brig. -Gen. W. N. R, 63, 227

Beauregard, Gen. G. T., 10; asks
for reinforcements, 11, 13, 20,
29 et seq., 32 et seq., 136

Beauregard, the, 15 et seq.

Benton, Brig.-Gen. W. P., brigade
of, 128, 180 et seq.

266

IKDEX.

Benton, Mim., IM, 19^ 192 et aeq.

Benton, the, 8, 15 et Mq., 18, 113,
123etieq.

Berwick, La., 213

Big Bbok River, 109, 183, 199,
132 et Boq., 139 et leq., 150,
161 et eeq., 166, 170, 178, 180,
186 et seq., 192 et leq.

Birdsong's Ferxy, 198 et eeq.

Bird's Point, 5

Bieland, Fort, 218, 219 et seq.

Bladk Bayou, 103 et leq.

Black Hawk, the, 84

Blair, Maj.-Gim. F. P., Jr., divi-
sion of, 4, 78 et seq., 136,
188, 148, 151 et seq., 154 et
•eq., 158, 160, 165, 169 ; at the
siege of Vioksborg, 118, 183,
185 et seq., 192

Bolivar, Tenn., 34, 36, 88, 43 et
seq., 52 et seq., 56, 71

Bolton, Miss., 141, 148, 152, 154
et seq., 163, 194

Boomer, Col G. B., kUled, 184

Bovina Station, Miss., 145, 149,
161 et seq., 165, 167

Bow^ Maj.-Gen. J. S., 48 et seq.,
118 et seq., 122, 126 et seq.,
183, 145 et seq., 150 et seq.,
155, 157 et seq., 166 ; at Vicks-
bnrg, 176 et seq., 184, 203 et
seq.

Bowling Green, Ky., 10, 13

Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 2, 13, 19, 21,
33 et eeq., 37 et Req., 44 et
seq., 53 et seq., 62, 66 et seq.,
100, 120, 136, 144, 173, 188,
190 et seq.

Bragg, the, 15 et seq.

Brandon Station, Miss., 196

Brashear City, La., 213, 219 et
seq., 22i, 228, 231, 283

Breckenridge, Maj.-Gren. J. C,

corps of, 21, 24 et seq., 43 et

seq., 190, 193, 195
Breese, Lieut-Comdr. E. R., 84
Bridgeport, 163, 165 et seq., 194
Brown, Lieat. -Comdr. Geo., Ill
Brownaville, Ark., 88, 152, 167,

194
Bminsbarg, Misa, 81, 125 et seq.,

130, 132, 135, 187, 222
Bnell, Maj.-Gen. D. C, 13, 29, 83

et seq., 37 et seq., 4.3, 45, .54 ;

superseded by Rosecrans, 55,

107
Buford, Brig. -Gen. A., 119, 12S;

158,227
Ball Ron, 2

Borbridge, Brig. -Gen. 8. G., bri-
gade of, 129, 181
Bnmsida, Maj.-Gen. A. B., 107,

188
BumsviUe, Miss., 39
BuUer, Geli. B. F., 18 et seq., 8^

209
Butte-a-la-RoM, La., 213, 220

Cabell, Brig. -Gen. W. L., brigade

of, 50 et seq.
Cairo, IlL, 5 et seq., 11 et seq., 14,

18,27,29,60,78,81,237
Cairo, the, 8, 15
Caldwell, Comdr. C. H. B,, 215
Camp Mootcl See Moore, Clonp.
Canton, Miss., 147, 152, 187 et aeq.,

193,105
Carondelet, the, 8, 15, 17 et seq.,

113,123
Carr, Brig. -Gen. E. A., division o^

125, 127 et seq., 152, 155, 159

et seq., 163 et seq., 169, 180,

185
Cayuga, Miss., 141

INDEX.

267

Chalmors, Brig. -Gen. J. R., 130 et

seq.
Champion, plantation of, 154 et

seq.
Champion^B Hill, MIrs., 158 et seq.,

162, 166, 170, 186, 207
Chancellorsville, Va., 108, 137
Chattanooga, Tenn., 2, 11, 29 et

«eq., S3 et aeq., 66 et seq., 75,

109, 118 et seq., 177, 190, 207

(note), 237
Chewalla, Tenn., 43, 45, 47, 52
Ghickamauga, Tenn., 207 (note),

287
Chickasaw Bay on, Miss., 138, 177
Chickasaw Blnffs, Miss., 71 et seq.,

76
Churchill, Gen. T. J., 84, 87
Cincinnati, O., 8, 31, 88
Cincinnati, the, 8, 14, 84, 197
Clark, Brig.-Gen. Charles, 27
Clifton, Tenn., 67 et seq.
Clifton, the, 220
Clinton, La., 230
Clinton, Miss., 144, 146, 148 et seq.,

171, 196
Cockrell, CoL F. M., brigade of,

128etseq.,157, 168, 184
College Hill, Miss., 63, 66
Columbia, Tenn., 67, ICO
Columbus, Ky., 6 et seq., 10 et

seq., 13, 27, 32, 34, 55, 61, 68,

66 et seq., 70, 72,91
Columbus, Miss., 120, 122, 127
Comstock, Capt. C. B., 186
Conestoga, the, 9, 17

Cooke, Lieut. -Comdr. A. P., 220
Corinth, Miss., 11, 13, 20, 28 et
seq., 55 et seq., 61 et seq., 64,

67 et seq., 72, 81, 100, 107
Crocker, Brig.-Gen. M M, brigade

of, 47, 132 et seq., 142 et seq..

147 et seq., 156, 158 et seq.,
167 (note)
Crum's Mill, Miss., 52
Crystal Springs, Miss., 150
Cumberland Gap, Tenn., 80
Cumming, Brig. -Gen. Alfred, bri-
gade of, 156 et seq., 176
Curtis, Fort, Ark., 234
Curtis, Maj.-Gen. S. R., 17 et seq.,
SO, 35, 56, 61, 64, 88, 235

Davies, Brig.-Gen. T. A., diviflion

of, 46 et seq.
Davis, Commodore C. H., 14 et

seq. ; Memphis surrenders to,

17 et seq., 23 et seq.
Davis, Jefferson, 4, 63, 66 ft seq.,

99, 137, 144 et seq., 172 «t seq.,

206 (note)
Davis' MiUs, Miss., 52, 71
Decatur, Ala., 36
De Courcy, Col. J. F., bii|;ade of,

78 et seq., 86 et seq.
De Golyer, Capt S., battery of, 142
De Kalb, the, 84
Demopolis, Ala., 206
Dennis, Brig.-Gren. B. S., brigade

of, 142 et seq.
De Russy, Fort, La., 213
Des AUemaods, Bayou, La., 232 et

seq.
De Shroon, plantation of, 125
De Soto, La., 95
DeSoto, the,lll,214
Dodge, Brig.-(^n. G. M., 65, 68 et

seq.
Donaldsonville, La., 219, 281 et

seq.
Donelson, Fort, 10, 18 et seq., 19,

109 et seq.
Dresden, Tenn., 68
Duckport, La., 109, 118, 115

268

OBEX.

Dwight, Brig-Gen. Wsl, 2S8 efe
■eq.

Bads, Gapt. J. R, 8

Ector, Brig.-Gen. M. D., brigade

of, 190
Edward's Station, Mias., 119, 122,

126, 1S2, 136, 140 et seq., 148

et Boq., 166, 171, 198
EUet. CoL CSiaa., 9, 15, 17, 110 et

Boq.
EUet, Biig.-Gen. Alfred W., 9, 84,

113, 118, 199
EUi8ton*8 plantation, 151, 155
Bmoiy, Brig..Gen. W. H., 210, 313

et seq., 219, 225, 228, 233
Bnterpriae, Miss., 206
Biuex, the, 8, 26, 215, 218
Estrella, the, 220
Eranii, Brig.-Gen. N. G., brigade

of, 190
Swing, Brig. -Gen. Hogh, brigade

of, 98, 179

Fagah, Maj.-Gen. J. F., brigade

of, 234 et seq.
Fazngat, Admiral D. G., 18 et

seq.; report of, 21 et seq., 28,

112 et seq., 180, 211, 214 et

seq., 218, 220 et aeq.
Featherston, Brig.-Gren. W. S.,

brigade of, 158
Fitch, Col. G. N., 17
Fontune, Col. Edw., 19
^ Foote, Commodore A. H., 10, 12,

14
Force, Gen. M. F., 29
Forney, Maj.-Gen. J. H., dirision

of, 150, 165, 176, 185, 203, 206

(note)
Forrest, Gen. K. B., 66 et seq., 74,

237

Forest Queen, the, 83, 113
Fort Bialand See Bisland, Fort.
Fort Cnrtis. See Curtis, Fort.
Fort De Bussy. See De Bnssy,

Fort
Fort Donelson. See Donelson,

Fort
Fort Henry. See Henry, Fort.
Fort Hill. See Hill, Fort
Fort Hindman. See Hindman,

Fort
Fort Pemberton. See Pemberioo ,

Fort
Fort Pillow. See Pillow, Port.
Fort Bandolph. See Randolph,

Fort
Fort Sumter. See Sumter, Fort
Franklin, La., 219
Fredericksburg, Va., 108
Fremont, Gren. J. C, 5 et seq., 8,

107
French, Maj.-Gren. S. G., division

of, 190, 193, 195
Fulton, Miss., 39, 41 et seq.

Gabauban, Mr. E. A., secretary

to Farragnt, 221 et seq.
Gaines' Mill, Va., 137
Galveston, Tex., 210 et seq.
Gardner, Maj.-Gen. Frank, 117,

227 et seq., 230
Grarrard, Brig.-Cren. T. T., brigade

of, 128
Genesee, the, 215, 217
Georgetown, Miss., 121
Gettysburg, Pa., 208
Girardeau, Cape, Mo., 5 et seq.
Gist, Brig. -Gen. S. R, brigade oi^

135, 146, 190
Glass* Bayou, 175 et seq., 183
GUde, the, 84
Goldsboro', N. C, 2

INDEX.

269

Gorman, Biig.-Gren. W. A., 97

Grand Golf, Miss., 21. 23, 28, 106

et seq., 109 et seq., 121 etseq.,

138, 141, 148, 170, 178, 187,

220,224

Grand Janction, Tenn., 43, 56, 61,

63, 70 et seq.
Grant, Maj.-Gen. U. S., Set seq.;
Fort Donelson sorienders to,
10, 13, 27; in command of
troops in the West, 34 et seq.,
88 et seq. , 51 , 53 ; takes the of-
fensive, 55 et seq. ; his (dans for
attackingVicksbiirg, 64 et seq. ;
his communicationB cat off, 70
etseq., 81 et seq.; his orders
to McGlemand, 88 et seq.; his
troops organized into four
army corps, 91 et seq.; he
abandons the canal project, 95;
goes to Lake Providence, 96 et
seq. ; abandons the Yazoo Pass
project, 101 et seq.; &bilure of
the fourth project, 106 et seq.,
113 et seq.; at Grand Gulf,
123 et seq.; strength of his
forces before Yicksburg, 136 et
■eq.; enters Jackson, 148 et
seq.; at Clinton, 152 et seq.,
161, 163, 167, 169 et seq. ; at the
siege of Vioksburg, 177 et seq.;
losses of, 185 et seq., 200;
treats with Pemberton, 204 et
seq., 220 et seq., 230, 237
Green, Brig.-G«n. Martin E., 49,
119, 122, 126 et seq., 158, 162,
184
Green, Brig.-Gren. Thos., brigade

of, 231 et seq.
GreenvUle, Miss., 110, 115
Greenwood, Miss., 100, 103
Greer, Iiieut.-Comdr. J. A., 123

Gregg, Brig. -Gen. John, brigade

of, 122, 142 et seq., 145 et seq.,

227
Grenada, Miss., 21, 56, 61 et seq.,

70 et seq., 74, 98 et seq., 119,

123,127
Grierson, Brig. -Gen. B. H., 120et

seq., 189, 228 (note), 230
Griffith, Sergt Joseph, 181
Grover, Brig. -Gen. C, 209 et seq.,

214, 219, 225, 228 et seq., 233

Hackleman, Brig. -Gen. P. A., 58
Haines* Bluff, Miss., 74 et seq., 80
et seq., 92, 94, 98 et seq., 106
et seq., 117, 123, 126, 138, 165,
169 et seq., 172, 187 et seq.,
193 et seq.
HaUeck, Maj.-Gen. H. W., 10, 12 ;
assumes command at Shiloh,
13 et seq., 20, 28 et seq., 81 et
seq. ; his lack of energy, 33 ;
made (aeneral-in-Chief, 84 et
seq., 38, 54 et seq. ; opposes
McClemand^s course, 61 et
seq., 72, 81 et seq., 88 et seq.,
139, 173, 187, 209, 219 (note),
220,223
Hall's Perry, Miss., 145, 187
Hamilton, Brig. -(Sen. C. S., di-
vision of, 40 et seq., 46 et seq.,
52, 55 et seq., 61, 210
Hankinaon's Ferry, Miss., 133 et

seq., 140 et seq., 192
Hardee, Lt.-Gen. W. J., 4 et seq.,

13,36
Hard Times, La., 116 et seq., 138
Harriet Lane, the, 211
Harris, Capt. D. B., 20
Hartford, the, 112, 215, 218, 222
Hart, Lieat.-Comdr. J. K, 215
Hatch, CoL Edward, 120 et seq.

270

INDEX.

Heberii Brig.-Gen. Lcmis, diTuion

of, 45, 49, 165, 177, 179, 184
Helfioa, Ark., 18, 3S, 88, 56, 61 et

■eq., 78, 88, 91, 94, 97 et aeq.,

234etBeq.
Hehn, Brig.-Gen. B. H., 27
Henzy Clay, the, 113 et seq.
Henry, Fort, 7, 10, 13, 29, 45, 68,

81
Herron, Maj.-Gen. F. J., 188 et

Beq., 237
HilU Fort, 168 et seq., 175 etaeq.,

197
Hill, Lt-Gen. A. P., 187
Hindman, Fort, 83 et seq.
Hoel, Lieut. W. R, 123
Holly Springe, Miss., 36 et seq. ,

42, 52, 56 etseq., 61 et seq., 70

et seq., 81
Holmes, Lieut. -Gen. T. H., 63, 284

etseq.
Hood, Lt.-Gen. J. B., 2
Hooker, liaj.-Gen. J. E., 107
Houston, Miss., 120
Hovey, Brig.-Gen. A. P., 62, 127

etseq., 152, 154 et seq., 166,

180 etseq.
Homboldt, Tenn. , 11, 43, 68 et seq.
Huntington, Tenn., 69
Hunts ville, Ala., 29
Hurlbut, Maj.-Gen. S. A., division

of, 34, 38, 43, 52, 55; given

command of 16th Army Corps,

91 et seq., 99, 117, 138, 170

(note), 187 et seq.

XllinOIS, regiments of : 6th Cav-
alry, 120 ; 77th Infantry, 181

Indiana, regiment of: 46th In-
fantry, 17

Indianola, the, 111 et seq.

IngerBoU, CoL Robert G., 68

Iowa, regiments of : 4th Infantry,
79; 2l8t Infantry, 18; 22d,
Infantry, 181
Island No. 10, 7, 11 et seq., 20
loka, Miss., 85 et seq., 107

Jacinto, Miss., 89 et seq.

Jaokson, Gen. W. H., 4, 37, 45, 187,
190, 195, 207

Jackson, Gov. C. F., 5

Jackson, Miss., 24, 27, 30, 36^ 58,
64, 67, 74, 81, 99, 118 et seq.,
122, 126et seq., 132, 135 etseq.,
140 et seq., 159, 167, 169 et
seq., 174 et seq., 178 et seq.,
190 et seq. , 208, 277 et seq.

Jackson, Tenn., 10,43 et seq., 51,
55, 62, 67 et seq., 70, 75

Jefferson City, Mo., 5

Johnson, plantation of, 75 et seq.,
177

Johnston, €ren. Albert Sydney, 12
etseq.

Johnston, Gen. J. R, 66 etseq.,
75, 100, 118 et seq., 187, 143
et seq., 159, 161, 165, 167 et
seq., 174 et seq., 177 et seq.,
186 et seq., 189 et seq. ; re-
treats to Jackson, 195 et seq.,
208,228,284

Johnston, Lieut. Amos, 215

Kimball, Brig.-Gen. N., 187 et

seq.
Eineo, the, 215, 217
Kaoxville, Tenn., 30, 83, 86

Lafayette, the, 118, 123
LaFourche, Bayou, La., 213, 230,

232 et seq.
La Grange, Tenn., 56, 99, 120 et

seq.

INDEX.

271

Lake, plantotJon of, 177

Lancaster, the, 15 et seq., 112

Landram, Brig.-Gren. W. J., bri-
gade of, 129, 181

Laoman, Brig.-Gren. J. G., division
of, 138, 187, 189

Lawler, Brig. -Gen. M. E., bri-
gade of, 180 et seq.

Leadbetter, Brig. -Gen. D., 80

Lee, Gen. Robert E., 2, 54, 187

Lee, Brig. -Gen. S. D., 79, 156, 176

Lee, Comdr. S. P., 19

Leggett, Brig.-Gren. M. D., bri-
gade of, 157, 180

Lentball, Naval Constmctor, 8

Lexington, Tenn., 67, 69

Lexington, the, 9, 17, 84

Lincoln, Pres. Abraham, 82, 59 et
seq., 65, 82, 89, 93, 107, 173,
200

Lindsey, Col. D. W., brigade of,
78,86

Little, Brig.-Gren. Henry, 40 et
seq. ; death of, 42, 45

Little Rebel, the, 15 et seq.

Little Rook, Ark., 17, 8S, 90, 234

Liverpool, Miss., 186, 188

Livingston, Miss., 167

Logan, Maj.-Gen. J. A., division
of, 91, 99, 115 et seq., 127, 130,
132 et seq., 142 et seq., 147,
' 156 et seq., 169, 180, 183, 185,
204 ; takes possession of Vicks-
bnrg, 205

Loring, Maj.-Gen. W. W., 100,
117, 181 et seq., 145, 149 et
seq., 155, 158 et seq., 166, 189
et seq., 192 et seq., 195, 207

Louisville, Ky., 10, 31, 84, 45, 54

LonisviUe, the, 8, 15, 18, 84, 118,
123

Lovell, Maj.-Gren. M., 18 et seq.;

superseded by Van Dom, 21,

80, 43 et seq., 51, 62
Lovell, the, 15 et seq.
Lowe, Brig. -Gen. W. W., 68
Lyon, Nathaniel, 4

McAbthur, Brig. -Gen. J., 47, 91,
96, 99, 136, 138, 148, 166; at
the siege of Vicksburg, 178 et
seq., 182 etseq., 193, 196

McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Geo. B., 32
et seq., 107

McGlemand, Maj.-Gen. John A.,
division of, 34, 58etseq., 66, 72
et neq., 80, 83 ; assumes com-
mand of Army of Mississippi,
83 et seq. , 86 et seq. ; Fort
Hindman surrendered to, 87
et seq. ; given command of
13th Army Corps, 91 etseq.,
99, 106, 110, 114 et seq., 118,
123, 125 et seq.; reinforced by
Stevenson, 130 et aeq., 188 et
seq., 152, 154 et seq., 159 et
seq. ; pursues the enemy, 163
et seq., 166, 109 ; at the siege
of Vicksburg, 178 et seq.; des-
patches from, 182 et seq. ;
blamed by Grant, 185 et seq. ,
189 ; relieved from command,
199 et seq.

McCown, Maj.-Gen. J. P., division
of, 66

McCullough, Brig. -Gen. H. R, 4

MoKean, Brig.-Gren. T. J., division
of, 46 etseq., 52

McKinstry, Capt J. P., 215

MoNair, Brig.-Gen. E., brigade of,
190

Macomb, Comdr. N. H., 215

Macon, Bayou, 97

Macon, Miss., 120

272

IKDBX.

MoPhenon, Maj.-Gfln. J. B., 51 et
■eq. , 56, 58, 61, 72 ; given com-
muid of 17ih Army Corps, 91
et aeq., 96 et seq., 109, 115 et
■eq., 127, 180, 132 et seq.; be-
fore Vicksboxg, 136 et eeq. ;
losses of, 148, 152, 154 et seq.,
159 ; pursues the enemy, 163 et
seq., 166 et seq., 169; at the
siege of Vicksburg, 180 et seq. ,
193. 200, 204

MaiDe, regiment of : 28th Infantry,
232

Magmder, Maj.-Gen. J. B., 211

Major, Col. J. P., 231 et seq.

HanasBaH, Va., 137

ICaps : Memphis to Inka, 35 ; Inka,
40 ; Corinth, 46 ; Memphis to
Yicksburg, 57 ; Chickasaw
Bluff, 76; Arkansas Post, 85 ;
Champion's Hill, 153 ; Opera-
tions in Louisiana, 212 ; Port
Hudson, 226; Helena, 235

Marmaduke, Maj.-Cren. J. S., divi-
sion of, 234 et seq.

Maury, Maj.-Gen. D. H., 40, 45,
47, 49 et seq., 75

Mazey, Brig. -Gen. S. B., brigade
of, 146, 190, 227

Mechanicsburg, Miss., 186, 188,
192

Meigs, Brig. -Gen. M. C, 8

Memphis, Tenn., 5 et seq , 9, 11,
13 et seq., 28 et seq., 31, 83 et
seq., 38, 43 et seq., 55 et seq.,
58 et seq., 71 et seq. , 80 et seq.,
89, 91 et seq., 96 et seq., 106,
108, 118, 120, 122, 138, 177, 187,
200

Meridian, Miss., 119 et seq., 127,
132, ITO, 196

Messenger's Ferry, Miss., 194

Michigan, 8th Battery, 148

Middleboxg, Temn., 71

Mimken's Bend, La., 73, 80, 8S,
89, 92, 101, 104, 109 et seq.,
186 etseq., 187, 109, 223, 231,
234

Miasissippi, the, 215, 217 et seq.

Missouri, regiments of: 6th In-
fantry, 79; 7th Infantry, 180;
8th Infantry, 104

Mitchel, Brig.-Gen. O. M., 29 et
seq., 33

Misner, Col. J. K., 71

Mobile, Ala., 13, 21, 31, 36, 81, 119,
210

Monarch, the, 15 et seq., 84

Monongahela, the, 215, 217

Monroe, La., 199, 231
I Montgomery, Ala., 120

Montgomery, Commodore J. E., 14

Moore, Brig.-Gen. J. C, brigade
of, 50, 176, 184

Moore, Camp, 24 et seq., 27, 230

Moore, Gov. T. O., 19

Morgan, Brig.-Gen. G. W., 80, 78,
77etseq., 83etseq., 89

Morton, Miss., 196

Mound City, the, 8, 14, 17 et seq.,
113,123

Mt. Albans Station, Misa, 161, 166

Mouton, Brig.-Cren. Alfred, bri-
gade of, 231 et seq.

Mower, Brig.-Gen. J. A., Imgade
of, 199

MuUen, Maj. J. D., 282

Murfreesboro', Tenn., 18

Murphy, CoL B. C, 70

Murphy, Lieut. J. M. L., 128

Napoleon, Ark., 89, 92
Nashville, Tenn., 10, 13, 31, 88, 37,
67

INDBX.

273

Natchez, Miss., 19, 21, 28, 111, 224
New Carthage, La., 106 et seq., 109

et Beq.
New Era, the, 111
New Madrid, Ma, 5 et seq., 11 et

seq*
New Orleans, La., 7, 9, 18 et seq.,

21, 24, 27, 44, 59 et seq., 82,

159, 195, 209 et seq., 214, 218

et seq.
Newton Station, Miss, 121 et seq.
New York, N. Y., 82, 209

Oglbsby, Brig. -Gen. B. J., 53

Okolona, Miss., 121 etseq.

Oneida, the, 19

Opelonsas, La., 213, 219 et seq.,
222 etseq., 231, 233

Ord, Maj.-Gen. E. O. C, division
of, 88 et seq., 42 et seq., 52 ;
severely woonded, 194 et seq. ;
supersedes McClemand, 199 et
seq., 204

Osterhaus, Brig.-Gen. P. J., divi-
sion of, 110, 116, 127 et seq.,
152, 154 et seq., 159 et seq.,
163 et seq., 169, 180 et seq.,

192 et seq.

Owen, Lieat.-Comdr. E. K, 84, 123
Oxford, Miss., 62 et seq., 68, 72

Pabuoah, Ky., 6, 11

Palmer, Capt. J. S., 215

Panola, Miss., 62

Parke, Maj.-Gren. J. G. , 188 et seq.,

193 et seq.

Parker*8 Cross Roads, Tenn., 69
Parsons, Capt. L. B., 73
Pattersonville, La., 219
PeaBidge, Ark., 17
Pemberton, Fort, 100 et seq., 117,
119, 122, 166

12*

Pemberton, Lt.-Gen. J. C, 53,

61 et seq., 65 et seq., 74, 81, 99
et seq., 117 et seq., 121 et seq.,
126 et seq. ; strength of, 135,
137, 142, 144 et seq., 148 et
seq., 154, 157 ; rout of, 159 et
seq. ; calls a council of war,
168, 171 et seq. , 178, 189 et seq. ,
199 et seq. ; sends reinforce-
ments to Gardner, 227, 234

Pensacola, Fla., 13, 19 et seq.

Perkins, plantation of, 115 et seq.,
125, 138, 187

Perry viUe, Ky., 54

Phifer, Brig.-Gen. C. W., brigade
of, 50

Pierre, Bayou, 125, 129 et seq.

Pillow, Fort, 7, 11 et seq., 20, 44,
237

Pillow, Brig.-Gen. Gideon J., 5 et
seq.

Pittsbnrg Landing, Tenn., 13

Pittsburg, the, 8, 113, 123

Plaquemine, Bayou, La., 213 et
seq., 231

Pocahontas, Ark., 4 et seq.

Pocahontas, Tenn., 39, 43 et seq.^
52

Polk, Maj.-Gen. L., 5 et seq., 10 et
seq., 13, 27

Pontotoc, Miss., 120

Pope, Maj.-Gen. John, 12 et seq.,
34,35

Porter, Admiral D. D., 65, 72, 80,
83 et seq. , 86, 88, 92 et seq., 98,
103 et seq. ; Grant's letter to,
107, 112 et seq., 119 ; at Grand
Gulf, 123 et seq., 178, 197, 199,
220

Porter, Comdr. D. D., 21, 26

Port Gibson, Miss., 122 et seq.,
137, 138 et seq., 144, 161, 170

274

INDEX.

Port Hndwm, Ia., 2, 27, 98, 87 et
■eq., 44, 62, 83, 112, 117, 119,
121 et seq., 1^, 189, 142, 168,
173, 177, 190etfleq., 207 (note),
206 et leq., 219 et seq.

PrentiM, Ma).-Gen. R M., 385et
■eq.

Price, ]C»j.-Gen. Sterling, divuion
of, 4, S6 et eeq ; loraee of, 42,
53, 62, 75, 234 et leq.

Price, the, 15 et seq., 113

Prime, Capt. F. R, 186

Queen of the West, the, 15 et
•eq., UOetBeq., 214, 220

Quinby, Brig.-Gren. I. F., dinnon
of, 91, 98, 101 et seq., 127, 182,
167, 169, 180, 183, 185

BiXEiOH, N. C, 2

Randolph, Fort, 7, 18

Ransom, Brig.-Gen. T. E. 6., bri-
gade of, 180, 183, 185

Battler, the, 84

Raymond, Miss., 141 efc Beq., 170,
195,208

Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. A.W., bri-
gade of, 132, 157, 161, 176

Richmond, La., 106, 109, 110, 114
et seq., 118, 199

Richmond, the, 215 et seq.

Richmond, Va., 2, 10, 31 et seq.,
62, 67, 72, 146, 173, 190 et seq.,
196,233

Rienzi, Miss., 34, 37 et seq.

Ripley, Miss., 43 et seq., 52, 57, 71,
120 et seq.

Rocky Springs, Miss., 133, 141, 224

Rodgers, Comdr. John, 8

Rodney, Miss., 125

Rogers, Col., death of, 50

Rosecrans, Maj.-Gren. W. S., 35 et

seq.; loesea of, 42 et seq., 45,
48 et eeq.; yiotory and loaaefl
of, 53 et seq.; supersedes Baell,
55, 67, 107, 118, 188

Rosa, Brig.-Gen. L. F., division of,
98, 101 et seq., 235

Ross^ Landing, La., 226 et seq.

Rogglea, Brig.-Cren. D., command
of, 21, 25, 27

Rust, Brig.-Gen. Albert, 43, 227

Sf OHEM, the, 215 et seq.

Salomon, Brig.-Gen. Fred., 235

Sara, Bayou, La., 139, 223, 225, 227

St. Charles, La., 17 et seq.

St. Louis, Mo., 2, 4 et seq., 11, 56,
72, 109, 188, 237

St. Louis, the, 8, 15, 17 et seq.

Savannah, Ga., 2

SohofieLd, Maj.-Gen. J. M., 187 et
fleq.

Scott, Lt.-Gen. Winfield, 27

Sheldon, Col. L. A., brigade of, 78,
128

Sherman, Maj.-Gen. W. T., 12,
84, 43, 65 et seq. ; leaves Mem-
phis* 61 et seq. ; discusses
plana with Grant, 64 et seq.,
71 ; his movements down the
Mississippi, 72 et seq. ; his
letter to Halleck, 83 et seq. ;
given command of 15th Army
Corps, 91 et seq. ; at Steele^s
Bayou, 104 et seq., 108, 110,
115, 126, 134 ; before Vicks-
burg, 136 et seq. ; at Jackson,
148 et seq., 168 et seq. ; at siege
of Vicksbnrg, 177 et seq. ;
pursues Johnston to Brandon
Station, 193 et seq., 200, 210,
228 et seq.

Shiloh, Tenn., 13 et seq., 20, 107

INDBX.

275

Shirk, Lieut -Oomdr. J. W., 84, 128

Shoape, Brig.-€ren. F. A., brigade
of, 177

Shreveport, La., 220, 324 et seq.,
234

Silver Wave, the, 118

Simaport, La., 225

Smith, Biig.-Gren.W. S., reinforces
Giant, 187, 189

Smith, Capt Mehmcton, 215

Smith, Brig.-€ren. A. J., 73, 77 et
aeq., 83, 87, 137, 129, 132, 152,
155 et aeq.; losses of, 160,164,
169, 180 et seq. , 304 et seq.

Smith, Lt-Gen. E. K, 30, 36,
199, 331, 334

Smith, Maj.-Gen. Martin L., 30,
33, 80, 63, 79, 150, 163, 165 et
seq., 168 et seq., 176 et seq.,
184, 303 et seq.

Smith, Brig.-Gren. Morgan L., 66,
73, 77etseq., 83

Smith, Brig.-Cren. Giles A., bri-
gade of, 179, 188

Smith, Brig. -Gen. J. E., division
of, 99, 130, 143 et seq., 157 et
seq., 180

Smith, Lieut. -Comdr. W., 84

Smith, plantation of, 115 et seq.

Smith, Brig. -Gen. T. Kilby, bri-
gade of, 179

Snyder's Bluff, Miss., 150

Springfield, IlL, 66. 185

Stanley, Brig.-€kn. D. S., division
of, 40 et seq., 46 et seq., 50, 53

Stanton, See. Edwin M., 9, 59 et
seq., 90

StarksviUe, Miss., 120

Steele*B Bayou, Miss., 75-103 et
seq., 106, 113

Steele, Maj.-Gen. P., 66, 73, 77 et
seq., 83, 85, 87, 110, 115, 118,

138, 169, 178, 183, 185, 194 et
seq.

Stevenson, Brig. -Gen. J. D., bri-
gade of, 130, 143, 157, 180

Stevenson, Maj.-Gen. C. L., di-
vision of, 66, 75, 100, 117, 119,
132 et seq., 136, 133 et seq.,
145, 149 et seq., 155 et seq.,
165; at Vicksburg, 176, 204,
306 (note)

Stone, Col W. M., brigade of, 128
et seq.

S tout's Bayou, Miss., 175 et seq.

Stuart, Brig. -Gen. D., division of,
83, 85, 104

Sullivan, Brig. -Gen. J. C, 50, 68
et seq.

Sumter, the, 15 et seq.

Sumter, Port, 2

Switzerland, the, 15 et seq., 112,
138, 223

Taylor, Brig. -Gen. T. H., brigade

of, 133
Taylor, Maj.-Gen. R, 199, 313,

230 et seq.
Teche, Bayou, La., 213 et seq.,

219, 230 et seq., 233
Thayer, Brig. -Gen. J. M, brigade

of, 78 et seq.
Thibodeau, La., 319, 331
Thompson, M. Jeff., 4 et seq., 13
Thompson's Bluff, Miss., 138
Thompson, the, 15 et seq.
Tilghman, Brig.-Gen. L., 58, 119,

132, 126, 132 etseq , 158 et seq.
Totten, Brig.-Gen. J. G., 8
Tracy, Brig.-Gen. R D., brigade

of, 126 etseq., 130
Trenton, Tenn., 69
Tullahoma, Tenn., 144
Tupelo, Miss., 30, 36, 64, 70, 121

276

INDEX.

ToaenmbU, Ala., 96, 88
ToMmmbia, the, 113, 123 ei leq.
Tnttie, Brig.>CreiL J. M., diyiaon
ot 138, 169, 178, 1S8, 185, 193
Tyler, the, 9

UsiON CiTT, TenB., 88
Utioa, Misa., 141

VanDob2Y, Ma>-Geii. Earl, 11, 13,
20; Bupenedea Lovell, 21, 2i,
27, 36 et aeq., 43 et aeq.; de-
feat of, 53 et aeq., 63 et seq.,
70, 74, 100

Van Dom, the, 15 et seq.

Vaughn, Biig.-Cien. J. C, brigade
of, 60, 75, 119, 162, 164, 177,
184

Vernon, Misa., 198

Vioksbnrg, Miaa, 2, 7, 14, 18 et
aeq., 30 et aeq., 37, 44, 54 et
aeq., 100, 108, 106, 108 et aeq.,
110, 111, 112, 113, 117 et Bcq.,
125, 136, 133 et aeq., 161 et
aeq. ; anrrender of, 193 et aeq.

Vioksborg, the. 111

Vidal, Bayou, La., 115, 116

Villepigae, Brig. -Gen. J. B., 43 et
aeq.

Wade, CoL Wm., 134
Wainwright, Gomdr. J. H., 211
Walke, Gapt. H., 123
Walker, Maj.-Oen. J. G., diviaion

of, 199
Walker, Brig. -Gen. L. H., 230et

aeq., 334 et aeq.

Walker, Brig. -Gen. W. H. T., bri-
gade of, 135, 145 et aeq.

Walker, Maj.-Gen. W, H. T., di-
▼iaion of, 190, 193 et aeq.

Walker, Lieat.-Comdr. J. G., 84

Wallace, Brig. -Gen. L., division
of, 34 et aeq.

Walnat Hilla, Miaa., 73 et seq.

Warxenton, Miaa., 93 et aeq., 99 et
aeq., 106, 107, 112, 113, 144 et
aeq., 150, 165, 170, 175 et aeq.,
182, 187, 189, 198

Waahbome, Maj.-Gen. G. G., 63,
189, 193 et aeq.

Waahington, D. G., 35, 59 et aeq.,
63, 70, 72, 83, 91, 93, 173, 300

Waal, GoL T. N., legion of, 176 et
aeq.

Webb, the. 111

Weitzel, Brig. -Gen. G. , 218 et seq. ,
219, 235, 228 et aeq., 233

Westfield, the, 2ll

Wildemeaa, battle of the, 137

WiUiama, Brig. -Gen. Thoa., 19, 31
et aeq. ; death of, 26 et aeq.

Willow Springa, Miaa., 133 et aeq.,
140

Wilson, Gol J. H., 97 et aeq.

Wilaon, Lieut. -Gomdr. Bjrron, 128

Woodworth, Lient. a £., 84

Wyatt, Miaa., 63

Yazoo Gitt, Miaa., 99, 103, 187

et aeq., 193 et aeq.
Yazoo Paaa, Miaa., 97 et aeq., 118
Yonng^a Point, La., 18, 93 et aeq.,

97, 99, 103, 109, 115

MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

are publishing, under the general title of THE

Campaigns of the Civil War,

a series of volumes, contributed at their solicitation by a
number of leading actors in and students of the great conflict
of 1861-65, with a view to bringing together, for the first
time, a full and authoritative military history of the suppres-
sion of the Rebellion.

The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every
doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility
only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years
after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a whole generation
has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is
at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and
to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field— for a
strong, vivid, concise but truly proportioned story of the great salient
events.

The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi-
als of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading,
an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader
does not possess. There have been no attempts at general histories
which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public
Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially
welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very
great class of readers; — and there has seemed to be great danger that
the time woiUd be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give
to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal
recollection. These Tttcts led to the conception of the present work.

From every depwrtment of the Govemmeiit, from the officers ot the
army, and from a great number. of custodians of records and special
information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received
every aid that could be asked in this undertaking ; and in announcing
the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the
thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to express
elsewhere.

The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250
pages each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under
the direction of the authors. They will appear, as far as
possible, in the chronological order of the Campaigns of
which they treat; and by their preliminary and concluding
chapters will be so far connected that the completed work
will practically cover the entire field of the war.

The price of each volume will be $1.00.

TheJolhwiHg volumes are now ready :

I.— THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. By John G.
Nicola Y, Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln ; late
Consul- General to France, etc.

A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering tiie
period from the election ot Lincoln to Uie end of the first battle of Bull Run.

II.— FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH. By the Hon.
M. F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati ; late
Brigadier-General and Bvt. Maj. GenU, U.S. V., commanding
First Division, 17th Corps: in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the
20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh ; Treasurer of
the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.

The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of x86i to May, i86s :
GOwring th«9aptare of Fts. Henry and Donelton, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc.

III.--THB PENINSULA. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D.,
President of the College of the City of New York ; Assistant
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1861-62; Inspector
General Fifth Army Corps; General commanding 2d Div.,
2d Corps ; Major General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army
of the Potomac.

The history of McCiellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the
end of the Seven Days* Fight.

IV THE ARMY UNDER POPE. By John C. Ropes,

Esq. , of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, the
Massachusetts Historical Society, etc.

From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to the appoint-
ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1869.

v.— THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG. By

Francis Winthrop Palfrey, Bvt. Brigadier GenM, U.S.V.,
and formerly Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry ; Lieut. Col. of the
20th Massachusetts at the battle of the Antietam ; Member of
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of the Massachu-
setts Historical Society, etc.

From the appointment of McQellan to the general command, Sept. x86a, to the
end of the battle of Fredericksburg.

VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By
Abner Doubi^day, Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A., and Maj.
Gen'l, U. S. V. ; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg,
etc.

From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee aftei the latter battle.

VII.— THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. By Henry
M. Cist, Brevet Brig. Gen'l U.S.V.; A.A.G. on the staff of
Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterwards on that of Major Gen'l
Thomas; Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army
of the Cumberland.

From the formation of the Army of die Cumberland to the end of the batdes at
Chattanooga, November, 1863.

IX.— THB CAMPAIGN OP ATLANTA. By the Hon.
Jacob D. Cox, Ex- Governor of Ohio ; late Secretary of the
Interior of the United States; Major General U.S.V., com-
manding Twenty- third Corps during the campaigns of Atlanta
and the Carolinas, etc, etc

From Sbennan's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to die beginnmg of
the Mardi to the Sea.

X.— THE MARCH TO THE SEA— FRANKLIN AND
NASHVILLE. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox.

From the b^inning of the March to the Sea to the Surrender of Johnston —
induding also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee.

The following volumes, now preparing for early publica-
tion, will complete the series :

VIII.— THE MISSISSIPPI. By Francis Vinton Greene,

Lieut, of Enguieersy U. S. Army ; late Military Attache to the

U. S. Legation in St. Petersburg; Author of *'the Russian

Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78,'* and of ^'Army

Life in Russia."

An account of the operations— especially at Vicksharg and Port Hudson — by
which the Mississippi River and its shores were restored lo the control of the Union.

XI THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY in 1864. The Cam-
paign of Sheridan. By George E. Pond, Esq., Associate
Editor of the Army and Navy JournaL

XII..THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA.

By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General and Bvt.
Major General, U.S.A. ; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of
Staff, Army of the Potomac, 1863-64 ; commanding Second
Corps, 1 864-' 65, etc., etc.
Covering the Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and '65, to Lee^s surrender.

*«* 1%* above ho^ks for sale by ailkeckteliert, or wUl he *ent^poti-^id^ nfon
receipt 0/ price by

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS,

743 AND 745 Broadway, New York^